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I. INTRODUCTION: MARKETS AND fiRMS 
Do antitrust and corporate law have much to say to each other? 
Judges, lawyers, law professors, and law students all seem to think that 
they do not.1 Antitrust is about markets; corporate law is about firms. 
Antitrust is about competition; corpo:rate law is about cooperation. An­
titrust regulates relations among firms; corporate law governs relations 
within fmns. In this Article, I argue that this common view is funda­
mentally flawed. When shareholders are also competitors, the normal 
corporate law instinct that collective action should be facilitated fails. 
At the borderline between firms and markets, antitrust, with its more 
subtle appreciation for the complexity of the relationships between 
competition and cooperation, comes to the fore. 
The division between corporate law and antitrust corresponds to 
the more general and equally traditional distinction between firms and 
markets. Economists have historically distinguished betv1een firms, in 
which relations are governed by commands, and markets, in which rela­
tions are regulated by prices.2 But the comfortable distinction between 
antitrust and corporate law begins to dissolve as the underlying distinc­
tion between markets and firms becomes less clear. In both economics 
and law, the firm/market distinction has lost much of its signlficance. 
In the economics of industrial organizations, some of the most e:x.citing 
modern work has questioned both the definition and importance of the 
firm/market boundary, demonstrating that it is neither clear whCl_t the 
firm "is" nor how relations within firms differ from relations in mar­
kets.3 RCJ_ther, as many have argued, the important and int�resting 
questions relate to which kinds of contracts are used for which activities 
and to the economic implications of differ.:'nt contrat'tl1<tl 
3rrangements.4 
!. This intuitive sense of the non-overlapping domains of the two subjects 
manifests itself in a number of ways. Relatively few people teach both subjt·cts. C>ntrts 
have been hostile to attempts to invoke antitrust doctrine in corporate contexts to 
prevent, for example, bidding agreements among competing bidders in a.uctions for 
corporate control. See, e.g., Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. !990), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1624 (1991); Kalmanovitz v. G .  Heileman Bre win g Co .. '769 F.2d 
152, 158 (3d Cir. 1985)_ 
2. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Symposium on Organizations and Economics, J Econ_ 
Persp., Spring 1991, at 15, 17_ 
3. The literature on the theory of the firm is rich and extensive. Sec, e.g., Oliver E. 
Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (197 5); 
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, ;md Economic 
Organization, 62 Am. Econ_ Rev. 777 ( 1972); Steven N.S. Cheung. The Contractual 
Nature of the Firm, 26J.L. & Econ. I (1983); Ronald H_ Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 
4 Economica 386 (1937); Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theorv of the 
Firm, 89 Colum. L. Rev_ 1757 (1989); Michael C. Jensen & William l-I. l\icckiing. Theon 
of the Finn: Managerial Behavior, Agcncv Costs and Owncr�hip Stn�<t•tiC, �� J Fin_ 
F.con. 305 (19'76); Benjamin Klein ct al., Vertical Integr-ation. :\ppropri;�bk ll.cnts. ;mel 
the CompetitiYe Contracting Process. 21 JL & Econ. 297 ( 1971)) _ 
4. Sec Cheung. �upr<� note 3. at 18: Klein et al., "upra note 3. at :)2(i: \'or:.1111 B;lnr·l. 
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Similarly in corporate law, it is now commonplace to think of the 
firm as a network of contracts and of corporate law as providing a stan­
dard form contract.5 As in economics, this new view erodes the firm/ 
market boundary. If firms are a network of contracts, what significance 
should be given to the fact that some of the agreements are between 
shareholders while others are between firms? 
Indeed, as soon as one begins to think about antitrust and corpo­
rate law together, two contrasting features emerge. First, from a collec­
tive action perspective, it is not at all clear that there should be any 
difference: some of the most interesting questions in both fields re­
volve around similar versions of the familiar Prisoners' Dilemma. Sec­
ond, the governing intuitions concerning the law's proper attitude 
towards collective action problems are radically different, indeed, pre­
cisely opposite in the two fields. 
In antitrust, the paradigm for Sherman Act Section 1 6  jurispru­
dence might be termed the "Cartelists' Dilemma." It is better for all 
widget manufacturers collectively if each raises prices and reduces out­
put, but it is better for each manufacturer individually to cut prices and 
increase output while the others charge a higher price. The effect of 
the Cartelists' Dilemma is that, absent effective coordination, each pro­
ducer is likely to cut its prices and expand its output until, in theory at 
least, the competitive level is reached. 7 
The paradigm for much of corporate law is the "Shareholders' Di·· 
lemma. "8 It is better for dispersed shareholders collectively if each 
contributes to monitoring and disciplining managers, but because all 
will benefit as long as someone does, it is better for each not to contrib­
ute. When shareholdings are dispersed, this collective action problem 
leads to rational apathy by shareholders. 
Economic Analysis of Property Rights 52-55 ( 1 989) ( the firm versus the market is a false 
dichotomy) . 
5. See generally Symposium: Con tractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 Colum. 
L.  Rev. 1 395- 1 774 ( 1 989) (discussing proper role of mandatory requiremen ts in 
corporate law). 
6.  Sherman Act § I, 1 5  U.S .C. § 1 ( 1 988 ) .  S ection I prohibits "[e)very contract ,  
combination in the form of trus t or o therwise, or conspiracy , in restrai n t  of trade or 
commerce among the several S tates, o r  with foreign nations . . . .  " 
7 .  For discussions of competition as a Prisoner's Dilemma game, see Edna 
Ullmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms 44-45, 1 27-29 ( 1 977) ; John S. Wiley, Jr. ,  
Reciprocal Al truism as a Felony: Anti trust and the Prisoner's Dilemma, 8 6  Mich. L Rev. 
1 906, 1 9 1 4-28 ( 1 988) ;  Peter Huber, Competition, Conglomerates , and the Evolution of 
Cooperation,  93 Yale L .J. 1 1 4 7 ( 1 984) (book review of Robert Axelrod, The Evolution 
of Cooperation ( 1984) ) .  
8 .  For discussions of the Shareholders' Dilemma, see Robert C .  Clark, Corporate 
Law § 9 . 5-9 . 5 . 4 , at 389--400 ( 1 986) ; Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) 
Significance of Insti tut ional Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo . L.  J -i45, 453 -63 ( 1 99 1 ) . 
The Shareholders' Di lemma primarilv characterizes large, publicly held corporations in 
which 01vnership is separated from controL Close corporations,  in which shareholders 
are also managers, pose distinct problems. 
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The Cartel is ts '  Dilemma and the Shareholders ' D ilemma are s truc­
turally s imilar. In both cases ,  it would be better for all would-be carte­
lists or shareholders if  all cooperated, but in the absence of effective 
coordination, it is better for each to defect. If all parties follow this 
strategy, the players are collectively worse off than if all cooperated .9 
Despite the deep s tructural  s imilarities, the prevailing legal re­
sponses to these prisoner-type dilemmas have been exactly opposite. 1 0  
I n  antitrust ,  the law takes the s ide o f  the jailer, frus trating communica­
tion and coordination among the prisoners . In large measure, the cen­
tral purpose of Section 1 of the Sherman Act is to prevent escape from 
the Cartelists' Dilemma, for it i s  the dilemma that produces and pre­
serves competition.  Thus , courts enforce a per se prohibition on price 
fixing among competitors, 1 1  interpret "agreement" broadly, 12 and 
scrutinize and-restrict exchanges of information, 1 3  basing point pricing 
systems,  1 4  preannouncement of price increases, i 5 and detailed price 
books, 1 6 all in order to frus trate coordination and enforcement of col­
lective decisions . 1 7  
9.  Collective action problems figure prominently in  other areas of the law as well. 
See,  e .g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 7- 1 9  (1986) 
(bankruptcy) ; Bruce A. Ackerman,  Beyond Carolene Products ,  98 Harv .  L. Rev. 7!3 ,  
724-3 1 ( 1 985) (const i tutional law); Harold Demsetz ,  Toward a Theory of Property 
Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347,  354-59 ( Papers & Proc. 1 967)  (property). 
I 0 .  For a description of the "Prisoners' D ilemma, "  see infra text accompanying 
note 78.  
1 1 .  See,  e .g. , United States v.  Socony-Vacuum Oil  Co. ,  3 1 0 U.S. 150,  222-24 
(1940) ; United S tates v. Trenton Potteries, 273  U .S.  392 ,  396- 402 (i927). 
1 2 .  See,  e . g . ,  American Tobacco v. United S tates, 328 U .S .  78 1 ,  809- 1 0  ( 1946): 
Interstate Circuit  v. Uni ted States ,  306 U . S .  208, 225-27 ( 1 93 9 ) .  
1 3 . See, e .g . ,  Uni ted States v .  United Sta tes Gypsum, 438  U . S .  422. 429-30.  
440-42,  456-59 ( 1 97 8 ) ;  United States  v .  Comainer Corp . .  393 U.S .  333 , 335 ( 1 959); 
Sugar Inst .  Inc .  v. Uni ted States,  297 U . S .  553 ,  599 ( 1 936) ;  Maple  Flooring Mfrs . ;\ss'n 
v. United States,  268 U . S .  563 ,  582 (1925): American Column & Lumber Co. v. Uni ted 
S tates, 257 U.S. 377,382 ( 1 92 1 ) ;  Eas tern States Retail Lumber Deal ers· Ass'n v_ United 
S tates, 234 U . S .  600, 603 ( 1 9 1 4) . 
14. See FTC v. Cement Ins t . ,  3 3 3  U . S .  683,  700-03 ( 1 94 8 ) ;  In re Plywood r\nti t rusl 
Lit ig. ,  655 F .2d 627 ,  63 1 -32 (5th Cir.  1 98 1 ) ,  cert. granted sub nom . 'vVeverhaeuser Co. 
v .  Lyman Lamb Co. ,  456 U.S.  97 1 (1982 ) ,  d ismissed (after sett lement).  462 U.S.  112 5  
( 1 983) .  
1 5. See United S tates v .  General Elec .  Co. , 197 7-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1!� 6!.659, 
6 1 , 660 (E .D. Pa. 1 97 7 ) .  
1 6. S e e  id .  
17 .  Ant i trust 's  long standing and deep suspicion of agreements  among competiiors 
has been reflected in ringing j udicial  p rose: 
Any combinat ion which tampers with price structures is engaged in an u nlawful 
act iv i ty .  Even though the members of the price-fixing group were in no 
pos i t ion to control the market ,  to the extent that they raised,  lol'.;crcd , or 
stabil ized prices they would  be d ircctlv in terfering with the free pLw of market 
forces . The Act places a l l  such schemes bc\·ond the pale and protects that vit�d 
part of our econornv agains t  anv degree of interference. 
Uni ted S tates \' _ Socom-\' acuum Oil Co., 3 I 0 L .S. 150,  221 ( 1  �l--!0): �tccord L ll!lcd 
States v. Topco .-\ssoc., 405 L.S. 5�)6. G I 0 ( 1972) (".-\ntitrus t la,,·s in general. and the 
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By contrast, much of corporate law can be read as providing mech­
anisms to facilitate escape from the equivalent Shareholders' Di­
lemma.w Boards of directors, proxy regulations, attorneys' fee 
provisions, and derivative suits can all be viewed as attempts to spread 
the costs of monitoring and disciplining managers among shareholders 
pro rata, thereby overcoming their collective action dilemma. In corpo­
rate law, the law takes the side of the prisoners, moving quickly from 
the identification of a collective action dilemma to strategies facilitating 
escape.19 
At the uncertain borderline between firms and markets, where 
shareholders are also competitors, these divergent approaches collide. 
Some of the most difficult current corporate law issues emerge at this 
problematic boundary. Should bidders in a tender offer auction be per­
mitted to adopt arrangements that eliminate competition among them­
selves in order to reduce the price paid to target shareholders?20 
Should target shareholders be permitted to eiiminate competition to 
tender their shares in order to increase their tender offer prem�um? 
Should non-equity stakeholders be permitted to form coalitions against 
shareholders?21 Should states be permitted to opt out of the competi­
tive national and international market for corporate control? Each of 
these issues revolves around the tension between cooperation and com­
petition, between intra-firm and market relations. 
Corporate law, with its emphasis on fiduciary duty and its assump­
tion that cooperation is good, provides an inadequate conceptual 
framework for analysis because, as antitrust teaches, sometimes cooper­
ation is bad. Naked price fixing among competitors has few defenders. 
But a corporate law jurisprudence that focuses on fiduciary duty cannot 
ask the question whether actions that are in the interests of sharehold­
ers should be prohibited. It is not surprising, then, that as one ap-
Sherman Act i n  particular. are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as 
important to the preservation o f  econom ic freedom and our free enterprise sys tem as  
the Bi l l  of  Rights i s  to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms .") . 
18. See Clark, supra note 8, § 9.5.4, at 394-400. 
19. For examples of the corporate law move fro m  identifving a collective action 
problem to facil itating e3cape. see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undis toned Choice and 
Equal Treatment in  Corporate Takeovers , 98 Harv. L Rev. 1693. 1696, 1752-54 ( 1985): 
John C .  Coffee, Jr . ,  Unstable Coali t ions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Plaver Game, 
78 Geo. LJ. 1495, 1542-44 (1990); Dale A. Oesterle ,  The Negotiation i\!odel of  Tender 
Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court, 7'2 Cornell L Rev. 1\7, 124-31 
( 1986); Dale A. Oe>terle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents  for Target 
Shareholders in Tender Oilers: A Reply to the Passi1i ty Thes is ,  71 Cornell L Re1 _ 53, 
78-82 (1985) lhereinafter Oes terle. Target Managers ] .  
20. I discuss this ques t ion 111 detail in Edward B .  Rock. Antitrust and the 1'-larkct for 
Corporate Control, 77 CaLL Re\. 1365 (!989). 
21. A "stakeholder" here refers to al l  participants in the corporate enterprise. 
including shareholders,  emplO\ees. bondholders. cu�tomcrs. suppliers and surrounding 
commumues.  See,  e .g . .  15 Pa. Cons. Stat. . .1,nn .  § 5i5(a)( l)  ( l �)91) (directors nu1 
consider nonshareholclcr imerests)_ 
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proaches the firm/market boundary where shareholders are not j us t  co­
owners , but also competitors ,  corporate law' s  traditional framework 
should prove inadequate. 
By contrast ,  antitrus t has long been forced to search for an appro­
priate balance between competition and cooperation, an i s sue that 
arises most sharply at the borderline between firms and markets .  I ar­
gue in this Article that the antitrust  perspective provides an essential 
analysis of corporate law issues lying at the firm/market boundary , that 
the antitrus t  perspective is better able to grapple with the ambiguity of 
this  distinction, and that  antitrust provides a useful conceptual frame­
work for thinking about the interplay of cooperation and competition in 
the corporate law context .  In Part II ,  I describe the antitrus t j urispru­
dence of the borderline between firms and markets .  In Part III, I apply 
this antitrus t analysis to four important contexts: first , the paradigm 
corporate law case of collective action to control agency costs ;  second , 
collective action by shareholders to eliminate competition to tender 
their shares in a tender offer; third, stakeholder coalit ions; and, finally, 
s tate attempts to opt out of the competitive market for control. 
The antitrust analys is  casts penetrating light on this set of issues .  
From the antitrust perspective, the paradigmatic corporate law strategy 
of facilitating collective control of agency costs is justified because in 
controlling agency costs ,  shareholders do not compete with each other. 
Moreover, collective action is necessary to enforce the contracts be­
tween managers and shareholders . 
By contrast ,  collective attempts to coordinate shareholders ' re­
sponse to a tender offer in order to increase tender offer premiums are 
fundamentally different:  unlike the paradigm case, shareholders , ab­
sent coliective action or regulatory protection, compete with respect to 
selling their shares.22 The intuition behind this section is that it is  use­
ful to think about agreements among competing shareholders to elimi­
nate competition to tender as analogous to agreements among 
competing widget manufacturers to eliminate competition in selling 
widgets .  In these terms,  agreements among shareholders are agree-
22. Regula tory provis ions displace some of  the competit ion among target 
shareholders to tender. For example,  the pro rata and best price p rovis ions of the 
Wiiliams Act , 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d) (6)  and 78n(d) (7) , require that tendered shares be 
accepted pro rata and that  earlier tendering shareholders receive the same p rice as later 
tendering shareholders . These p rovisions l imit the means by which a bidder can play 
target shareholders off against  each other.  
But such p rovisions do not  entirely el iminate (and, as I argue below, should not  be 
read as intending to eliminate) , competit ion to tender, nor do thev p lace target 
shareholders in the bargaining posit ion of a sole owner. Direct competi t ion to tender 
can be reintroduced lw means of a partial or two t ier tender offer. l\ioremer, difficulties 
f�1ced bv shareholders in coordinating a col lecti1-e response to a one or t11 o - tier tender 
offer mav, as a pract ic a l matter, approxima te the effects of direct competition. For ;1 
discussion of ,,.}1\ these regulatorv prov isions should not be interpreted as ous t ing the 
antitrust ]a,,·s from the tender offer context. see text accompatwing infra notes 171-17!). 
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ments among sellers that will have the typical and predictable negative 
impact on the buyers, the bidders. 
For those skeptical of this intuition, the question is how the collec­
tive elimination of competition to tender by shareholders differs from 
the collective elimination of competition in widgets by widget manufac­
turers? The normal corporate law justification-that joint bargaining is 
in the interests of target shareholders-is as unpersuasive as the analo­
gous argument that price fixing is in the interests of competing manu­
facturers.23 Two principal secondary justifications likewise fail: joint 
bargaining among shareholders cannot be justified either on the 
grounds that shareholders are co-owners of a commonly held asset or 
on the grounds that shareholders, unlike widget manufacturers, are 
subject to being frozen out by a majority shareholder. While there are 
substantial allocational arguments for joint bargaining, the antitrust 
perspective makes clear that, even if such allocational claims are 
demonstrated, proponents of such agreements must also show that 
joint bargaining agreements are reasonably necessary to achieve alloca­
tional efficiency, and in addition, that the procompetitive benefits out­
weigh anticompetitive effects-burdens that have not yet been met. I 
then argue that plausible populist and doctrinal justifications are also 
insufficient. 
An extension of this analysis undermines the suggestion that the 
law should facilitate the formation of stakeholder coalitions. In particu­
lar, absent additional normative arguments regarding stakeholders' en­
titlements, one cannot conclude that stakeholder collective action 
problems are market failures rather than market successes. 
Finally, the antitrust lens proves to be particularly useful in analyz­
ing the validity of state antitakeover legislation. In contrast with the 
standard judicial and scholarly analyses, the antitrust perspective sug­
gests that the central issue posed by state antitakeover statutes is one of 
antitrust federalism: to what extent, and with what conditions, can 
23 .  Thus, when shareholders compete, the "hypothetical shareholders' contract" 
standard, often invoked in law and economics analyses of corporate law, must be 
expanded to include all affected parties in the hypothetical negotiation. The antitrust 
approach thus identifies a concern not addressed in the current literature. Haddock, 
Macey and McChesney, for example, argue that because the resistance rule that will 
maximize target shareholder interests will probably vary from company to company, 
target shareholders should be able to precornmit to passivity (for example, by a charter 
provision mandating target management passivity) ,  but should not be required to do so .  
See David D. Haddock et al. ,  Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 
73 Va. L. Rev. 70 1 ,  726-37 ( 1 987) .  But one cannot answer the question whether target 
shareholders should be required to adopt such a rule solely by reference to the interests 
of target shareholders. That would be equivalent to arguing that widget manufacturers 
should be able (although not required) to precommit to competition because 
competition might be in their interests. It is a separate and additional question whether 
such a rule is likewise presumptively optimal for the widget buyers who mav, as a resul t 
of the rule, pay higher prices, or whether such a rule is efficiency-enhancing once all 
interests are taken into account. 
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states opt out of competitive markets? The central question, to date 
entirely ignored, is whether state attempts to escape from a competitive 
market for control are prohibited or limited by the Sherman Act and 
the national commitment to competition embodied in it. I argue below 
that this approach provides a more satisfactory analysis than either of 
the prevailing analytic frameworks, dormant Commerce Clause analysis 
or preemption by the Williams Act. In terms of antitrust federalism, 
state antitakeover statutes are problematic not for the conventional rea­
son that they interfere with a competitive market for control (although 
they may also be problematic for that reason), but primarily because 
they do so by allowing private, interested parties, acting without active 
state supervision, to determine whether or not there should be compe­
tition for control. 
Conceptually, this Article reflects something of a mirror image of 
the Chicago School's approach to antitrust. A fundamental insight of 
the Chicago School is that many (initially unfamiliar) inter-firm ar­
rangements can be viewed as the equivalent of efficiency-enhancing in­
tra-firm arrangements.24 Thus, for example, vertical restraints have 
been defended as a means of controlling free riding, a problem solved 
in other contexts by bringing an activity within the firm through vertical 
integration.25 This Article makes the opposite move, exploring the ex­
tent to which nominally intra-firm arrangements can be seen as analo­
gous to competition-destroying inte1-firm arrangements.26 
My argument here is an argument for a fundamentally different 
way of thinking about corporate law. For those who are convinced, it 
mav follow that Section l of the Sherman Act should be intemreted to ' 1 
regulate shareholder bargaining agreements and their functional 
equivalent, poison pills. But that is an additional step, well beyond the 
scope of this Article. For present purposes, I seek to show that the 
antitrust perspective provides an important vantage point on corporate 
law problems arising at the firm/market boundary. The precise legal 
:rules implied by that perspective can come later. 
24. See. e.g . .  Robert H. Bark, The Antitrust Paradox (1978); Richard A. Posner, 
Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (1976); Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price 
Fixing. 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 886, 908-10 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook. The Limits of 
Antitrust, 63 Texas L Rev. l, l-2 (1984); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the 
Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and 
Potential Competition Decisions, 75 Col urn. L. Rev. 282 ( 1975); Richard A. Posner, The 
Rule of R eason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision. 45 
U. Chi. L. Rev. l, 10-13 (1977); see also Vv'illiamson, supra note 3, at 224-47 (making 
the same point from rhe perspective of transaction cost economics). 
25. See. e.g., Bork. supra note 24. at 297-98; see also other sources cited supra 
note 24. 
26. This approach complements Professor Hovenkamp's rnancloush rich and 
revealing historical investigations into the intersection. overlap, and reciprocal influence 
of antitrust and corvorate law. especiailv during antitrust's formative years. See Herbert 
Hovenbmp. Enterprise and American Law. 1836-!937 (199!). 
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I I .  SECTION 1 ,  THE PRO BLEM OF THE O N E  AND THE MANY , AND THE 
FIRM/MARKET B O RD ERLINE 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes " [e] very con tract,  combi­
nation . . .  or conspiracy, i n  restraint of  trade o r  commerce . . . .  "27 As  
such,  i t  applies only  to concerted acti o n . B ecause more than one p er­
s o n  is nearly always involved in any business  decision,  a recurrin g  ques­
t ion has been whether a particular arrangeme n t  or  act ion p resents  the 
requisite concert of  action to implicate the competitive concerns under­
lying Section 1 .  
In  two paradigmatic antitrus t  contexts , the ques tion whe ther the 
necessary concert of  action i s  present has s eemed obvious . In  the clas­
s ic  price fixing cartel , concert of action of  the requisite s ort is  clear: 
The cartel is  nothing more than an agreement among compe ti tors to  fix 
prices and restrict output .  Likewise ,  in the case of ordinary s in gle  firm 
acti o n ,  such as when a firm decides to  increase price s ,  the result is 
equally clear. Although in almost every case there will b e  s o me " agree­
ment" between at  least  two people-say, b etween the Executive Vice 
President for 0Derations and the Executive Vice President for Market-� 
ing-in the ordinary case that agreemen t has n o t  been though t  to be 
t h e  sort that triggers Section 1 . 28 In such cases ,  " [ t ]he officers of a 
s ingle  firm are not  s eparate economic actors pursuing separate eco­
nomic intere s t s ,  s o  agreements among them do not suddenly b ring to­
gether economic p ower that was previously pursuing divergent 
goal s . "29 Such decisions , while perhaps " ' price fixing' in the li teral 
sense , "30 are treated as unilateral action and therefore n o t  subj ec t  to 
Section 1 .  
The ques tion of  concerted action b ecomes p roblematic in precisely 
those instances when one would expect i t  to  be :  when the challenged 
agreement occurs i n  a context that falls b e tween the paradigmatic in­
dependent firm and the paradigmatic market.  The courts have d ealt 
with this issue in a wide variety of  case s .  In each of these contexts , the 
acto rs are both participants in the " firm" as well as competi tors in the 
" market . "  As I will show below, these ambiguous cases provide the 
o u tlines of a more general antitru s t  analysi s .  
2 7. 1 5  U.S.C. § I ( 1 988) .  
28. See Copperweid Corp. v.  Independ ence Tube Corp. , 4 6 7  U . S. 752,  769 ( ! 984) .  
In Coppenoeld , the Court overru l ed the " i ntraenterprise conspiracy" doctrine,  which had 
held that an agreement among s eparately incorporated s ubsidiaries or b etween a parent 
and a separately incorporated sub�id iary s atisfied the concert of action requirement for 
Section I .  See also Knutson v. Daily Review Inc. , 548 F. 2 d  7 9 5 ,  80 1 -03 (9th Cir. 1 97 6 )  
(quoting Phillip Areeda,  Antitrust Analysis 3 1 9  ( 2 d  ed .  1 9 74 ) )  ( " S o  long as a business 
enterprise is regarded as an individual economic unit, it  must be permitted to act . " ) ,  
cert. d enied , 4 3 3  U.S. 9 1 0  ( 1 9 7 7 ) ;  Nelson Radio and Supplv Co. v .  Mo torola ,  Inc. , �00 
F.2d 9 1 1 ,  9 1 4  ( 5th C ir. 1 9 5 2 )  ( "A  corporation cannot conspire with itself . . . . " ) .  cc r t .  
d enied , 3 4 5  U . S .  925 ( 1 95 3 ) . 
2 9 .  Coppmurld, 4 6 7  C . S .  at 7()q 
C:\ 0 .  Broadcast M u sic. I n c. \ .  C B S ,  4-t l U . S .  1 ,  8 ( 1 9 7 9 ) . 
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In this section, I examine the antitrust analysis of organizations ly­
ing at this firm/market borderline . In these cases ,  the firs t question is 
whether the parties to the agreement are competitors or potential com­
petitors in the market that the agreement affects or to which i t  i s  di­
rected .  3 1 If so, then Section 1 applies even if  the agreement takes p lace 
within a corporation .  In such circumstances , the courts s imply ignore 
the corporate form. \1\/hen this threshold i s  met, the substantive ques-· 
tion i s  whether the anticompetitive effects of the agreement outweigh 
any procompetitive consequences . 3 2  When this is the case, the agree­
ment will be proscribed by Section 1 .  
A. The Concert of Action Requirement 
In a variety of cases ,  courts have found the Section l concert  of 
action requirement satisfied when participants in an enterprise are also 
competitors or potential competitors . Courts have faced the issue in 
the context of  various j oint ventures , 33 including trade associations , 
s tandard-setting organizations ,  professional societies ,  agreements 
among doctors and hospital s ,  sports leagues ,  and securities and com­
modities exchanges .  From the corporate law perspective, what i s  per­
haps most s triking about the antitrust  treatment of joint ventures has 
been the ease with which the courts have pierced the corporate veil to 
find a "contract, combination or conspiracy . "  
Consider, for example, the old and famous United States v. Terminal 
Railroad Ass 'n case .34 The notorious Jay Gould and a group of  railroads 
formed a corporation to acquire the terminal facilities and rail bridges 
31. One might extend this to include "separate economic actors ' '  as well to explain 
why vertical cases-where the restraint  i s  between a manufacturer and wholesaler or 
retailer-come within the scope of Section l .  See, e . g . ,  Copperweld , 4 67 U . S .  a t  768-70. 
But  such an extension may be unnecessary if one views vertical a rrangements as 
problematic largely to the extent that they i nvolve potential competitors .  This issue is 
not  addressed because the criti cal relations at issue in corporate law, at leas t  in this 
preliminary inquiry, are horizontal. 
32. This i s  a general statement of the Rule of Reason.  For a more detailed 
descript ion,  see infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text. Certain patterns of conduct 
have been determined to be almost  always anticompetitive and rarely jus tified by 
procompetitve benefits .  In these instances,  courts have held such practices to be per se 
illegal, that  i s ,  illegal without  any showing of actual ant icompeti tive effects .  The classic 
per se offenses are price fixing by competitors,  see Uni ted S ta tes v .  Socony-Vacuum Oil  
C o . ,  310 U.S.  150 (1940), and market divis ion by competitors, see Uni ted S ta tes v.  
Topco Assocs . ,  405 U.S. 596 ( 1 972). For the Court 's  most recent explanat ion of the 
rationales for the per se rule, see FTC v .  S uperior Court Trial Lawyers Ass 'n ,  110 S.Ct .  
768,  780-82 (1990). 
33. The phrase "j oint  venture" has no determinate meaning in antitrust 
j urisprudence. See Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Anti trust Law s :  Some 
Reflections on the Significance of Penn-Olin , 82 H arv. L Rev . 1 007, 1007 ( 1 969). 
Rather, it has been-and,  in this Article, will continue to be-loosely used to refer to 
ventures formed by competi tors or potential competitors,  including both temporary 
business associat ions and more permanent arrangement s .  
34. 224 U . S .  3 8 3  ( ! 9 1 2 ) 
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in St .  Louis ,  thereby controll ing east-west rai l  traffic. The corporation 
charged nonshareholder railroads a subs tantially higher price for the 
use of the terminal facilities than i t  charged shareholder rail roads .  The 
Court found that the discrimination toward customer railroads consti­
tuted a violation of the Sherman Act. 35  In so doing, the Court looked 
through the corporate form, finding the operation of the terminals to 
be an ongoing "contract, combination or conspiracy" in violation of 
Section 1 .  Critical for the Court was the fact that the corporation was 
not a truly independent entity, but was controlled by the shareholder­
railroads ,  each of whom appointed a director. 36 
The Court followed the same approach in Associated Press v. United 
States . 37 Associated Press (AP) was a cooperative association of news­
papers incorporated under New York law. At issue in the case was 
whether bylaws prohibiting AP members from selling news to non­
members and granting each member the power to block its non-mem­
ber competitors from membership constituted a "contract ,  combina­
tion or conspiracy" in restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 or a 
conspiracy to monopolize in violation of Section 2 .  With minimal dis­
cussion, the Court affirmed the district court 's holding that the bylaws 
themselves constituted agreements among competitors and thereby vi­
olated Section 1 .  38 
Similarly, where shareholders are also potentially competing licen­
sees or member s tores, concert of action has been found. For example, 
in United States v. Sealy, Inc. ,39 the government brought a Section 1 ac­
tion against Sealy, a corporation that owned, promoted and licensed 
the Sealy trademark. The licensees held substantially all of the corpo­
ration's s tock and, according to its bylaws, directors had to be s tock­
holder-licensees or their nominees . The Court treated Sealy as 
consisting of l itt le more than ongoing concerted action by its s tock­
holder-licensees .40 S imilarly, in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. ,4 1 
the Court treated a purchasing cooperative of independent grocery 
s tores that promoted a common Topco brand name in competition 
with the private label products of the large chains as nothing more than 
an ongoing combination and conspiracy subject to Section 1 .  The 
Court looked through Topco's independent incorporation on the 
grounds that Topco's s tock was owned by member stores and that  
Topco members controlled i t s  operation.42 In Northwest Wholesale Sta­
tioners v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. ,43 the Court again ignored the 
35.  See id. at  409- 1 1 .  
36.  See id.  a t  398-400. 
37. 326 U . S .  1 ( 1 945) . 
38 .  See id.  at 1 2- 1 3 .  
39 .  388 U . S .  350 ( 1 967) . 
40.  See id. at 352-54 . 
-l l .  405 U . S .  596 ( 1 972) . 
4 2 .  See id.  at 609. 
4 3 .  4 72 U.S. 284 ( 1 985 ) . 
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corporate form in finding concert of action in the operation of a 
purchasing cooperative composed of competing retail s tationers .44 
The same disregard for organizational form appears when mem­
bers of trade groups ,  profess ional societies ,  or s tandard-setting organi­
zations are competitors . Thus, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar ,45 the 
Court ignored the separate existence of the bar association in  finding 
the bar's minimum fee schedule to be concerted action by the member 
lawyers in violation of Section 1 .46 S imilarly, in National Society of Profes­
sional Engineers v. United States ,47 the Court assumed that an ethical ca­
non of the Society prohibiting competitive bidding by members 
satisfied the concert of action requirement.48 Likewise,  private s tan­
dard-setting associations ,  which typically include members having hori­
zontal business relations , have traditionally been treated as continuing 
conspiracies of their members when agreements have related to areas 
in which they compete.49 
The market for medical services has raised similar is sues . Again, 
the courts have looked through the organizational form when members 
or shareholders have been competitors . Thus , in Arizona v. iV!aricopa 
County JV!edical Society ,50 the Court held that the maximum price set by 
the medical foundations was no thing more than a maximum price fix­
ing agreement among the competing member doctors and therefore 
per se illegal . S  1 In FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists , 52 the Court held 
that the Federation' s  policy of not cooperating with third-party insurers 
in the review of dental care cons t i tuted a collective refusal  to deal by 
the member dentisrs  and, as  such , was an unreasonable restraint of 
trade in violation of Section 1 . 53 
In the courts of appeals ,  a recurring issue has been whether the 
refusal of a hospital ' s  medical s taff to grant admitting privileges trig ­
gers Section 1 scrutiny . Again, the courts have taken the view that 
when the decision makers are competitors or potential competitors of 
the doctor applying for privileges , and who thus have an interest in 
44 .  See id .  a t  293 -96. 
45.  42 1 U . S .  773 ( 1 97 5 ) .  
46 .  S e e  i d .  a t  7 8 1 -82 .  
4 7 .  4 3 5  U . S .  679 ( ! 97 8 ) .  
4 8 .  S e e  i d .  a t  692-93.  
49 .  See,  e . g . ,  Aliied Tube & Conduit Corp. v .  Indian Head,  Inc . ,  486 U.S .  492 ,  
509- 1 0  ( 1 988) ( s tee l  industry ) ;  Radiant B urners , Inc .  v .  Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. ,  
3 64 U . S .  656,  659-60 ( 1 96 1 )  (association of  p ipe l ine  companies, gas  d istributors, and 
manufacturers of gas burners) ; Fashion Originato:rs' Gui ld  v .  FTC, 3 1 2  U . S .  4 5 7 ,  
463 -68 ( 1 94 1 )  ( text i les ) ;  National Macaroni M frs . A s s ' n  v.  FTC, 3 4 5  F . 2 d  4 2 1 , 4 26-2 7 
(7th Cir. 1 965) ( agreement among m embers of association on composit ion of macaroni 
with view toward depressing price of critical input held violation of  Sen ion 1 ) .  See 
generally 7 Phi l l ip  E .  Areeda , Antitrust Law H 1 4 75-78, a t  334-60 ( 1 986) .  
50.  4 5 7  U . S .  332 ( ! 982) .  
5 1 .  See i d .  a t  3 5 6-57 .  
52 .  476 U . S .  4 4 7  ( 1 986) 
53. See id .  a t  4 5 7-59 .  
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minimizing competition , the actions of the medical staff will be consid­
ered collective action by the competing doctors . 54 Similarly, when a 
third-party payor is controlled by participating physicians ,  actions of 
the payor are considered to be collective action by the physicians .55  On 
the other hand, when the third-party payor is  independent of the physi­
cians ,  the third party is considered to be an independent actor outside 
of Section 1 .  56 
Sports leagues provide another common example of  an arrange­
ment that lies at the firm/market boundary .  One can view a sports 
league as a firm in which "horizontal restraints on competition are es­
sential if the product is to be available at  all . "57  Alternatively, one can 
view a sports league as a market composed of competitors whose agree-
54. In  the leading case of Weiss v.  York Hosp . ,  745 F .2d  786 (3d Cir. 1 984) ,  cert. 
denied,  470 U . S .  1 060 ( 1 98 5 ) ,  the court held:  
The York medical staff is a group of doctors ,  al l  o f  whom practice medicine in 
their individual capacit ies , and each of v:hom is an independent economic 
entity in competition with other doctors in the York medical community.  Each 
staff member, therefore, has an economic interest separate from and in many 
cases in competition with the in teres ts of other medical staff members . Under 
these circumstances , the medical s taff canno t  be considered a single economic 
entity for purposes of antitrust analys is .  
Id .  at  8 1 5 ; accord Bolt  v .  Halifax Hosp.  Medical Ctr . ,  89 1 F.2d 8 1 0, 8 1 9 ( l i th Cir.  1 990) 
(because members of the medical staff practice medicine in their individual capacities, 
each is a separate economic entity potentially in competition with other physicians) , cert . 
denied, 1 1 0 S. C t .  1 960 ( 1 990) ; Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial H osp . ,  857  F .2d  
96.  1 1 8 (3d  Cir .  1 988)  cert.  denied , 489 U . S .  1 078  ( l 989) (same);  Oi tz  v .  S t .  Peter's 
Community Hosp . ,  86 1 F.2d 1 440,  1 4 50 (9th Cir .  1 98 8 )  (nurse anesthetists excluded 
fro m  community hospital at behest of competing anes thesiologis ts) . 
For discussions of the application of anti trus t to potentially anticompetit ive 
arrangements among doctors and hospitals and , in particular,  to credential decisions,  
see James F .  Blumstein & Frank A .  Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital  Peer Review, 5 1  Law & 
Conternp.  Probs . ,  Spring 1 988,  at 7 :  Clark C .  Havighurs t ,  Doctors and Hospitals :  An 
Antitrus t Perspective on Tradi tional Rela tionships,  1 984 Duke LJ .  I 07 1 ;  Philip C. 
Kissam et  al . ,  Antitrus t and Hospital  Privi leges:  Tes ting the Conventional Wisdom, 70 
Cal .  L .  Rev. 595 ( 1 98 2 ) .  
55 .  See, e . g . ,  Hahn v .  Oregon Physic ians'  Serv . ,  868 F . 2 d  1 02 2 ,  1 028-29 ( 9 t h  Cir.  
1 988)  (physicians formed a maj oritv of the board and therefore contro lled payor) , cert.  
denied, 1 1 0 S. Ct. 1 40 ( 1 989) ; Virginia  Academy of Cl inical Psychologis ts v .  Blue Shield, 
624 F.2d 4 76,  48 1 (4th Cir. 1 980) (doctors exercised control over third-party payor) , 
cert . denied, 450 U . S .  9 1 6  ( i 98 ! ) .  
56 .  See, e .g . , Barry v .  Blue Cross ,  805 F .2d 866, 8 68-69 (9th Cir. 1 986)  (when two­
thirds of board were public representatives,  inadequate evidence that doctors controlled 
plan) ; Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v .  Medical Serv. Ass 'n ,  745 F.2d 248, 2 5 3 -54 (3d Cir. 
1 984 ) (when only two of thirty-two members of Blue Shield board were dentists and 
when dental policy committee, composed of  dentists,  was only advisory , Blue Shield's 
actions were unilateral conduct) , ccn. denied, 4 7 1  U . S .  1 0 1 6  ( 1 985) ; Royal Drug Co .  v .  
Group Life and Health Ins .  Co . .  737 F .2d 1 43 3 ,  1 43 6-37 (5 th  Cir.  1 984)  (pharmacy 
agreements  did not constitute per se il legal horizontal combination because agreements 
did not run between competi tors i n  pharmaceutical industry,  nor between competitors 
in insurance industry, but between individual pharmacies and Blue Shield,  which did not 
compete with pharmacies ) ,  cert.  denied , 469 U . S .  1 1 60 ( 1 985) . 
5 7 .  NCAA v. Board of Regents ,  468 U . S .  85 ,  1 0 1  ( 1 984) .  
5 1 0  COL UN!BIA LA W REVIE W [Vol .  92 :497 
ments pose anticompetitive dangers . Indeed, the l eading Supreme 
Court case, NCAA v. Board of Regents , 58 while describing the NCAA in 
terms that highlight the extent to which it can be viewed as a firm, ulti­
mately focused on the anticompeti tive effects of joint bargaining over 
television rights .59 Whether sports leagues are seen as a firm or a mar­
ket ,  courts have viewed them as satisfying the Section 1 concert of ac­
tion requirement because it has seemed obvious that they involve 
agreements among competitors .60 
58.  468 U . S .  85 ( 1 984) .  
59.  The Court first noted that i n  many respects ,  the NCAA resembles a firm: 
[T]he N CAA seeks to market a particular brand of football-college foo tball .  
The identification of this "product" with an academic tradit ion d ifferentiates 
college football from and makes it more popular than pro fessional sports to 
which i t  might o therwise be comparable ,  such as, for example,  minor league 
basebal l .  In order to preserve the character and quality of the "product ,"  
athletes must  not be paid,  must  be required to a ttend class,  and the l ike .  And 
the integrity of the "product" cannot be preserved except by muLUal 
agreement ;  if an institution adopted such res trictions uni laterally, i ts  
effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might  soon be destroyed. 
Thus ,  the NCAA plays a vital role in enabl ing college football to  preserve its 
character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed which might 
o therwise be unavailable .  
I d .  a t  1 0 1 -02 .  
However, the Court went  on  to conclude: 
Because i t  restrains p rice and output ,  the NCAA's televis ion plan has a 
significant potential for anticompetit ive effects .  The findings o f  the District 
Court i ndicate that this potential  has been real ized. The Dis trict  Court found 
that  i f  member inst i tut ions were free to  sell  television rights ,  many more games 
would be shown on televis ion,  and that  the NCAA's output restriction has the 
effect of raising the price the n etworks pay for television righ ts .  . . The 
anticompetitive consequences of this arrangment are apparent .  Individual 
competitors lose their freedom to compete. Price is higher and o u tput  lower 
than they would otherwise be, and both are unresponsive to consumer 
preferences . 
I d .  at 1 04-06.  
60. See,  e . g. , Haywood v .  N BA, 4 0 1 U.S.  1 204 ( 1 9 7 1 )  (basketball ) ;  Radovich v .  
N FL,  352 U . S .  445 ( 1 957)  (footbal l ) ; Volvo N .  Am. Corp. v .  Men's  In t ' l  Professional 
Tennis Council ,  857 F .2d 55 (2d Cir .  1 988)  (tennis) ;  Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum 
Comm'n v .  NFL, 726 F .2d 1 38 1  (9th C i r. ) ,  cert. denied, 469 U . S .  990 ( 1 984) (footbal l ) ; 
Brenner v. World Boxing Counci l ,  675 F .2d  445 (2d Cir. ) ,  cert. denied,  459 U . S .  835  
( 1 982)  (boxing) ; NASL v .  NFL,  670 F .2d  1 249 (2d Cir . ) ,  cert .  denied,  4 59 U . S .  1 074 
( 1 982)  (footbal l ) ;  United States Trott ing Ass'n v.  Chicago Downs Ass ' n ,  665 F.2d 78 1 
( 7th Cir. 1 98 1 )  (horse racing) ; Smith v. Pro Footbal l ,  Inc . ,  593 F . 2 d  1 1 73  (D .C .  Cir.  
1 978) (football) ; Ashley M eadows Farm, Inc. v .  American Horse Shows Ass 'n ,  609 F. 
Supp. 677 ( S . D . N .Y .  1 985)  (horse shows ) .  But see Federal Baseball Club v .  National 
League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U . S .  200 ( 1 922) (no i nterstate commerce 
i nvolved ) ;  Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U . S .  258 ,  284-85 ( 1 972)  (affirming Federal Baseball on 
stare decisis  grounds) . 
The d iscussion of the application of Section I to sports leagues has become 
something of a cottage industrv.  See, e . g . ,  Lee Goldman, Sports,  Ant i trust ,  and the 
S ingle Entity Theon• ,  63 Tul .  L .  Rev. 7 5 1  ( 1 989) ;  Myron C .  Grauer, The Use and l'v! isuse 
of the Term "Consumer Welfare":  Once M ore to the i\·fat on the I ssue o f  Single Ent i tv 
Status for Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act ,  64 Tul .  L. Rev. 7 1  
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Finally, commodities and securities exchanges provide another ex­
ample of an organization that can be viewed either as a firm or a mar­
ket .  Because exchanges are typically established and controlled by 
competing members , the courts have consis tently held that exchange 
rules governing behavior of members are agreements among competi­
tors .6 1  At the same time, exchanges require rules in order for the prod­
uct of the exchange, a marketplace, to be available at all . Thus ,  in Board 
of Trade v. United States ,62 the Court rejected a charge of price fixing 
against  a requirement that off-hour trades be made at the closing mar­
ket price on the grounds that channelling trades into the exchange 
made the market more competitive. 63 
B .  Distinguishing Among Activities 
Central to the determination of concert of action, and thus to the 
applicability of Section l ,  has been a distinction between agreements 
that affect markets in which the participants compete and agreements 
with respect to other matters .  In each case in which concert of action 
has been found, the agreements have related to a market in which the 
parties to the agreement have been competitors or potential competi­
tors . 64 Thus ,  in Terminal Railmads , the agreement res tricting access to 
( 1 989) ; Myron C .  Grauer, Recognit ion of the National Football  League as a Single Enti ty  
Under Section I of the Sherman Act :  Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model ,  82  
Mich. L. Rev .  I ( 1 98 3 ) ;  Gary R .  Roberts , The Anti trus t S ta tus of Sports  Leagues 
Revisited, 64 Tul . L.  Rev. 1 1 7 ( 1 989) [hereinafter Roberts,  Antitrust Status ) ;  Gary R .  
R oberts , The S ingle Entity S ta tus of Sports  Leagues Under Section I of the Sherman 
Act: An Alternative View, 60 Tul . L. Rev. 562 ( 1 986) ; Gary R. Roberts,  Sports Leagues 
and the Sherman Act :  The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on 
Imraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. Rev.  2 1 9  ( 1 984) ; John C. Weistart , League Contro l  of 
Market Opportunities:  A Perspective on Competit ion and Cooperation in  the Sports 
Industry, 1 984 Duke L.J. 1 0 1 3 . 
The cases and the analysis in the text suggest that the appropriate answer to the 
single enti ty/concerted action question in the context of sports leagues is that  a S ection 
l "rule of reason" analysis applies if an agreement among teams relates to  a market in  
which the teams compete, but  does  not  apply  if  the  agreement relates to a market in 
which they are neither competitors, potential competitors nor independent economic 
actors . The debate over the proper antitrust treatment of league governance rules 
ultimately revolves around this question. See Roberts , Antitrust Status, supra, at 1 27 .  
6 1 .  See,  e . g . ,  S i lver v .  NYSE,  3 7 3  U . S .  34 1 ( 1 96 3 ) ;  Board of Trade v .  United States,  
246 U . S .  23 1 ( 1 9 1 8) .  In  Silver, the Court thought i t  obvious that " removal of the wires 
by collective action of the Exchange and i ts  members would ,  had i t  occurred in  a context 
free from other federal regulat ion,  constitute a per se violation of § I of the Sherman 
Act, "  despite the fact that the only concen of action was the members ' agreement to 
comply with Exchange directives upon being admitted to membership .  Silver, 3 7 3  U . S .  
a t  347 .  
6 2 .  246 U . S .  2 3 1 ( 1 9 1 8) .  
63 .  For a recent analysis o f  exchanges a s  firms,  see Jonathan Macey & Hideki 
Kanda , The Stock Exchange as a Firm : The Emergence of Close Subst i tutes for the New 
York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 Cornell L Rev. 1 007  ( 1 990) .  
64. The rules governing interlocking d irectors revolve around a s imilar  d is t inction,  
prohibi ting anyone fro m  serving as a director " in any two or more corporations . . .  if 
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the cross-Mississippi terminals and bridges related to the rai lroad mar­
ket in which the shareholders competed.  In Associated Press , the obj ec­
tionable bylaws limited competition in the members ' daily newspaper 
markets . In Sealy and Topco , the territorial res trictions on the use of the 
trademark affected competition in the mattress and grocery markets re­
spectively .  In Northwest Stationers , the expulsion of Pacific from the 
purchasing cooperative affected Pacific' s  ability to compete in the retail 
s tationery market. In Goldfarb ,  Professional Engineers , Indiana Dentists and 
A1aricopa , the objectionable association rules affected competition in 
the professional services markets in which members competed . In the 
doctor s taff privileges cases , the i l legal agreements among doctors re­
l ated to the market for medical services. Finally , in NCAA , the joint 
bargaining arrangement affected competition among member schools 
for television contracts .  
In  each of these cases , the agreement raised an antitrust  concern 
because it affected or potentially  affected a market in which members 
competed. When that has not been the case, however, no concerns are 
or should be triggered.65 The decision, for example ,  of any of these 
joint ventures to establish a central office, to rent space, or to hire asso­
ciation employees,  is  and should be unobjectionable precisely because 
any agreement to engage in these activities has no s ignificant potential 
to affect competition in any market in which the members compete.66 
This distinction-whether or not s takeholders67 compete in the 
market to which the agreement relates-provides the critical link for 
the antitrust  analysis of corporate law issues at the firm/market border­
l ine.  The intuition underlying this Article is that the antitrust  analysis 
such corporations are . . . competitors, so that the el iminat ion of  competi t ion by  
agreement between them would  constitute a violation of any  of the provisions of any  of  
the antitrust laws
, . Clayton Act  § 8,  1 5  U .S C .  § 19  ( 1 988) . See geheral ly 5 Areeda, 
supra note 49, n 1 300- 1 305,  at 359-76 (discussing relevant statutes and horizontal ,  
vertical ,  and indirect interlocks) (Volume Five of  the treatise is co-authored with Donald 
F.  Turner; i t  was published in 1 980) . As elsewhere, the key is whether actors are 
competitors or potential competitors . 
65 .  See 7 Areeda, supra note 49 ,  � 1 4 7 7 ,  a t  347- 4 8 ;  Nurse Midwifery Assocs . v .  
H ibbett,  9 1 8  F . 2 d  605,  6 1 4  ( 6 th Cir .  1 990) , modified 9 2 7  F . 2 d  904 (6th Cir . ) ,  cert .  
denied, 1 1 2 S .  Ct.  406 ( 1 99 1 ) : 
I d .  
The fact  that medical s taff members may be  i n  competit ion wi th  each other 
does not  mean that every decision of the medical s taff warrants scrutiny under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act .  When the s taff as a group makes decisions or 
recommendations for the hospital  in  areas that do not  affect the market in 
which they compete as i nd ividuals ,  there i s  no reason not to treat them as 
agents of the hospital . 
66. This is not to say that the dist inction is unproblematic. I nevitably,  there are 
difficulties in  discerning whether or not the parties to the agreement compete in the 
affected market .  
67.  As above,  the term "stakeholder" is used to refer to a l l  participants in  the 
corporation,  including shareholders,  employees, cred itors,  customers , etc. 
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i l lustrated in the preceding cases applies when agreements among com­
peting s takeholders relate to the market for corporate contro l .  
C .  The Rule of Reason Analysis 
As we have seen, the threshold question is whether Section 1 ap­
plies . When the parties to an agreement compete in the market af­
fected by the agreement, the concert of action requirement has been 
satisfied. The substantive question i s  then reached: Does the chal­
l enged arrangement constitute a contract, combination or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade? 
The fundamental mode of analys is  under Section 1 i s  the " rule of 
reason ,"  whose test is  "whether the challenged agreement i s  one that 
promotes competition or one that suppresses competition. "68 Such an 
extraordinarily broad formulation is not particularly helpfu l .  Although 
a great deal has been written by courts and commentators on the na­
ture of the rule of reason and the per se rule ,69 the actual analytic pro­
cess utilized by the courts in assessing the competitive impact of 
challenged restraints can be concisely summarized . Professor Areeda's 
s tructured rule of  reason analys is  provides a useful  analyt ic 
framework. 70 
In Professor Areeda ' s  view, courts apply a multi-stage, sequential 
analysis in which the burdens of proof shift between plaintiffs and de­
fendants. As the general s tatements of the rule of reason indicate, the 
ul timate inquiry is whether a restraint is "one that tends to impair com­
petition s ignificantly without  adequate justification. " 7 1 I have taken the 
l iberty ofslightly recasting Professor Areeda's analysis in order to make 
i t  more directly applicable to arrangements at the firm/market 
borderline. 
1 .  Restraint of Trade . - In keeping with normal li tigation burdens ,  
to  withstand summary judgment,  a "plaintiff must show by argument 
that the challenged activity is of a type that res trains trade within the 
meaning of the Sherman Act. "72 
2. Quick Look . - A res traint of  the sort that lies within the general 
prohibitions of the Sherman Act may "avoid summary condemnation if 
the defendant claims justification of the kind which a ' quick look'-usu­
ally at the arguments alone-shows to be legi timate in principle and 
68.  National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,  435 U . S .  679,  69 1 
( 1 97 8 ) .  
6 9 .  S e e  supra n o t e  32 for discussion of the p e r  se rule.  
70 .  See 7 Areeda, supra note 49,  � I  1 5 1 1 ,  at 427-36 .  For a similar s tructured rule of 
reason, see also Richard Schmalensee, Agreements Between Competitors in Antitrust . 
In novation and Competi ti\-encss 1 04-14 (Thomas i\1 . Jorde & David J Tecce, eds .  
1 992 ) .  
7 1 .  Id .  a t  4 2 8 .  
7 2 .  Id .  
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capable of being proved satisfactorily .  "73 
3 .  Significant Magnitude . - Once the res traint survives summary 
condemnation ,  as i t  i s  likely to do in nearly all cases at  the firm/market 
borderline, " the plaintiff must show that the type of restraint identified 
. . .  is likely to be of significant magnitude. "74 The purpose of this 
requirement is to screen out de minimis or harmless restraints . How 
the plaintiff meets this burden will vary . Proof of actual detrimental 
effects will suffice. If, for example, the plaintiff can show either output 
restriction or the transfer of consumer or producer surplus as a resul t  
of the restraint ,  that  wi l l  typically be sufficient. In  the absence of a 
showing of actual detrimental effects , defendants ' market power (as de­
termined by the normal proxy of substantial market share) will usually 
suffice. But when actual detrimental effects can be shown, such an indi­
rect measure of market power need not be used , and the failure to 
demonstrate a substantial percentage of a relevant market will not de­
feat a claim.  
4 .  Justifications . - "The defendants have the burden of coming for­
ward with allegations and evidence that the justifications claimed are 
legitimate in principle and are actually promoted sign ificantly by the 
res traint . "75  This s tep combines two inquiries :  whether the res traint 
has procompetitive goals and whether the res traint is reasonably neces­
sary to the accomplishment of those goal s .  In conducting this analys i s ,  
courts have u sed a variety of presumptions depending on the general 
severity of the restraint .  
5.  Balancing . - "\Vhere both benefi t  without a preferable alterna­
tive and harm are potentially s ignificant, balancing is  necessary . . . .  "76 
How one conducts the ultimate , fifth s tep, rule-of-reason balancing is  
problematic. Professor Areeda's analysis i s ,  in part ,  an attempt to avoid 
i t  by identifying cases in which it i s  unnecessary .  But in the most inter­
es ting cases ,  one may not be able to do so .  
As Professor Areeda points out ,  the NCAA case i l lustrates this se ­
quential analysis (with the exception of  the final balancing) in a classic 
case at the firm/market borderline .77  But for those cases in which the 
7 3 .  Id .  a t  428-29. 
74. Id .  a t  429 .  
75 .  Id .  
76.  Id .  a t  430.  
77 .  I n  NCAA v .  Board of Regents, 468 U.S.  85 ( 1 984) ,  member ins t i tu t ions ,  
competitors both in athletic terms as wel l  as i n  the marketing of televis ion rights ,  agreed 
through the NCAA on the total number of member football  games that would be 
televised, the number of  times individual colleges could appear, and tht' aggregat e  price 
and schedule o f  fees for telecasts .  Because the NCAA's televis ion plan l imited the 
number of  games broadcast and precluded price negotiation between b roadcas ters and 
i ndividual inst i tutions-the sort  of horizontal restraints on price and output that l ie at  
the heart of the prohibit ions of Sect ion ! -the first  step \vas sat i �fied.  See i d .  at 9 1 -9-t . 
Moving to the second s tep,  the Cour t ,  noting the critical role that  the NC·\A p laYs  
in creating and marketing the product "col lege football , "  examined the panicubr 
just i ficat ions offered for the joint  barga ining cffons. Because t h e  NC·\.-\ i .1wolvcd :_m 
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ulitimate balancing i s  necessary, collective action theory provides a use­
ful approach to this problem. 
D .  A Collective Action Analysis 
As we have seen, in the Cartelis ts '  Dilemma, sellers collectively 
would be better off if  they would all charge the monopoly price and 
l imit output, but each is better off individually if the others charge the 
monopoly price and the individual seller cheats .  This temptation to 
cheat may prevent the dispersed sellers from reaching a monopoly 
price or, if  they are already at a price above the competitive one, may 
lead to a downward spiral to the competi tive price. 
Consider the standard Pri soners' D ilemma matrix in which A and B 
are the two dominant competitors in some market :  
B 
cooperate cheat 
cooperate ( 1 ' 1 )  ( - 1  , 2 )  
A 
cheat (2 ,  - 1 ) (0 ,0) 
If one considers only the interests of the prisoners (A and B) , then Box 
1 ( 1 , l )  i s  collectively superior to Box 4 (0 ,0) , and failure to reach Box 1 ,  
from A and B's perspectives, is  a collective action failure. But  if  one 
considers the interests of the prisoners plus the interests of the jai ler, 
where the jailer is a proxy for buyers ' interests-an interest not in­
cluded in the s tandard two-by-two matrix-then Box 1 is clearly infer-
industry in which horizontal restraints on competition were essen tial if  the "product"  
was  to be available a t  al l ,  the Court held that  the specific competitive jus tifications for 
the challenged practices must be examined. I d. at 1 0  I .  
The Court then proceeded to the third step, holding that the prices charged 
networks were "unresponsive to viewer demand and unrelated to the p ri ces that would 
prevail in a competitive market; "  and that "price is higher and output lower than they 
would otherwise be ."  I d .  a t  1 06-07. In addition to these actual anticompeti tive effects ,  
the Court also found that the NCAA had market power in the market for col lege football 
games. Thus, the Court concluded that  the N CAA. television plan constituted a 
sufficiently serious restraint that it should be regarded as unreasonable in the absence of 
competitive justification, the fourth step o f  the analys is .  See id.  a t  1 09- 1 0 .  
A t  this s tage, a l though the Court accepted a s  legitimate i n  principle the NCAA's 
claim that the television plan " efficiently created a marketable product  and facil itated 
competi tive balance among teams,"  it held that the restraints involved in the television 
plan were not reasonably necessary to achieve those goals , both because the restraints 
did not further them effect ively and because they would be equally well  served by less 
res trictive alternatives. Id. at  1 04- 1 3 . Because the Court did not find any of the 
NCAA's purported jus tifications persuasive, i t  ended the analysis a t  this s tage without 
proceeding  to an ul t imate balancing. See 7 Arceda, supra note 4 9 .  � 1 5 1 1 .  at  430-36 .  
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ior to Box 4 because the loss to the jailer ( the consumers) is greater 
than the gain to the prisoners ( the manufacturers ) ,  and the collectively 
irrational result for the sellers considered by themselves is, instead, col­
lectively rational for society as a whole.  If one represented the collec­
tive action dilemma as a three-person game (including payoffs to the 
buyers) ,  what appears to be a collective action failure from the perspec­
tive of the two would-be cartel ists is ,  in fact ,  welfare increasing for soci­
ety as a whole. 
The s tandard graph of monopoly pricing il lus trates the point 
nicely: 
Price 
Quantity 
MR 
The benefit of price fix i ng to the seliers ( the prisoners considered 
jointly) is the transferred consumer surplus  (PY"'AB) , less  the lost  pro­
ducer surplus from the reduced output (zero vvhere, as here, margi nal  
cos t i s  cons tant) less  any costs incurred i n  establ ishing and maintai n i n g  
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the cartel .  The loss  to the consumers (the jailer) i s  the transferred con­
sumer surplus WcPmAB) , plus the lost consumer surplus from the re­
duced output (BAC) ,  plus any costs incurred in preventing the 
establishment and maintenance of the cartel . Because the transferred 
consumer surplus cancels out, the loss  to consumers is greater than the 
benefi t  to the s ellers by an amount equal to the deadweight welfare loss 
triangle (BAC) , plus rent seeking and transaction costs . 78 The collec­
tively rational outcome is  therefore to prohibit naked price fixing. 
Once the j ailer's interests are added to the p icture, Box 4 is clearly 
superior to Box 1 . 
This analysis suggests that , as a first approximation, escape from a 
collective action dilemma should not be facilitated if the net benefits to 
the parties to the agreement are less than the net costs to non-parties . 
More controversially, some argue that collective action should be per­
mitted whenever the benefits to the parties outweigh the costs to non­
parties ,  whether or not non-parties share in those benefits .  79 In rank­
ing outcomes ,  i t  is crucial that all interests be factored in .  
This collective action approach to the rule of  reason provides a 
good account of the antitrust analysis of joint ventures and foreshad­
ows the analysis in the corporate context. Consider, for example ,  a 
partnership agreement among lawyers that provides for collectively de­
termined hourly rates as weil as a commitment not to compete during 
the term of the partnership .  How would such an arrangement be ana-
78.  The relat ionship between the monopoly overcharge, the deadweight welfare 
loss, the ren t-seeking expenditures by the would b e  monopol is t ,  and the ren t-defending 
expend i tures b y  s trategic buyers  is complicated by the i n terrelat ionship among the 
various costs .  Ren t-defendi n g  expenditures by buyers may,  fo r example,  reduce the 
deadweight welfare loss  and monop9ly overcharge, t hereby reducing the rent-seeking 
expendi tures by a would-be monopo l i s t .  For a ciear d i scussion o f  this  relat ionship and 
the condi tions under which rent-defending expenditur e s  increase or decrease social  
welfare, see Tore E l l ingsen, S trategic Buyers and the Social  Cost of Monopolv,  8 1  Am. 
Eco n .  R e v .  648 ,  650-52 ( 1 99 1 ) .  For the s eminal discussio n s  o f  the conversion of t h e  
dis tri but ional  consequences of monopoly i n to a l l ocat ional  inefficiency,  see Gordon 
Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs ,  Monopolies  and Theft ,  5 W .  Econ . .J . 224 ( 1 96 7 ) ;  
Richard A .  Posner,  T h e  Social  C o s ts o f  Monopoly a n d  R e gulat ion,  83 J .  P o l .  Econ . 807,  
809-2 1 ( 1 975 ) .  
7 9 .  American ant i trust doctrine h a s  yet t o  answer t h e  question of h o w  t o  balance an 
i ncrease in market  power against an i ncreas e  i n  efficiency. Sec Alan A .  Fisher et a l . ,  
Price Effects of H orizontal  Mergers. 77 C a l .  L.  R e v .  7 7 7 ,  778 ( 1 989) ; Lawrence A .  
S u l l i v a n ,  The V i a b i l i ty o f  t h e  C urrent Law on Horizontal  Restra i n t s .  75 C a l .  L. Rev. 835 ,  
8 5 1 -55 ( 1 98 7 ) .  F o r  an economi s t ' s  approach to the tradeoff, s e e  Oliver E .  W i l l iamson.  
Economies as an Anti tru s t  Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 Am . Econ.  Rev.  i 8 ,  
33 -34 ( 1 968) and O liver E .  W i l l iamson, Economies a s  a n  Anti trust  D e fense Revi s i t ed, 
1 25 U. Pa. L. Re\·.  699, 703 - 1 3  ( 1 97 7 ) .  I n terest ingly ,  European competit ion Ia'' 
provides that  arrangements that resu l t  in b o th market power and efficiencies mav b e  
legal  i f  t h e y  provide " consumers a fa i r  s hare o f  t h e  result ing benefi t . "  Trca tv 
Establishing the European Economic C o m m u n i  t v ,  1\!ar.  25 .  I �15 7 .  art . 85 ( 3 ) ,  298 
U . '\ .T .S .  I I . -4 8 :  accord Richard 'Ahish,  Compet i t ion La\\ 1 95-202 ( 1 985 ) .  
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lyzed under the s tructured approach?80 
Firs t ,  the agreement is  of the type that restrains trade within the 
meaning of the Sherman Act. The lawyers in the firm are competitors 
or potential competitors and agreements as to price are of the sort that 
implicate Sherman Act scrutiny. But the lawyers can offer pro-competi­
tive jus tifications :  a partnership can offer more attractive legal services 
than sole practitioners; lawyers in a firm can special ize;  clients can re­
ceive one-stop service; a reputation for quality can be developed; econ­
omies of scale for support services can be exploited ,  and so forth . 
Thus ,  the partnership can avoid summary condemnation .  
Given these justifications, by  Professor Areeda's  analysis ,  plaintiffs 
must next show that the res traint is likely to be of s ignificant magni­
tude. Whether plaintiffs can do so will depend on the s tructure of  the 
market and the s ize of the firm. If  the firm cons is ts of  a relatively small 
percentage of the lawyers in the market ,  this res traint  i s  unlikely to be 
s ignificant .  On the other hand , if so many lawyers band together that 
there are only two firms ,8 1 one might conclude that each firm has s ig­
nifi cant market power. 
In that event, the lawyers would then have to justify the arrange­
ment. They might ,  for example,  argue that the partners face a collec­
tive action dilemma: I t  is better for the lawyers collectively to adopt a 
common price l is t .  While it may be better for each individually to try to 
s teal clients from other lawyers by competing on price,  i f  that hap­
pened,  the firm might well self-des truct .  Alternatively, the lawyers 
might argue that in dealing with a firm, clients demand a common price 
l is t .  Plaintiffs might respond that eliminating fee competition among 
firm lawyers is not reasonably necessary to the preservation of  the firm, 
and that a common price l ist  could be provided even if firm lawyers 
were permitted to compete with each other on hourly rates .  
Assuming that the lawyers ' collective action jus tification were ac­
cepted as legitimate, one would be forced to the final s tep of the analy­
s i s :  the balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects . This is at least in 
part a factual question: are we better off with the lawyers in Box 1 or  
Box  4 ?  The lawyers collectively benefit in  the move from Box 4 to  Box  
1 ,  just as competing manufacturers benefit from a price fixing cartel ,  
bu t  does society as a whole lose more than the lawyers gain ?  When the 
market for legal services is reasonably competitive, everyone is better 
off perm i t t ing partnerships .  The partnership agreement permits law­
yers to  form firms,  with all the attendant advantages , and the competi­
tive market for legal services prevents them from charging a price 
above the competitive level . But when all the lawyers in town are 
united into  only two firms ,  there are both benefits ( e .g . ,  specialization) 
t\0 _  S c: c  � u p ra tc: x t  accompa m ing no tes 70-7 7 _  
1\ I _  Cf. lawyer j o ke # 3 2  ( s o l e  la11 1Cr i n  smal l  tOII !l 11·as s t �l n i n g :  second b 11 1Tr 
ani-.ccl ;md t he\ hoth grew rich ) . 
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and cos ts ( e . g . ,  higher fees because o f  a reduction in competition) . The 
i nterpretation of the rule of reaso n  sketched here, b y  which an arrange­
ment is legal if the net benefits to the parties to the a greement out­
weigh the net costs imposed o n  non-p arty consumers, provid es a 
s tandard against which this ques tion could b e  answered .82 
E. Summary 
Joint ventures,  trade associations,  professional societies ,  doctor­
controlled hospitals ,  sports leagues , and s ecurities or commodities ex­
changes can all  be thought of as firms or as markets,  depending on 
what questions one is  trying to answer. With respect to some activities ,  
i t  wil l  make sense to consider the arrangement as a s ingle entity,  be­
yond the reach of Section 1 .  With respect to other activit ies , competi ­
t i o n  a m o n g  t h e  participants m a y  b e  res trained a n d  i t  makes s ense to a s k  
whether or not the restraint is  reasonable or unreasonable.  
Two i ssues emerge as critical . First ,  the threshold question is  
whether the agreement at issue i s  an agreement among competitors or 
p otential competitors that  affects the market in which they compete.  
Second, i f  it  i s ,  then courts have developed a s tructured,  sequential 
analysis  to determine whether the a greement is one that promotes or 
restrains competi tio n .  While by no means unambiguous i n  its applica­
tion, the antitrust  mode o f  analys is  provides a sophisticated framework 
for analyzing arrangemen ts a t  the firm/market boundary . In the next 
Part, I apply this antitrust analysis  to s everal s ignificant issues in corpo­
rate l aw aris ing at the firm/market b orderl ine.  
III .  AN ANTITRUST PERSPECTIVE ON CoRPORATE LAw 
When shareholders or members of a j oint  venture compete within 
a market that is  affected by their intra-firm agreement, Section 1 applies 
and,  depending on the competi tive impact,  may or may not prohibit  the 
a greemen t .  Generally , courts have fol lowed this approach with regard 
to agreements affecting product markets in which members or share­
h olders compete. The intuition underlying this Article is  that the same 
perspective is  appropriate and provides insight when shareholders 
compete in capital markets .  
A.  An Illustration: Dodge v .  Ford Motor C ompany 
As an initial  i l lus tration o f  the antitrust p erspective on corporate 
law, consider that icon of the corporate law, Dodge v. Ford :'\Jotor Com-
82.  W h ether this  balancing i s  theore t ical ly d i ffic u l t  (e .g. ,  involving i n terpersonal 
u t i l i ty comp<�risons)  or thcoret ical lv  easy ( e . g . ,  involving weal t h  maxim izat ion)  depends 
on what  t h eorv i s  read into the final  s tep of the analys is . See general lY  G u i d o  Calebres i ,  
The Pointl essness o f  Pare t o :  Carn·ing Coase Further,  1 00 Yale L.J .  1 2 1 ! ,  1 2 2 1 -2 8  
( 1 99 1 )  (efficiency criteria h a v e  contestable d i� tr ibut ional  con�cqucnces. t h e  e\·a luat ion 
of •sh i ch req ui res i n i c rpc r s o n J l  u t i l i t \  comparisons ) .  
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pany .83 While Dodge has long been considered the preeminent example 
of the shareholder primacy view of  the corporation,84 the antitrust per­
spective suggests a rather different view. How did the Dodge Brothers, 
who we now primarily associate with Chrysler, become shareholders of 
Ford Motor Company? Why did they end up suing Ford?85 
In the early days of the indus try, automobile companies would buy 
bodies from a body company, engines and transmissions from a 
machine shop,  and then assemble the parts .86 The bes t  machine shop 
in Detroi t  was that of  the colorful John and Horace Dodge.87 
In the late 1 890s , an engineer named Henry Ford designed a car 
and started a company that quickly went bankrupt .88 Convinced that 
the future of the infant car indus try lay with light, simple, low-priced 
cars , he continued to design engines ,  and by 1 902 had designed a new 
car.89 Ford then approached the Dodges, asking them to make 650 
chasses (engines, transmissions ,  and axles) for his firs t season.90 Rec­
ognizing a promising design,  the Dodges turned down contracts from 
Oldsmobile and other established car companies to devote their ful l  
efforts to manufacturing the Ford chasses . 9 1 During this period,  Ford 
was trying to raise capital for the enterprise .  Given the speculative na­
ture of the infant automobile indus try and Ford 's  previous failure, con­
vincing investors proved difficult .92 
Ultimately, Ford managed to raise s tart-up capital from,  among 
other sources ,  the Dodge brothers. Of the 1 ,000 shares originally is­
sued, Ford and his partner Malcomson together received 5 1 0  shares of 
Ford Motor Company (FMC) .93 The Dodge brothers each bought 50 
83.  1 70 N . W .  668 (Mich.  1 9 i 9 ) .  
84. See Jesse H. Choper e t  a! . ,  Cases a n d  Materials o n  Corporations 3 6  ( 1 989) ; 
Clark, supra note 8 ,  a t  678-79; Wil l iam T. Allen,  Corporate Takeovers and Our 
Schizophrenic Conception of the Business  C orporation (copy on fi l e  wi th the Columbia 
Law Review) . Dean Clark is one of the few to notice the antitrust overtones in the case. 
See Clark, supra note 8 ,  § 1 6 . 2 . 1 ,  at  604 . 
85 .  The fol lowing account  comes from Allan Nevins, Ford: The Times , The Man,  
The Companv ( 1 954) ( in  collaboration with Frank E .  Hi l l )  [hereinafter 1 Nevins ) ;  Al lan 
Nevins & Frank E.  Hi l l ,  Ford : Expansion and Challenge 1 9 1 5- 1 9 3 3  ( 1 9 5 7 )  [hereinafter 
2 Nevins ) ;  Allan Nevins & Frank E. Hi l l ,  Ford : Decline and Rebirth 1 933 - 1 962 ( 1 96 3 ) ,  
t h e  definitive biographies of  Henry Ford a n d  t h e  Ford M o t o r  Company,  a n d  Caroline 
La tham & David Agresta,  Dodge Dynasty :  The Car and the Fami ly that  Rocked Detro i t  
( 1 989) . 
86. See l Nevins ,  supra note 85,  at 222 .  
87 .  See id .  a t 230-3 1 .  
8 8 .  See id .  at  1 72-9 1 .  
89.  See id .  at  225-26.  
90.  See id .  a t  23 1 -32 .  
9 1 .  Sec  icL at  2 3 1 .  
92. See i d .  at  229-30 ,  233 -3 7 .  
93 .  S e e  i d .  at 2 3 8 .  Ford subscquentlv bought o u t  i\blcomson and some of  
Malcomso n ' s  associates giv ing  him 58 5 %  of the shares . Sec  i d .  a t  3 30<)2 .  
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shares for $5 ,000 . ')-! There were eight other outside shareholders .95 
FMC was an instant success ,96 growing to monumental size over 
the next decade. The Dodge brothers supplied increasing numbers of 
chasses , growing rich in the process .  But friction repeatedly arose be­
tween the Dodges and FMC in the annual chasses price negotiations . 97 
As early as 1 9 1 0 , the Dodges suggested that Ford buy their company 
and run it as a subsidiary.98 Negotiations proceeded, leading to a lease 
on the Dodge brothers ' plant, but eventually the Dodges realized that 
Ford had no intention of concluding a deal .99 
In 1 9 1 3 , after the negotiations to sell their company to FMC fel l  
through , John Dodge canceled the lease with FMC and resigned his  
position as vice president and director. 1 00 Shortly thereafter, the 
Dodges announced that they would begin to manufacture a car under 
their own name .  10 t 
Over the next year, the Dodges  designed their new car and ex­
panded and retooled their factory. 1 02 The first Dodge automobile 
rolled off the assembly line in November 1 9 1 4 .  By 1 9 1 5 , the factory 
was up to speed, producing more than 45 ,000 cars a year. 1 03 The pro­
cess of redesigning and expanding the Dodge plant was enormously 
expensive. ! O-! 
In January of 1 9 1 6, Ford informed the Dodges that, although FMC 
had accumulated $58 million in profit ,  he was cutting the annual divi­
dend to reinvest for the growth of the company. 1 05 The Dodges,  who 
had been receiving $ 1 .2 million per year in dividends on their FMC 
s tock and depending on this income for the operation and expansion of 
their own factory, would now only receive $ 1 20,000.  Ford refused to 
buy the Dodges out ,  saying that as he already owned the maj ority of the 
s tock, he saw no need to buy more . 1 06 
In  August of 1 9 1 6 , Ford, without consulting the board of directors , 
slashed car prices by ten to twenty percent. 1 07 Given that the company 
94 . See i d .  a t  238.  T h i s  $ 1 0 ,000 i n v e s t m e n t  was i n  addit ion to t h e  s u bstantial  
amounts the Dodges had i nvested to �quip their machi n e  shop t o  produce the chass i s .  
9 5 .  See i d .  
96.  S e e  i d .  a t  246. 
97. S e e  id .  a t  479.  
98 .  S e e  Latham & Agresta, supra note 85,  a t  ! 1 4 .  
99. See id .  a t  1 1 4- 1 5 . 
1 00 .  See 1 Nevins,  supra n o te 85,  at 4 79; Latham & Agres ta,  s up ra n o te 85,  a t  
1 1 5- 1 6 . 
1 0 1 .  G iven the Dodges· acknowledged expertise in building engines,  success was 
confi d e n t l y  predicted.  More than 22 ,000 people app lied for Dodge dealers h i p s .  See 
Latham & Agresta, supra note 8 5 ,  a t  1 1 6 .  
1 02 .  See i d .  a t ! 1 7-20. 
1 03 .  See id.  a t  1 23 .  
1 04 .  See i d .  a t 1 20-2 2 .  
1 05 .  See 2 Ne\ i n s .  s u p ra n o t e  85,  a t  90-9 1 .  
1 06 .  See i d .  a t  9 1 :  La t h a m  & Agres ta,  s upra note 85 .  a t  1 3-! .  
1 07 .  See 1 Ne\ i n s ,  supra n o te 8 5 .  a t  5 72-73 ;  2 i d .  a t  9 3 .  
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could sel l  a l l  the cars that  i t  could produce at the higher price, this 
resulted in at least a short-term decline of $40 million in profits . 1 08 
Later in August, Ford announced publicly that all $58 million in accu­
mulated profits would be plowed back into the business ,  thus eliminat­
ing special dividends entirely . 1 09 
In November of 1 9 1 6 , the Dodge Brothers , facing a cash shortage 
from the reduction in dividends , filed the case that was to become a 
corporate law classic .  They made several claims ,  the mos t  important of  
which were that FMC was  monopolizing the market for inexpensive 
cars and that the directors had abused their discretion by refusing to 
pay dividends . 1 1 0 
In October 1 9 1 7 , the Michigan circuit court rej ected the monopoli­
zation charge, but otherwise largely accepted the Dodges ' claims ,  or­
dering that fifty percent of  the cash surplus (about $20 mill ion) be 
paid . 1 1 1  On appeal , the Michigan Supreme Court partially reversed the 
circuit court,  holding for FMC on all the issues except the most impor­
tant issue, the payment of  dividends .  On the monopolization claim, the 
Court affirmed the circuit court,  holding that the plaintiffs had failed to 
prove that FMC's expansion would result in the monopolization of the 
low-price car market in violation of s tate, federal or common law . But 
on the dividend issue, the Court affirmed, holding for the Dodges in 
what has become the quintessential s tatement of the shareholder pri­
macy view. 1 1 2 
The antitrust  perspective potentially transforms our view of the 
case .  Despite the rejection of the monopolization claim, the inference 
that Ford cut the dividends in order to hamper the Dodges in compet­
ing with FMC seems to color the analysis . 1 1 3 The practical effect of  the 
courts' decisions was to provide funds for the Dodges to invest in and 
1 08 .  See Dodge v .  Ford Motor Co . ,  1 70 N.W. 668, 683 (Mich.  1 9 1 9) .  
! 09.  Sec 2 Nevins , supra note 85,  a t  94.  
1 1 0 .  See Dodge , 1 70 N.W. a t  678-79 .  
I l l .  See 2 Nevins ,  supra note 8 5 ,  a t  1 0 1 -0 2 .  
1 1 2 .  T h e  Court stated that :  
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the  profit of 
the s tockholders . The powers of the directors are to be employed for that  end.  
The discretion of d irectors is to be exercised i n  the choice of  means to at ta in 
that  end, and does not  extend to a change in the end itself, to  the reduction of 
profi ts ,  or to the non-distribution of profits among s tockholders in order to 
devote them to other purposes . 
Dodge , 1 70 N . W .  a t  684 . 
1 1 3 .  Latham and Agres ta quote the Michigan Supreme Court as s tat ing that :  
Where a corporation wi th  an  unsatisfied demand for i ts cars and the output  of 
500,000 per annum deliberately makes a cut  of $80 in  the pr ice of a car ,  and 
enters upon a duplication of i ts  present enormous plant ,  not to  speak of  other 
large expendi tures . suspicion wi l l  arise that i ts motives arc not whol ly 
philanthropic; dominat ion qui te as much as phi lanthropy comes to mind.  
Latham & Agres ta .  supra note 8 5 ,  a t  ! 39 .  I have been unable to find th is  passage in  the 
reported case .  
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expand their competing automobile  company.  Indeed, by p reve n ting 
Ford fro m  hindering the expansi o n  o f  the Dodge brothers , probably 
the most skilled and dangerous competitors that FMC faced,  the case 
may p erhaps b etter be read as s ub ordinating pure shareholder interests 
to competi tive concerns than as a n  undiluted express ion of the share­
holder primacy view. 
B. The Paradigm Case: Collective Action to Control Agency Costs 
C o ns ider, then, the antitru s t  analysis of the p aradigmatic corporate 
law problem: col lec tive action to minimize agency costs .  If o n e  applies 
the Areeda framework, the analys is  terminates after the firs t step.  Be­
cause agreements among s hareholders to monitor and discipline man­
agers are n o t  agreements relatin g  to markets in which the s h areh o lders 
compete,  they are not the type of activity that restrain s  trade within the 
meaning of the S herman Act .  It is  this feature, rather than any argu­
ment that the antitrust laws do n o t  apply to agreements a m o n g  s hare­
h o lders , 1 1 4 or that trade or comm erce is s omehow not  involved,  1 1 5 that 
j u s tifies the quick conclusion that antitrust  is  not  implicated i n  the nor­
mal  comext of corporate governance . 
The same res ult  follows fro m  a direct application o f  the rule of 
reason under the earlier collective action interpretati o n .  C onsider the 
s imple case in which managers are paid a competitive sala!'y yet s till feel 
a temptation to steal fro m  the t i l l .  Does i t  make sense to facilitate col­
l ective action among shareholders (such as derivative suits  o r  the elec­
tion o f  outside directors) to prevent managers fro m  s teali n g ?  Are the 
net b enefits to the shareholders o f  escape fro m  their S hareho l ders ' Di­
lemma greater than the net costs  to n on-participants ? 
Assume a corporation with 1 00 shares in which, abs e n t  collective 
actio n ,  the managers wil l  b e  able to s teal $ 1 000 while spending $50 to 
conceal i t  fro m  the shareholders , and in which organizin g  the s hare­
h olders and preventing the managers fro m  s tealing can be accom­
p lished for $ 1 00 .  The net benefit to the shareholders o f  collective 
action is  $900 ($ 1 000 saved less c o s ts o f  $ 1  00) . The net cost to the 
managers is $950 ($ 1 000 l o s t  plus saved costs o f  $50) . O n  this analysi s ,  
i t  would s e e m  that t h e  b e n e fi t  to s hareholders o f  collective action is  l e s s  
than t h e  costs to the managers , and that collective action is therefore 
u nj us tified.  
But this analysis undercounts the costs .  I n  this case ,  there is a con­
tract between managers and shareholders in which managers explicitly 
o r  implicitly promise not to steal.  While i t  may b e  that the b enefit to 
the managers of breaching that c o ntract is  greater than the cost  to the 
1 1 4 .  See Finnegan v .  Campeau Corp . ,  9 1 5  F .:2d 824 ,  8:28-3:2 (:2d Cir.  1 990) , cert .  
denied,  1 1 1  S .  C t .  1 6:24 ( 1 99 1 ) .  
1 1 5 .  Sec Kalmanov i t z  \ . G .  Hei leman Brewing Co . .  769 F . :2 d  1 5:2 ,  1 56-57 ( 3 d  C ir .  
1 98 5 ) .  
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shareholders , that  is at best  a reason to permit breach with payment of 
damages .  If  one ins tead permitted discharge without payment of dam­
ages ,  the costs of contracting would rise as tronomically . Shareholders 
would demand higher returns before they would invest ;  managers 
would invest resources in trying to s teal; individual shareholders would 
invest resources in preventing theft ,  and so forth . If  al l  of these costs 
were taken into account ,  the net benefits to managers from s tealing 
would likely be much less than the net cost to shareholders . With re­
spect to s tealing from the till , shareholders and managers are therefore 
collectively bet ter off allowing shareholders to reach Box 1 than keep­
ing them in Box 4 .  
Accordingly, under both the collective action analysis  and the 
s tructured rule of reason analysis ,  the paradigmatic intra-firm corpo­
rate governance solutions do not raise any significant antitrust con­
cerns .  This explains why i t  makes sense to ignore antitrust  in the 
normal corporate context .  
C .  Shareholders ' Decision t o  Tender: joint Bargaining Agreements and 
Functional Equivalen ts 
Consider ,  now, a s i tuation superficially similar to (but fundamen­
tally different from) the classic corporate law concern wi th sharehold­
ers' collective need to monitor and discipline managers: the problem 
of the shareholder faced with a one-tier, all shares tender offer. Be­
cause of their collective action problem, shareholders confronted with a 
tender offer face a " threat" :  they may receive less than they would have 
had they been able to coordinate their actions and to negotiate effec­
tively . 1 1 6  Thus ,  in Professor Bebchuk's terms ,  sharehoider choice is 
1 1 6 .  Before the Wil l iams Act with its "pro rata" and "best  pnce prov:s 10ns ,  
bidders could play one shareholder off against anOlher, bargaining down the price of the  
shares. The p ro rata ru le ,  Wi l l iams Act  § l 4 (d ) (6 ) , 15  U .S .C .  § 78n(d) (6)  ( 1 98 8 ) ,  
provides t h a t  when a tender o ffer is  oversubscribed , the shares wi l l  be accepted pro rata, 
according to lhe number of securities deposited by  each depositor .  This provision 
prevents fir s t  come, first s e rved tender offers.  The bes t price rule, Will iams Act 
§ l 4 (d) ( 7 ) ,  1 5  U . S . C .  § 78n(d ) ( 7 )  ( ! 988) , requires that when the b id  i s  increased,  earl ier  
tendering shareholders must  receive the increased considerat ion . But  even with  the 
protection of the pro rata and best  price rules ,  direct  competit ion can b e  reintroduced 
by means of a partial or  two-tier tender offer. See infra note 1 1 7 .  Moreover,  even 
without direct  competi t ion,  an inabil i ty to  coordinate bargaining will  m ean that  
shareholders wil l  receive smal l er premiums than they would with j oint  bargaining, 
moving them toward the competitive outcome. 
Prof. Oesterle has c lear! y articulated the target shareholders·  p roblem: 
The shareholders must  bargain collectively if they are to vindicate their bel ief, 
or the  belief of their board, that a higher price is availab le .  Absent collective 
action, [ target] shJreholders lose the possibi l i ty of sharing in anv negotiated 
premium over the in i t ial twenty percent o ffer .  They lose the power to  enforce a 
bottom l ine posit ion at a thirtv percent premium or to bluff t o  a premium of up 
to f1ftv percent .  Thus ,  the s tampede effect d imi nishes the target shareholder's 
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"distorted" with respect to  the " sole owner" s tandard . 1 1 7 
Poison pil ls ,  1 1 8 when used by loyal management ,  are a solution to 
the shareholders ' dilemma . By preventing b idders from dealing di­
rectly with target shareholders , they make target management the ex­
clusive negotia ting agent for the shareholders. As such, they are the 
functional equivalent of a joint bargaining agreement .  Indeed, this has 
been the primary jus tification for their use . 1 1 9 
abi l i ty to bargain for a portion o f  the potential  gam caused by the new 
combination of bidder-target .  
Oesterle, Target Managers , supra note 1 9 , a t  63 .  
On price inadequacy as a ' ' threat," see Paramount Communications,  Inc .  v .  Time, 
Inc . ,  57 1 A.2d 1 1 40,  1 1 52-53 ( Del . 1 989) ; Unocal  Corp.  v .  Mesa Petroleum Co.,  493 
A . 2 d  946,  955 (Del.  1 985) ; City Capital Assocs . Ltd.  Partnership v .  Interco ,  Inc . ,  55 1 
A . 2 d  787,  796-800 (Del .  Ch.  1 988) , part ial ly  overruled by Paramount Communications , 5 7 1 
A . 2 d  1 1 40 .  
1 1 7 .  See Bebchuk, supra note 19 ,  a t  1 700-04 . Professor Bebchuk argues that  
tender offer regulation should seek to put  dispersed shareholders into the bargaining 
posit ion of a sole owner. 
In a two-tier offer, additional pressure results from the successfu l  bidder's 
(theoretical)  abil ity to freeze out  minority shareholders at a price below the value o f  the 
shares to the minority shareholder, · a pressure that has led some courts and 
commentators to characterize such tender o ffers as "coercive . "  See. e .g . ,  [:no cal ,  493 
A . 2 d  a t  955; Victor Brudney & M arvin A. C hirelstein, Fair Shares in Corp orate Mergers 
and Takeovers , 88 Harv. L.  Rev. 297, 3 3 7  ( 1 97 4 ) ;  Leo Herzel & Richard W. Shepro, 
B idders and Targets :  Mergers and Acquisi t ions in the U . S .  1 1- 1 5  ( 1 990) . 
S imilarly, in a partial tender offer, in which the b idder offers to buy 5 1 %  of the 
shares but makes no  commitment as to the remaining 4 9 ';1o of the shares, the value of the 
remaining 49% shares wil l  be impaired by the fact  that a single party has acquired 5 1 % .  
The value of the m inority shares wil l  suffer for three reasons.  First, there wi l l  no longer 
be any possibi l i ty o f  a control premium in  the future. Second, the minority shareholders 
may be subject  to various sons of self�dealing and oppression by the majority 
shareholder that,  while not  rising to  the level that would trigger l iabi l i ty ,  may 
nonetheless negatively affect the value o f  the shares . Finally,  a majority shareholder wil l  
be able to freeze out  the m inori ty whenever i t  is  desirable from the maj ority 
shareholder's perspective. See Bebchuk, supra note 1 9 , at  1 708- ! 5 .  
Note that even a n  al l  shares,  a l l  cash o ffer i s ,  i n  fact ,  a two- tier offer. N on-tendering 
shareholders are frozen out at the same price, but several months later ,  wi thout  any 
in teres t .  The second stage o f  such an offer is thus s l ightly lower than the first s tage in an 
amount equal to the t ime value of money, further d iscounted by the risk that  the  second 
s tage will be delaved or canceled.  For a tender offer to be truly one-tier, the second 
s tage merger consideration would have to be slightly h igher than the first s tage.  
1 1 8 .  A "poison pi l l"  i s  a preferred righ ts plan typical ly adopted by target 
management that has the effect of preventing an acquis i t ion of the target without the 
consent of the target board. See Ronald J .  Gi lson,  The Law and Finance of C orporate 
Acquisit ions 636-40 ( l 986) ; id. at  1 40-4 7 ,  1 55-60 (Supp.  1 99 1 ) .  
1 1 9 .  For examples o f  poison pi l l s  used as means enabling management t o  negotiate 
on behalf o f  shareholders, see Barkan v .  Armsted Indu s . ,  567 A . 2 d  1 2 79 ,  1 282 (Del .  
1 989) ; City Capltaf, 551  A.2d at 790,  797;  MAl Basic Four ,  Inc .  v .  Prime Computer, I n c . ,  
C i v .  A .  No .  1 0,868,  1 989 'vVL 63900, a t  '" l -2 (Del .  Ch june 1 3 ,  1 989) ;  Grand !Vfetro. 
PLC v .  Pi l lsbury C o . ,  Civ .  A .  Nos. 1 0,3 1 9 , 1 0 , 3 2 3 ,  1 988 W L  1 1 9402,  at * 1 -2 (DeL C h .  
N o v .  7 ,  1 988) ;  Doskoci l  Co .  v .  G riggv, C i v .  A .  No.  1 0 ,095,  ! 988 W L  1 05 7 5 1 ,  at * 3 -5 
( Del .  Ch.  Oct .  7, 1 988) ; Facet Enters .. Inc .  v. The Prospect Group, 1 988 WL 3 6 1 40,  at 
*4-5 (Del .  Ch .  :-\pr.  ! 5 ,  1 988) ;  Bebchuk, supra note 1 9 , at 1 74 2 ;  Robert Comment & 
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But the fact that  joint bargaining may benefit shareholders or the 
fact that shareholders ' choice is " dis torted" cannot alone justify such 
joint bargaining. A widget manufacturer' s  choice is  likewise "dis­
torted" with respect to the " sole producer" s tandard. 1 20 Just  as joint 
bargaining will al low shareholders to exert greater bargaining power in 
negotiating with a bidder (and receive higher prices) ,  so too will j oint 
bargaining allow widget manufacturers to exert greater bargaining 
power (and receive higher prices) in selling widgets . 1 2 1  The ques tion is 
whether there are convincing arguments for permitting shareholders to 
engage in joint bargaining while prohibiting widget manufactures from 
doing the same thing. 
1 .  The Rule of Reason A nalysis . - Consider how joint  bargaining in 
response to a tender offer would be analyzed under the general ,  s truc­
tured rule-of-reason analysis . 1 22 To begin, can a plaintiff show by argu­
ment that a joint bargaining agreement in response to a one- tier tender 
offer is the type of activity that res trains trade within the meaning of the 
Sherman Act? 1 23 
In the tender offer context, this initial condition is  met because,  
Gregg A. Jarre l l ,  Two Tier and Negotiated Tender Offers: The Imprisonment of the 
Free Riding Shareholder, 19 J. Fin.  Econ. 283, 284-88 ( 1 987) ("stockholders share an 
agent in the person of target management who can negotiate for their common 
interest" ) ;  G regg A. Jarrell ,  The Wealth Effects of Li tigation by Targets:  Do I nterests 
Diverge in a Merger), 2 8 J . L. & Econ. 1 5 1 ,  1 56-57 ( 1 98 5 ) ;  Oesterle, Target Managers, 
supra note 1 9 , at 64-70;  Office of the Chief Economis t ,  Shark Repel lants :  The Role and 
Impact of Anti takeover Charter Amendments,  Staff Study (Gregg A. Jarrell et a ! . ) ,  1 984 
Fed . Sec. L.  Rep . (CCH) � 83 , 7 1 4  ( 1 984) .  
Indeed, Professors Gilson and Kraakman describe the poison p i l l  a s  "the least  
ambitious rationale for defensive tactics. "  Ronald J .  Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, 
Delaware' s  In termediate S tandard for Defensive Tactics : Is  There Substance to 
Proportionality Review ? ,  44 Bus .  Law. 247, 2 6 1  ( 1 989) . 
1 20. Sec Bebchuk, supra note 1 9 , at 1 764-80.  
1 2 1 .  I t  is  th is  feature that makes the " hypothetical shareholders '  contract" s tandard 
overly narrow. The hypothetical  contract  wil l  not provide an efficient  result  when the 
(hypothetical) parties to the contract are also competitors. See supra note 2 3 .  
1 22 .  S e e  supra text accompanying notes 68-77 .  
1 23 .  A s  a general principle ,  antitrust is  particularly suspicious of  j oint  bargaining 
agreements and jo int sa les  agents ,  especially when the result  i s  h i gher  prices. See 
Citizen Publishing Co.  v .  United States ,  394 U.S.  1 3 1 ,  1 33 -34 ( 1 96 9 ) ;  United S tates v .  
Sealy, Inc . ,  388 U . S .  350,  355-58 ( 1 96 7 ) ;  Timken Roller Bearing Co. v .  United States,  
34 1 U.S.  593,  597-98 ( 1 95 1 ) ,  partial ly rev'd on other grounds,  Copperweld Corp. v.  
I ndependence Tube Corp . ,  467 U . S .  752, 764-65 ( 1 984) ; Yamaha M otor Co.  v .  Federal 
Trade Comm'n ,  657 F.2d 97 1 ,  979-8 1 (8th Cir. 1 98 1 ) , cert. denied,  456 U.S .  9 1 5  
( 1 98 2 ) ;  Virginia Excelsior Mi l l s ,  Inc.  v .  Federal Trade Comm'n, 2 5 6  F . 2 d  538 ,  540 (4th 
C i r. 1 958) ;  2 Areeda, supra note 49,  � 405,  a t  280;  Lawrence A. Sul l ivan,  Handbook of 
the Law of Antitrust  §§ 77,  1 02 ,  1 04 ( 1 97 7 ) ;  Joseph F. Brodley,  Joint  Ventures
· 
and 
Anti trust Policy, 95 Han . L.  Rev.  1 52 3 ,  1 530-34,  1 555  ( 1 98 2 ) ;  Robert Piwfsky,  A 
Framework for Antitrust Analvsis ofJoint Ventures, 74 Ceo . L.J . 1 60 5 ,  1 6 1 5- 1 9  ( 1 986) .  
Such arrangements are  problematic because they are the  most  effective means of 
coordinating pricing, preventing cheating, and preventing nonprice competit ion bv 
cartel members . 
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absent some private or regulatory protective device, shareholde1·s will 
compete to tender their shares into an above-market bid. 1 24 Even 
when, as in the tender offer context, some competition has already 
been eliminated by regulation, col lective action designating manage­
ment as shareholders' sole negotiating agent is designed to eliminate 
the remaining competition and to facil itate a collective reponse. 1 25 
Like an agree1T1ent among •.vidget manufacturers to sell at  a comrnon 
cartel price, joint bargaining by shareholders impairs the competitive 
process and therefore is activity of  the type that restrains trade within 
the meaning of  Section 1 .  
But unlike the naked price fixing agreement among members of a 
cartel , a collective response to a tender offer may avoid summary con­
demnation because arguments can be formulated that will pass the 
"quick look."  Defendant shareholders could argue that a collective re­
sponse is legitimate because shareholders, unlike widget manufactur­
ers, are co-owners of  a comrnonly held asset ( the corporation ) ,  because 
they are subject to being fi·ozen out ,  and because j oint bargaining may 
increas e allocational efficiency by making it more likely that the highest 
valuing user viill end up with the company or by encouraging the opti·· 
mal level of investment by potential targets . Because, as in NCAA , a 
corporation presents a context in which horizontai res traints rnay be 
necessary if the activity (in this case the pooling of capital that consti­
tu tes a corporation) is to o ccur at al l ,  specific competitive justifications 
must be examined. 
The inqui:ry then proceeds to the question whether plaintiff can 
show that the res traint  was of a s ignificant magnitude. The substantial 
increases in tender offe1- premiums that resul t  from the use of j oint bar­
gaining would sat isfy that i-equirement. 1 26 Just  as the magnitude of the 
1 24 .  See supra notes 2 2  & l l 6 and accompanying text .  
1 25 .  Oes terle ,  i n  defending management ' s  ro le  as negotiat ing agent against  
proponents of  managemen t passivi tv ,  has described defensive devices in  exactly these 
terms : 
The best solution for target shareho lders i s ,  of course, col lusion. An organized 
refusal to tender w the lower offer breaks the [target shareholders ' ]  d i lemma . 
. . . The most  workable  method [of col lus ion]  and the one seemingly most 
often chosen by corporat ions ,  is to delegate negotiation responsibi i i ty  to 
management. Target managers are ideally situated to consolidate shareholder 
power, permitting the collusion which generates the largest poss ible total 
b lended premiwn. Through the creat ion of, among other devices , revocable 
poison pill pians and waivable supermajority vote provis ions,  target managers 
can effectively and efficiently maximize the u l t imate tender price. 
Dale A. Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of  Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware 
Supreme Coun, 72 Cornell L. Rev.  1 1 7 , 1 29--30 ( 1 986) . 
1 26 .  On the magnitude of the premiums result ing from joint  bargaining,  s e e  
�.J ichaei Bradley e t  aL ,  Synergis t ic  Gains from Corporate Acquis i t ions and their Division 
Between Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms ,  2 !  J Fin.  Econ .  3 ,  2 1 -2 5  ( 1 988)  
(targct shareholders received an <l\·erage premium of 4 2-46% in mult iple bidder tender 
offers compared to a fHemiu,n of 26-30% in  s ingle  bidder offers ) ;  Gregg A . .Jane ! I  el  a l . ,  
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premium above the competitive level charged by a cartel provides evi­
dence that the type of res traint (horizontal price fixing) i s  of significant 
magnitude, so too the increase in tender offer premiums from the use 
of a poison pill is evidence that the type of restraint (a  j oint bargaining 
agreement) is of significant magnitude. 1 27  
The Market for Corporate Contro l :  T h e  Empirical Evidence Since 1 980,  2 J .  Econ.  
Persp.  49, 58 ( 1 988) (once a bid has been made, shareholders receive h igher premiums 
where board puts up a fight) ; Gregg A .  jarrell & M ichael Bradley, The Economic Effects 
of  Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & Econ.  37 1 .  389-90 
( 1 980) (The Will iams Act had the effect of increasing tender offer premiums by 20 % :  
fro m  mean tender offer premiums o f  3 2 . 4 %  to 52 . 8 % .) .  
1 27 .  With respect to the market for corporate contro l  as a whole,  a rule permitt ing 
joint  bargaining among shareholders, l ike a rule permitting price fixing agreements,  
al lows shareholders by acting joint ly to move from the posit ion of  p rice-takers facing a 
horizontal demand curve to price-setters facing the downwardl y  sloping industry 
demand curve. As in the paradigmatic cartel case, the effect of this j oint  action ( if  
indeed it  is in  the interests of the shareholders) is to sel l  fewer companies a t  a higher 
price per company. And, as  in the classic anti trust  analysis ,  this leads to both 
dis tributional consequences (wealth transferred from buyers to sellers) and allocational 
consequences ( the dead weight welfare loss from the fai lure of buyers to buy companies 
at  a price greater than sellers would be wil l ing to accept plus rent-seeking and defending 
expenditures) . 
The debate over whether a rule perm i t ting target managers to seek competing bids 
in  response to a tender offer is  i n  shareholders ' interes ts can thus be viewed as a debate 
over shareholders' best s trategy for maximizing rents .  Professors Bebchuk and Gilson 
argue that the higher premiums result ing from tender offer auctions ,  while reducing the 
number of controi contests ,  wi l l  maximize shareholders return s .  See Lucian A.  
Bebchuk, The Case for Faci l i tat ing Competing Tender Offers, 95 Harv .  L .  Rev.  1 02 8 ,  
l 0:.14-46 ( 1 982)  [hereinafter B ebchuk, Facil i tating Competing Bids ] ;  Lucian A .  
Bebchuk, The Case for Facil i tating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 
35 S tan. L. Rev. 23, 3 3 -38 ( 1 982)  [ hereinafter Bebchuk, Reply] ; Ronald J.  Gi lson,  
Seeking Competi tive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense,  35 S tan .  L. 
Rev.  5 1 ,  62-67 ( ! 98 2 ) .  By  contras t ,  Professors Eas terbrook and Fischel argued that  the 
higher prices wil l  reduce the i ncidence of tender offers (and tender offer premiums) 
sufficiently to leave shareholders worse off. See Frank H.  Easterbrook & Daniel R .  
Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs  in Tender Offers, 35 Stan .  L .  Rev .  l ,  2 ( 1 98 2 )  
[hereinafter Eas terbrook & Fischel,  Auctions a n d  S u n k  Costs ] ;  Frank H .  Eas terbrook & 
Daniel R .  Fischel ,  The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a 
Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev.  1 1 6 1 ,  1 1 76-77 ( 1 98 1 )  [hereinafter Eas terbrook & 
Fischel. Proper Role] . As Professor Coffee points out ,  the question whether increased 
premiums will be offset by the lower number of transactions depends on the elasticity of 
the demand curve for companies.  See John C .  Coffee,  Jr . ,  Regulating the Market for 
Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role  in Corporate 
Governance, 84 Colum.  L. Rev.  1 1 4 5 ,  1 1 7 5-83 ( 1 984) .  
But that  i s  precisely the question facing a profit maximizing monopolist  i n  setting 
price and output :  whether one has reached the elastic portion of the demand curve.  
The stock price studies indicating that the l ion's share of tender offer gains go to target 
shareholders are cons istent with the suggestion that target s hareholders , whether by 
means of j oint  bargaining through management,  the Wil liams Act's provisions . or both, 
have managed to convert most of the buyer or consumer surplus into sel ler or producer 
surplus. For a summarv of the stock price s tudies, see Gilson,  supra note 1 1 8 ,  at 
.f 3 4- 40; id .  a t  6 1 -86 (Supp.  1 99 1 ) . 
Eas terbrook and Fischel , by adopting the perspective of the widely diversified 
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In response, defendant shareholders could argue that because a 
nearly unlimited number of companies have similar investment charac­
teristics , l 28 shareholders collectively have no market power. Accord­
ingly, they could assert that any restraint of competition among 
shareholders will be of minimal s ignificance. 
To this assertion, plaintiff can make two sorts of responses .  Firs t ,  
plaintiff can argue, in accord with cases such as NCAA and Professional 
Engineers , that when actual detrimental effects are shown (here, the in­
creased premiums resulting from joint bargaining) , market power (de­
fined in terms of a large share of a relevant market) is legally 
irrelevant . l 29 In addition , as in other antitrust contexts, persistently 
high profitability ( larger tender offer premiums in response to joint 
bargaining) together with evidence of collective action are a s trong in­
dication that those competi tors in fact have market power . 1 30 
Moreover, plaintiff could argue that collectively shareholders do in 
fact possess market power, within what one might characterize as the 
submarket for the shares of a given target .  The analys is of market 
power within the market for corporate control must pay close attention 
to the peculiarities of that market .  l 3 1 It is a much thinner market than 
the market for shares because, for any given company, relatively few 
sui table partners can be found . 1 32 Once a b idder has invested the up-
shareholders and by assuming that shareholders own equal s takes in bidders and 
targets, focus on  overall weal th maximizat ion,  rather than rent maximization by target 
shareholders . See Easterbrook & Fischel ,  Auctions and Sunk Costs ,  supra, at 7-8 . But 
the mandatory passivity rule they propose is something of an embarrassment for their 
contractual approach , as they recognize. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel  R .  Fischel ,  
The Economic S tructure of Corporate Law 1 70-74 ( 1 99 1 ) .  The ant i trust perspective 
makes c lear why a mandatory rule may be necessarv: this is  a s i tuation where actions i n  
t h e  collective interes t o f  target shareholders qua target shareholders may n o t  be i n  the 
general interest .  
1 28 .  See,  e . g. , Richard A .  Brealey & S tewart C .  Myers, Corporate Finance 307-08 
(4th ed. ! 99 1 )  
1 29.  See NCAA v .  Board of Regents ,  468 U . S .  8 5 ,  1 09- 1 0  ( 1 984) ;  Nat ional  Soc 'y  of 
Professional Eng'rs v .  United S tates,  4 3 5  U . S .  679,  694-95 ( 1 978) ;  7 Areeda,  supra note 
49,  '1! 1 5 1 1 ,  at 4 3 3 .  
1 30 .  S e e  Richard Schmalensee, Another Look a t  Market Power, 95 Han· . L.  Rev . 
1 789, 1 805-07 ( 1 98 2 ) .  
1 3 1 .  For a more extensive discussion of market power in t h e  market for corporate 
control ,  see Rock, supra note 20, a t  1 4 1 8-2 1 .  
1 32 .  See, e .g . ,  Cottle v .  S torer Communicat ion,  Inc . ,  849 F.2d 570,  572-73 ( l l Lh 
Cir .  1 988)  (S torer's directors , four  of whom were elected on a p latform commitred to 
sel l ing the company, searched from March through July for potential b idders but  onlv 
two indicated any in terest ) ; Hanson Trust PLC v .  M L  SCM Acquis i t ion I n c . ,  7 8 1 F .2d 
264 ,  269 ( 2 d  Cir .  1 986) ( " [ N ] one of over forty companies contacted [by Goldman Sachs) 
were wil l ing to act as a 'white knight, '  and that of three LBO firms contacted, . . .  onlv 
Merri l l  [Lynch] was interested in participating in a leveraged buyout . " ) ;  Solash v. Telex 
Corp . ,  [ 1 987- 1 988 Transfer Binder]  Feel . Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) n 93 ,608.  9 7 , 723 (De l .  
Ch.  1 988)  ( " [The l\iemorex] prospect w a s  developed after a canvass of s o m e  fifty firms 
fai led to uncover anv act ive i n terest in  acquiring the company at p rices reflect ing a 
comparable premium to that being offered bv Mcmorex . " ) :  Thompson v. Ens tar  Corp . .  
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front (and partially sunk) cos ts of identifying a target and launching a 
tender offer, identifying an alternative transaction, if one exists ,  may be 
more expensive than proceeding. 1 33 
Having passed this hurdle, the analysis then proceeds to the jus tifi­
cations for jo int  bargaining that can be offered by defendant sharehold­
ers . Can joint bargaining in response to a single-tier tender offer be  
justified a s  promoting a procompetitive goal , and a s  reasonably neces­
sary to the accomplishment of that goal?  What justifications can be of­
fered for allowing competing shareholders (but not competing widget 
sellers) to use a joint bargaining agent? If (and only if) procompetitive 
justifications can be offered does one proceed to a balancing of the 
benefits to shareholders against the costs to others . 1 34 
Five sorts of arguments can be made. Firs t , shareholders, unlike 
509 A.2d 578,  58 1 ( Del . Ch . 1 984) (" [A)fler contact with over 1 00 prospects, and after 
an in-depth review by 26 seriously interested buyers, only one firm offer was before the 
board . . . .  " ) . 
1 33 .  In  the language of transaction cost economics , these firm specific investments 
create a poten tial for opportunistic behavior by shareholders to secure appropriable 
quasi-rents .  See. e.g. ,  O liver E .  Wil l iamson, The Economic Insti tutions of Capitalism 
52-56 ( 1 985 ) ;  Klein et al . ,  supra note 3, at 298-302.  
1 34 .  I n  the Delaware cases, the use of a poison pi l l  by  ioyal  management to 
maximize the premium to shareholders is  considered unproblematic .  See Moran v .  
Household In t ' l ,  Inc . ,  500  A .2d  1 346 ,  1 356--57 (De l .  1 985)  (finding poison pi l l  
"reasonable" in light of bel ief that company was vulnerable to coercive acquisit ion 
techniques) ;  Revlon, Inc .  v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings , Inc . ,  506 A.2d 1 73 ,  
1 80-8 1 ( Del .  1 986) (finding pil l  was adopted in good faith and upon reasonable 
investigation to protect shareholder interes ts) ;  Citron v .  Fairchild Camera and 
Ins trument Corp . ,  569 A.2d 53, 66--69 (Del. 1 989) (finding directors exercised "due 
care" and fulfilled fiduciary duty to shareholders ) ;  In  re j .P .  S tevens & Co. Shareholders 
Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 7 8 1 -82 (Del. Ch. 1 988 )  (finding topping fee provision not 
inconsistent with duty to seek best available transaction for shareholders ) ;  Facet Enters . ,  
Inc. v .  The Prospect Group, I n c . ,  1 988 W L  36 1 40,  a t  ':' 6-7 (Del .  Ch .  Apr. 1 5 , 1 988)  
(al lowing directors to hold off redeeming "poison p i l l"  rights plan) ; I n  re RJR Nabisco, 
Inc. Shareholders Lit ig. ,  No. Civ .  A.  1 0,389,  1 989 WL 7036, at * 1 8-22 (Del .  Ch. Jan.  3 1 ,  
1 989) (requiring only good faith and investigation).  Indeed, within a j urisprudence of 
fiduciary duty, such actions by management further and do not threaten shareholder 
in teres ts .  But the Delaware cases beg the prior and more fundamental question of  why 
we should permit managers to act as bargaining agents for shareholders, but not permit  
s imilar jo int  bargaining by  widget manufacturers . One cannot ask th i s  question wi thin 
Delaware corporate law jurisprudence because of the fundamental  premise that 
managers only owe fiduciary duties to their own shareholders, not to  the shareholders of 
other corporations or to the general public .  
In a departure from the shareholder primacy approach, some s tate non-shareholder 
consti tuency statutes and some recent Delaware opinions suggest that the board may 
balance the interests of shareholders and non-shareholder interes ts .  See, e .g . ,  1 5  Pa. 
Cons. S ta t .  Ann. § §  S I S , 5 1 6, 1 7 1 5, 1 7 1 6  (Supp. 1 99 1 ) ; Paramount Communicat ions,  
Inc.  v. Time Inc . ,  57 1 A.2d 1 1 40,  1 1 53 -54 (Del .  1 990) . See generally David Mil lon, 
Redefining Corporate Law, 24 Ind.  L. Rev. 223,  235-40 ( 1 99 1 )  (arguing that recent 
j udicial and legislative efforts "indicate a will ingness to subordinate shareholder 
financial in teres ts to the in terests of nonshareholders and of the corporate ent i ty 's  
longer-term viabil i ty ,  at  leas t in the host i le takeover context " ) .  While these 
developments may represent a broadening of traditional fiduciary duties ,  they do not  
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widget manufacturers , are co-owners of a commonly held asset and 
their relationship as co-owners may be thought to jus tify collective bar­
gaining. Second, shareholders, unlike widget manufacturers , are s i.lb­
ject to being frozen out by a successful  b idder and that freezeout 
possibility may also be thought to j us tify j oint bargaining. Third , joint 
bargaining may be thought to be potentially j us tified because i t  leads to 
greater allocational efficiency by providing additional t ime for a higher 
valuing bidder to enter the contest  or  by encouraging optimal invest­
ment by targets . Finally, some other distributional or doctrinal feature 
of the shareholders ' s ituation may be thought to distinguish sharehold­
ers from widget manufacturers and thereby justify joint bargaining. 
The first three arguments fal l  within the rule of reason analysis and are 
considered in the remainder of this subsection. The distributional and 
doctrinal arguments fal l  outside the scope of the rule of reason analysis  
and are considered in subsequent subsections .  
a .  Shareholders as Co-Owners . - An initial argument might be based 
on co-ownership: because shareholders , unlike widget manufacturers , 
are co-owners of a commonly held asset,  they should be entitled to bar­
gain jointly. On further inspection, however, co-ownership provides 
l itt le basis for allowing shareholders to act jointly with respect to sellin g 
their shares . 
Co-ownership is a familiar problem in antitrust .  The oil field pro­
vides a good example. 1 35  Where there is an underground pool of oil ,  
the oil under one parcel may be drained away by a well drilled on a 
nearby parcel . This creates an incentive to drill an excessive number of 
wells and to pump as much oil from each well as possible in order to 
drain away one's neighbor's oil or to ensure that one' s  own oil is not 
drained away . At the same time, excessive and disorganized production 
is was teful :  more holes are drilled than necessary and a subs tantial 
extend to include the interests of the buyer of the shares,  nor do they authorize or direct 
courts to balance the losses to buyers against the gains to sellers.  
1 35 .  See Robert E. Hardwicke, Antitrust Law, et  a l .  v .  Unit Operation of Oil or Gas 
Pools 3 1-33,  1 07-74 ( rev. ed .  1 96 1 ) ;  John S .  Lowe, Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell 
220-36 ( 1 98 3 ) ;  Eugene V. Rostow, A National Policy for the Oil Industry 1 1 9- 4 8  
( 1 94 8 ) ;  Burns H .  Errebo, U n i t  Operation at Cotton Valley: A n  Alleged Violation o f  the 
S herman Act, 24 Tul .  L. Rev. 76, 8 1-90 ( 1 949) ; John C. Jacobs, Unit Operation of Oil  
and Gas Fields,  57 Yale L.J .  1 20 7 ,  1 2 1 7-20 ( 1 94 8 ) .  
For more recent treatments of t h e  common pool problems present i n  the 
exploitation of oil fields, see Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property R i ghts ch. 6 
( 1 989) (exploring the obstacles to fieldwide unitization) ;  Gary D .  Libecap & Steven N .  
Wiggins, Contractual Responses t o  t h e  Common Pool: Pro-Rationing o f  Crude Oil 
Production, 74 Am. Econ . Rev. 8 7 ,  88-90 ( 1 984) ;  Gary D. Libecap & S teven N. Wiggins ,  
The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of O i l Field 
Unitization, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 690 , 69 1 -99 ( 1 985) . On analogous problems raised by 
groundwater basins, see Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons :  The E volution of 
Inst itutions for Collective Action ch . 4 ( 1 990) . 
For a recent judicial treatment in the context of s tate natural gas field regulat ion,  
see Northwest Cent .  Pipel ine Corp.  v .  S tate Corp . Comm'n,  1 09 S .  Ct .  1 262 ( 1 989 ) .  
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amount of oil i s  left in the ground that could otherwise be recovered . 
The most efficient means of exploiting an oil field i s  " uni t ization , " by 
means of which the field may be operated as an integrated whole with 
each owner entitled to a pro rata share of the production . 1 36 
Unitization poses an obvious anti trus t  i s sue:  i t  i s  an agreement 
among competitors with the purpose and effect of l imiting produc­
tion . 1 37 Under modern cases , such agreements  would be subject to the 
rule of reason because they often increase the overall ,  long-term output 
of the field and reduce the costs of  development, even if they reduce 
production in the short term. 1 38 On such an analysi s ,  unit ization agree­
ments restricted to eliminating physical was te in production would al­
most certainly be permiss ible .  
Now consider agreements at the other end of the efficiency spec­
trum:  agreements among co-owners to eliminate what oil drillers 
would call "economic was te ," that i s ,  "excess ive" use of  oil because of 
"unreasonably" low prices caused by "overproduction ,"  agreements 
rela ting to  the price a t  which the oil  from the field would be sold, or 
agreements whereby the owners agree to sell their interests  j ointly . 1 39 
Such agreements would pose subs t<�ntially more serious  antitrus t  
136. Unit  operation of o i l  o r  gas pools found on l and !eased from t h e  fed eral 
government is  explicit ly permi tted, and perhaps required,  "whenever determined and 
certified by the Secretary of the I n terior to be necessary or advisable in the publ ic  
i n teres t . "  30 U . S .C. § 226(m) ( 1988). 
137. The proper analvsis  of such a greements under the ant i tru s t  laws is unclear 
because of a dearth o f  cases, and because uni t ization agreements are now e ither 
approved by state regulatory commissions (and thus l argel y  protected by state act ion 
im mu n i ty) or mandated by federal law. In United S tates v .  Catron Val ley ,  7 7  F.  Supp . 
409, 4 1 2- i 4  (\Ji/ . D .  La ) ,  aff 'd,  339 U. S. 940 ( 1948) (per curiam), the Department of 
Jus tice a l l eged that  uni tization agreements coveri n g  the Cot ton Valley oil field had been 
used t o  violate the Sherman Act. The case thus squarely raised the issue of the 
appl ication of the ant i trust la\vs l O  unitization agreements and the l i ne between 
agreements rcb t i n g  to  the operation of an oi l  field that violated the S h erman Act and 
those that d id not. The case W<!S dismissed before the issue was decided. The only 
o ther case on point i s  Woods Exploration & Prod .  Co. v .  Aluminum Co. of A m . ,  438 
F.2d 1 286, 1 30 1-03 (5th Cir .  l 97 i ) , cert.  denied , 404 U.S. 104 7 ( 1972) , i n  which the 
Fifth Circui t  re\'ersed the disuict court's holding that  unitization a greements were 
compl etely exempt from the an t i trust laws,  and l i m i t ed state act ion immunity to state 
regula ted and approved agreements. 
Following Cotton J 'altey , the antitrust  issue all but disappeared .  By contras t ,  u p  unt i l  
then,  there had been substant ial  discuss ion of the ant itrust issues raised by joint  
opera tion of o i l  and gas  fields ,  including pool ing and unit izat ion agreements. See,  e . g. ,  
Rosro\v, supra note 135, at 123 - 44 ;  Errebo, supra note 135, a t  8 1-90; Jacobs,  supra 
n o te 1 35,  at 12 17-20; Cornelius F. Kelley, Relat ion of Anti-Trus t  Legislat ion to 
Co nservation of M ineral Reso urces, 53 ABA Rep. 639, 65 1 ( 1 928) ; Abram F. Myers, 
Relation of the Federal Anti trust  Laws to Problems o f  M i neral Conservat ion,  55 ABA 
Rep. 672, 678-82 ( 1930). 
1 38. Cf. Broadcast Mu�ic,  I n c .  \' . C B S ,  44 1 U . S .  I ,  1 9-23 ( 1 979) (blanket l icenses 
f'or mus ical composit ions mav i n c reas e output ) .  
1 39. See,  e. g . .  Rosto·.,·. s u pra note 1 35, at  30. 34-3 5 ,  4 3 -53 (d escribing tvpes o f  
,., , l :; te  in  o i l  produc t ion a n d  preocribing �; oluti o ns ) .  
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problems . 1 40 Unlike a umtization agreement, these sorts of joint bar­
gaining agreements bear no relation to the efficient operation of a fie ld .  
Rather, if successful ,  they would benefit co-owners by allowing them to 
increase profits by eliminating competition amongst themselves and as 
such, closely resemble the classic cartel arrangement. As to these mat­
ters , the co-owners are competitors . Their relationship as co-owners, 
while centrally important to the jus tification of agreements relating to 
the efficient development and operation of the field, i s  irrelevant to the 
analysis of agreements relating to matters on which they compete. 
Whether analyzed under the per se rule or the rule of reason, such an 
agreement would very likely be il legal . 
Similarly, while the shareholders '  relationship as co-owners j us ti­
fies collective action in the core corporate governance area-the moni­
toring and disciplining of officers and directors-it provides little 
jus tification for agreements relating to their individual interes ts ,  such 
as the sale of their shares , where their co-owners are competitors . As 
the NCAA case makes clear, shareholders' s tatus as co-owners does not 
provide any sort of blanket l icense for engaging in concerted 
activities . 1 -1 1 
b .  The Freezeout Complication . - Unlike co-owners of an oil field,  co­
owners of a corporation may be frozen out. The modern Delaware de-
1 40.  See Cotton Valley , 77 F .  Supp.  a t  4 1 2- 1 3  (discussing l ine between appropriate 
conservation measures and violat ions of the Sherman Act) ; Rostow,  supra note  1 35 ,  at  
2 7-53 ,  1 1 9-22 (discussing the anticompetit ive potential of unit ization agreements and 
other "conservation" measures ) ;  Errebo, supra note 1 35 ,  at  80-86 ;  Jacobs,  supra note 
1 35 ,  a t  1 2 1 7- 1 9  ( Sherman Act should not  apply to pooling agreements m o tivated by 
efficiency concern s ) ;  see also NCAA v .  Board of Regents ,  468 U.S.  85 ,  1 0 1  ( 1 984)  ( j oint  
b argaining by member schools over television l icensing fees violates Sherman Act) ; 
Arizona v. Maricopa County M edical  Soc'y ,  457 U .S .  3 3 2 ,  348- 49 ( 1 982)  (agreements to 
fix maximum price no less suspect than those fixing minimum price) ; Timken Roller 
Bearing Co.  v .  United States,  34 1 U.S.  593 ,  597-600 ( 1 95 1 )  (discussing l egality of 
agreements to suppress competi tion) ; Yamaha Motor Co .  v.  Federal Trade Comm'n,  
65  7 F .2d  97 1 ,  977-8 1 (8th Cir .  1 98 1 )  (discussing ami-competitive effects of joint­
venture agreement ) ,  cert. denied , 1 02 S .  C t .  1 768 ( 1 98 2 ) ;  Brodley, supra note 1 23 ,  at  
1 569-70 ( joint  buying group suspect  where market power as buyer) ; Pi tofsky, supra 
note  1 23 ,  at 1 6 1 5- 1 7  (efficiency gains not s ignificant) . Agreements beyond the scope of 
s ta te regulation of oi l  and gas production are not immune from the ant itrus t laws.  See 
Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. , 438 F .2d  a t  1 303.  
1 4 1 .  :\'CAA , 468 U.S .  at  1 04- 1 0  (where college teams are competitors with respect 
t o  television righ ts ,  concerted action implicates section I ) .  So-called "ancil lary 
restra ints"  h owever pose no problem. Thus ,  on an ant i trust analysis ,  the typical close 
c o rporat ion s hareholder agreem e n t  w o u l d  eas i ly  pass m u ster .  S u p p o s e  t h a t  
s hareholders o f  a close corporat ion,  in  order to prevent any separat ion between 
ownership and contro l ,  agreed that each shareholder/employee would not sell his or her 
s hares to any third party and further, that upon termination of employment ,  would sell 
all shares back to the company according to an agreed upon formula. While such an 
agreement would undoubtedly restrict competition in the sale of the shares of the 
corporat ion,  i t  would not  raise any significant antitrust concerns .  Such an agreement .  
l ike the noncompete agreement that  may be in the employee/shareholder's employment 
contract , would be ancil lary to the establishment and maintenance of the organization.  
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cisions have largely held that  a majority shareholder may el iminate a 
minority shareholder in a cash-out merger . 1 42 Moreover, shareholders 
cashed out are not entitled to any portion of the gains aris ing from the 
merger. 1 43 Minority shareholders are enti tled only to their pro rata 
See United S tates v .  Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. ,  8 5  F .  2 7 1 ,  280 (C .C .A .  Tenn .  1 898) ,  
modified, 1 75 U .S .  2 1 1 ( 1 899) . 
Other agreements among shareholders may likewise be ancillary. For example, a 
syndicate of underwriters collectively purchases the in i tial public stock offering of a 
corporation and, as part of the syndicate agreement,  agrees on the resale price. I n  that 
s i tuation, even though the members of the syndicate agree not to compete against each 
o ther as to price in  resell ing the security, such an agreement does no t  violate the 
Sherman Act because it is ancillary to the main purpose of the syndicate, the orderly 
marketing of the new shares of the corporation. See Uni ted States v. M organ,  1 1 8 F .  
Supp.  62 1 , 689-9 1 (S .D .N .Y. 1 953 ) .  Similarly, a n  agreement among t h e  members of the 
syndicate to " stabil ize" the prices of such new issues for a reasonable period is  legal,  
when entered i n to as part of  a syndicate to  distribute a new issue, but  might well violate 
the antitrust laws if  entered into for o ther reasons.  See id .  at 694-98 .  
1 42 .  See  Bershad v .  Curtiss-Wright Corp . ,  535  A.2d 840, 844- 4 5  (Del .  1 987 ) ;  
Weinberger v .  UOP ,  I nc . ,  457  A .2d  70 1 ,  703  (Del .  1 983 ) ;  David J Greene & Co .  v .  
Schenley Indus . ,  Inc . ,  28 1 A .2d  30 ,  32-33 (Del .  Ch .  1 97 1  ) ;  S tauffer v .  S tandard Brands 
Inc . ,  1 87 A.2d 78, 79 (Del. 1 962) , overruled by Roland lnt ' l  Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 
1 032  (Del . 1 979) ; Coyne v .  Park & Tilford Disti l lers Corp . ,  ! 54 A.2d 893 ,  895-98 (Del .  
1 959) . 
For a brief period, the Delaware courts flirted with a "business purpose" test. I n  
Singer v .  Magnavox Co . ,  380 A.2d 969 (Del .  1 977 ) ,  overruled b y  Weinberger v .  UOP, 
457 A.2d 70 1 (Del.  1 983) ,  the Delaware Supreme Court departed from precedent ,  
holding that a maj ority shareholder may not  "cause a merger to  be made for the sole 
purpose of eliminating a minority shareholder o n  a cash out basis . "  I d .  at  978.  Rather, 
the court held, a freezeout merger is permissible on ly if  the majority has a legitimate 
business purpose beyond simply a desire to eliminate the minori ty  shareholders. See id .  
at  979. 
Within weeks , however, this " business  purpose" test was drained of any significant  
content in  Tanzer v .  International Gen .  I ndus . ,  3 79 A.2d 1 1 2 1 ,  1 1 24 (Del .  1 977) , 
overruled by Weinberger v .  UOP, 457 A.2d 70 I (Del .  1 983 ) .  I n  Tanzer, the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that a majority shareholder satisfied the business purpose test by 
effecting a cash out  merger to serve its own business purposes, even if doing so did not  
serve any  business purpose of  the subsidiary corporat ion or  the  subsidiary's minority 
shareholders . 
I n  1 983 ,  recognizing the failure of the business purpose test ,  the Delaware Supreme 
Court abandoned it. See Weinberg,�r v. UOP, 457 A.2d 70 1 ,  7 1 5  ( Del .  1 983 ) .  
1 43 .  See Del .  Code Ann .  t i t .  8, § 262  (h )  ( 1 99 1 )  ( in  a s tatutory appraisal, the Court 
of Chancery "shall appraise the shares, determining their fair value exclusive of any 
element of value arising from the accomplishment or  expectation of the merger or  
consolidation" ) ;  Harriman v .  Du Pont,  4 1 1  F .  Supp.  1 33 ,  1 54 (D. Del .  1 975 ) ;  Rosenblatt 
v .  Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940 (Del .  1 985) (quoting Sterling v .  M ayflower Hotel ,  93 
A.2d 1 07 ,  1 1 4 (Del .  1 952) ) ;  Weinberger , 457 A.2d at  7 1 3 - 1 4 ;  Bell v .  Kirby Lumber Corp . ,  
4 1 3  A.2d 1 37 ,  140-42 (Del . 1 98Q', ;  Tanw, 4 0 2  A . 2 d  at  3 9 5  (Del . 1 979) ; Tri-Continental 
Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 7 1 ,  72 (Del .  1 950) .  
A focus of post- l l 'ein bnger l i tigation has  been over what  sort  of valuation proceeding 
dissatisfied minority shareholders may pursue. l l 'einbe1ger,  as interpreted by subsequent 
opinions, provides that if shareholders' sole complaint is that the price is unfair, the 
exclusive remedy is a judicial appraisal proceeding under § 262. See Cede & Co. v .  
Technicolor, I n c . ,  1 987 WL 4768, a t  * 6  ( Del.  C h .  J a n  2 0 ,  1 987 )  CWestlaw, S tate, Del .  
Case Law File ) ,  rev'd in pan on other grounds,  542 A.2d 1 1 82 ( Del .  1 988) ; Rabkin \' .  
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share of the corporation under current management . 1 44 The minority 
shareholders' s i tuation is further exacerbated by the procedural imped­
iments attendant on a judicial appraisal .  One might therefore argue 
that this freezeout possibi l i ty justifies joint shareholder bargaining. 
But, as shown below, this argument fai l s .  
The threshold question i s  how to analyze the freezeout rule itself. 
From the antitrust perspective, the freezing out of the minority share­
holders by collective action of the majority shareholders resembles a 
" group boycott" or a "collective refusal to deal . "  From this perspec­
tive, does the freezeout rule i t self pose significant concerns ?  
Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery and Printing 1 45 pro­
vides an intriguing analogy. Northwest was a cooperative comprising 
approximately 1 00 office supply retailers in the Pacific Northwest, 
which acted as the retailers ' primary wholesaler. At  the end of each 
year, Northwest would dis tribute its profits to members in the form of a 
percentage rebate on purchases . A bylaw prohibited member retailers 
from engaging in wholesale. The plaintiff, Pacific, was both a whole­
saler and a retailer, but had been grandfathered in when the byla'rv was 
enacted. Pacific 's  ownership changed hands and the new owners did 
not officially notify the directors of Northwes t, apparently in violation 
of another Northwest bylaw. The Northwest membership subsequently 
voted to expel Pacific. 
Pacific claimed that i ts expulsion constituted a group boycott that 
l imited Pacific ' s  ability to compete and should be considered a per se 
violation of Section 1 .  The Court rejected Pacific 's  argument for the 
application of the per se rule to its expulsion because such rules are a 
necessary part of establishing and maintaining a cooperative. As the 
Court held in a passage that provides insight into how one might ana­
lyze a freezeout rule: 
The act of expulsion from a wholesale cooperative does not  
Philip A .  Hunt Chern. Corp . ,  4 9 8  A . 2 d  ! 099,  1 1 04 (Del .  1 98 5 ) .  If, on t h e  o ther hand, 
shareholders can show that there was unfair dealing in addition to unfairness o f  price, 
then shareholders are entitled to a procedurall y  more desirable valuation proceeding. 
See id.  
1 44 .  Del . Code Ann. t i t .  8 ,  § 203 ( l  99 I )  l imits the maj ority sharehold er's abil ity to 
freeze out minority shareholders in the context of a takeover by preventing an acquiring 
company from merging with the target for three years, unless: (a)  the firm has opted 
out, (b) the target board approves in advance, (c )  the bidder acquirers a t  least 8 5 %  in a 
s ingle transaction, or (d)  the transaction is approved by the post-acquisit ion board and 
two thirds of the disin terested shareholders . The primary effect of such a " business 
combination" statute (also adopted by New York (without exceptions) , Wisconsin, 
Georgia, and Arizona) is to render more difficult the second step, fol low-up, freeze-out 
merger to eliminate non-tendering shareholders. This inabi l i ty to acquire l 00% 
ownership apparently complicates financing of bids by preventing the acquirer's use of 
the target 's  assets as security for acquisition financing. I t  also complicates post­
acquisition transactions between the bidder and the target because of the obl igation that 
al l  such transactions be in trinsically fair. 
1 4 5 .  472 U . S .  284 ( 1 98 5 ) .  
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necessarily imply anticompeti tive animus and thereby rai se a 
probability of anticompetitive effect . Wholesale purchasing 
cooperatives must es tablish and enforce reasonable rules in 
order to function effectively . Disclosure rules ,  such as the one 
on which Northwest relies ,  may well provide the cooperative 
with a needed means for monitoring the creditworthiness of 
. its members . Nor would the expulsion characteris tically be 
likely to result in predominantly anticompetitive effects , at 
least in the type of situation this case presents . 1 46 
Indeed, l'l/orthwest itself seems to have involved a freezeout. While 
Northwest was organized as a cooperative rather than a corporation, 
the essence of Pacific's complaint was that i t  no longer could be a share­
holder. Although Pacific was not precluded from purchasing from 
Northwest ,  i t  lost  i t s  right to a share of Northwest ' s  profits .  
Just  as  wholesale purchasing cooperatives must es tablish and en­
force reasonable rules in order to function effectively,  so  too must cor­
porations . In el iminating the righ t of the nineteenth-century 
shareholder to veto any merger, the freezeout rule was in the collective 
interest of the shareholders because i t  solved two collective action 
problems . 1 4 7 Firs t ,  permitting a majority shareholder to freeze out the 
minority prevents s trategic behavior by eliminating the blocking power 
of individual shareholders .  Under the old rule, nonconsenting share­
holders could demand extra compensation in exchange for acceding to 
the wishes of the majority. Second, the rule minimizes a free rider 
problem . By allowing an acquiring company to eliminate objecting 
shareholders at  a price equal to the pro rata value of the firm, exclusive 
of merger gains ,  shareholders are unable to take a free ride on the ben­
efits that a new controlling shareholder might bring.  If  shareholders 
could either remain in the firm under new management or be paid a 
pro rata share of merger gains ,  a free rider problem could arise that 
might prevent transfers of control that would be in the collective inter­
ests of the shareholders . 1 48 
The question remains whether the freezeout possibility, and the 
pressure that i t  may place on shareholders to tender, p rovides a justifi­
cation for permitting joint bargaining arrangements that might be ob­
jectionable in other contexts . Because the freezeout rule already makes 
shareholders better off by solving two collective action problems 
(holdout behavior and free riding) , i t  is difficult to see how or why the 
1 46.  Id .  at 296 (citation omitted ) .  
1 4  7 .  On the evolution of t h e  freezeout rule, see Wil l iam J .  Carn ey , Fundamental 
Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1 980 Am. B .  
Foun d .  Res.  J .  69, 86-92.  
1 48 .  See Sanford J .  Grossman & O liver D .  Han, Takeover Bids ,  the Free-Rider 
Problem,  and the Theory of the Corporation, I I  Bell J. Econ. 42, 52  ( 1 980) . The 
traditional Delaware freezeout rule solves this free rider problem by denying frozen out  
shareholders anv portion of the merger gains . DeL Code Ann.  t i t .  8 ,  § 203 ( 1 99 1  ) ,  by 
potent ia l lv  dclaving the business combination by up to three years, may reintroduce i t .  
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pressure to tender that may result from the rule would then addition­
ally justify an otherwise objectionable joint bargaining agreem-ent  be­
tween competing shareholders . 
Compare the shareholders' position with that of the part owner of 
an oil field. There may be some si tuations in which a third party will 
wish to acquire the whole oil field. In the absence of a governmental 
taking, the individual rights holders cannot be forced to sell . They are 
thus in precisely the same position as shareholders were under the old 
freezeout rule .  And, as under the old corporate law rule, rights holders 
may behave strategically, holding out for extra compensation, or may 
try to free ride by remaining as unit holders under new, better field 
management .  In the oil field context, I argued above that a joint bar­
gaining agreement with respect to the sale of drilling right s  would be 
problematic and, indeed, probably a violation of the antitru s t  laws .  To 
argue that the existence of a freezeout rule, which already puts share­
holders in a better position than oil rights holders, would jus tify such a 
joint bargaining arrangement between shareholders is to argue that a 
rule that makes shareholders better off than o ther co-owners of com­
monly held assets justifies making them even better off. If this argu­
ment were accepted, not only would shareholders be better off than 
other co-owners by virtue of the freezeout  rule that enables them to 
overcome the holdout and free riding problems, but they would derive 
additional benefits by relying on that rule as a jus tification for a joint 
bargaining agreement .  The freezeout possibil ity therefore cannot jus­
t ify joint bargaining by shareholders . 
c .  Allocational A1guments . - Even if joint bargaining is not jus t ifiable 
on the grounds that shareholders are co-owners or that shareholders 
face a freezeout, one may s til l ask whether it i s  nonetheless justifiable 
on the ground that i t  makes the market for corporate control more effi­
cient. The question of what rules governing tender offers will maxi­
mize allocational efficiency is hotly contested and depends in s ignificant 
measure on dif-ficult and unknown empirical evidence. 1 49 It is beyond 
the scope of this Article to sort out the debate. Instead, I focus here on 
comparing how this dispute fi ts into the antitrust and corporate law 
frameworks and how, from the antitrus t  perspective, the different argu­
ments relate to familiar antitrust disputes . 
Note first  how difficult it is to fi t the allocational efficiency dispute 
into the normal corporate law fiduciary duty framework. By f(xusing 
on fiduciary duty, corporate law's  traditional jurisprudence truncates 
the inquiry at the point where it  determines whether actions are in the 
149. Among the important contributions to this  debate are Bebchuk,  supra note 1 9 : 
Bebchuk,  Faci l i tat ing Competing Bids .  supra note 1 2 7 ;  Bebchuk,  Reph-. supra note l '2 7 :  
Coffee. supra note I '27; Easterbrook & Fischel .  Auctions and S u n k  Costs. supra n o t e  
I '27; Easterbrook & Fischel . Proper R o l e .  supra note l '2 7 ;  Gilson,  supra n o t e  1 ':!. 7 :  .-\Li n  
Schwanz ,  The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in U t i l i tarian Theorv. 17 J Leg a l  S t u d .  
J ():J ( 1 C)88 ) . 
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interest of shareholders, and often well  before that point .  If joint bar­
gaining, for example, is in the interests of target shareholders , it is fun­
damentally irrelevant whether it  is also allocationally efficient. 
By contrast ,  antitrust has traditionally said that i t  was concerned 
with competition, not competitors . 1 50 Restrictions among competitors 
cannot be jus tified on the grounds that they are in the competi tors ' 
j oint interests ,  but only on the grounds that they increase competi tion . 
Thus , for example,  in Board of Trade v. United States , 1 5 1  an exchange rule 
prohibiting off-hour trades at any price other than the closing bid was 
upheld against a government charge of price fixing on the grounds that 
it  maximized the exchange ' s  efficiency as a competitive market by chan­
neling transactions onto the exchange. 1 52 
The principal efficiency argument that has been made in support of 
j oint bargaining is that permitting it  (by means of a l imited duration 
poison pill) will increase allocational efficiency by s lowing down the 
sale process  sufficiently to allow enough time for the h ighest  valuing 
user to make a bid. 1 53 From the antitrust  perspective , one would be 
skeptical of this argument .  Imagine how suspect an analogous argu­
ment would be from competing widget manufacturers who wished to 
act collectively to slow down the sale process to allow the h ighest  valu­
ing user to buy the widgets .  At the very least ,  the significant premiums 
that result from such joint bargaining would raise a question about the 
necessity of such a restraint in achieving allocational efficiency .  
But does this skepticism lead to Eas terbrook and Fischel ' s  thesis 
that managers should remain passive in response to a tender offer? 1 54 
·whether it does or not depends on the (as yet undetermined) answer to 
the underlying issue of allocational efficiency. To move from asserting 
that joint bargaining by shareholders through their managerial agents 
by means of a poison pill i s  problematic on antitrust grounds to a con­
clusion that target management must remain passive would require ad­
ditional argument. In the normal antitrust context, while competing 
widget manufacturers are precluded from fixing prices ,  they are not 
precluded from individually seeking additional buyers o r  even from 
jointly doing so. Industry advertising to s timulate demand is  common . 
Rather than implying the passivity thesis , this line of argument suggests 
1 50 .  See, e .g . ,  B rown Shoe Co.  v .  Uni ted States,  370 U . S .  294 , 320 ( 1 96 2 ) .  
1 5 ! .  246 U.S. 23 1 ( 1 9 1 8) 
1 52 .  See id .  a t  240- 4 1 .  
1 53 .  See, e . g . ,  B ebchuk, Faci l i tat ing Competing Bids ,  supra note 1 2 7 ,  a t  1 05 1 ;  
B ebchuk, Reply, supra note 1 2 7 ,  a t  39; Haddock et  a l . ,  supra note 2 3 ,  a t  7 0 7 .  7 1 0- 1 1 ;  
Gilson,  supra note 1 27 ,  a t  6 2 .  
1 54 .  Easterbrook a n d  Fischel have argued that  the proper role of target 
management faced with a tender offer is pass ivi ty .  See Easterbrook & Fischel ,  Proper 
Role .  supra note I '2 7 .  at 1 1 78 ;  Easterbrook & Fischel .  Auctions and Sunk C o s t s .  supr<1 
note 1 2 7 .  at 1 7-20.  By contras t ,  see Bebchuk.  Faci l i ta t ing Compet ing B i d s ,  supr<t note 
1 27 (argu ing that  a l lowing managers to seek compet ing bids \\' i l l  maximize shareholder 
ret urns)  and Gilson. supra note 1 '27 (same) . 
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a version of the English approach: target management can seek com­
peting bids ,  can propose alternative transactions, and can lobby share­
holders , but cannot engage in actions that prevent or delay the bid 
from going forward , such as l i tigation or poison pill s . 1 55 
Once one permits target shareholders and target managers to so­
l icit  competing bids ,  to propose alternative transactions ,  or to lobby 
shareholders , i s  the antitrust  perspective then committed to allowing 
them to use poison pil ls to gain the time necessary to do so in  an intelli­
gent and orderly fashion? Again ,  it may be (depending on the determi­
nation of the allocational efficiency issue) , but not necessarily: the 
additional time provided by poison pills may be anticompetitive insofar 
as it permits competitors to coordinate their actions . 1 56 
A number of scholars have advanced an additional efficiency con­
s ideration, arguing that increased premiums from res is tance to tender 
offers (including joint bargaining) may increase allocational efficiency 
by making it more l ikely that targets will invest in value-increasing 
projects . 1 57  In antitrust  terms , this is  an argument that res tricting com­
peti tion i s  just ified because i t  will lead to greater investment .  
From the antitrust perspective, this argument can be  interpreted in  
two ways . On  one level , i t  is  simply a statement about the supply curve 
for companies or the supply curve for investment .  The higher the pre­
miums, i . e . ,  the higher the price, the greater the supply of targets ,  and 
the greater the amount of internal investment by potential targets .  
Such an argument is equivalent to arguing that price fixing i s  jus tified 
because the increased profits make investment by the colluding firms 
more likely. In this form, the argument is a non sequitur. Without 
knowing whether an increase in investment will be efficient or ineffi­
cient, the argument cannot jus tify allowing shareholders to limit 
competition . 1 58 
1 55 .  On the English approach, see, e . g . ,  Bebchuk, supra note 1 9 , at 1 796- 1 80 1 .  
The English rule has been defended as providing an appropriate solution to the 
problem o f  entrenchment by disloyal managers . The argument in the text sugges ts  that 
i t  may likewise be a solution to the competitive dangers of defensive actions by loyal 
managers. 
1 56 .  See Easterbrook & Fischel ,  Auctions and Sunk Costs ,  supra note 1 2 7 ,  a t  4-7 . 
To d raw an exaf:Ylple from antitrust ,  the advance announcement of proposed price 
increases invites price fol lowing or "conscious paral lel ism" while reducing the costs to 
the proposer if  the price rise is not general ly  fol l owed. See, e .g . ,  DuPont v. FTC (Ethyl  
Corp . ) , 729 F.2d 1 28 ,  1 34 (2d Cir. 1 984)  (advance notice of price changes held 
insufficient to es tablish violat ion given special his tory of industry practices) ; United 
States v .  General Elec.  Co. ,  1 977-2 Trade Cases (CC H )  �� 6 1 ,659,  6 1 ,663 ( E . D  Pa.  
1 97 7 )  (price protection plan adopted prospectively) . 
! 57 .  See,  e . g . ,  Haddock et a l . ,  supra note 23 ,  at 707,  7 1 0- 1 1 ;  David W .  Leebro n .  
Games Corporations Plav .  6 1  N .Y . U .  L R e v .  1 53 ,  205- 1 4  ( 1 986) . 
1 58 .  Consider  the related market for init ial  public offerings . M o re companies  arc 
s ta rt ed when t h e  I PO market is hot than "·hen i t  is co ld .  I s  a h o t  I PO market  more or 
less a l locationalh  efficient  than a co ld  ! PO market ) One cannot tell ,,· i t h o u t  kno ,, i n g 
more . All  one kn o\\·s is t hat higher prices call  forth m o re companies .  n o t  t ha t the 
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But there is a second, more interesting interpretation of  the argu­
ment that relates more closely to a claim of allocational efficiency . One 
can read the argument as claiming not simply that higher premiums 
lead to more inves tment, but that allowing shareholders to bargain 
jointly eliminates a collective action problem that interferes with value­
increasing investments .  Specifically, the argument seems to be that un­
less shareholders can bargain with bidders jointly (by means of loyal 
managers) ,  they will fai l  to make at  leas t some investments whose pres­
ent value is  greater than the cost, because their col lective action 
problems may prevent them from realizing the maximum value of those 
investments .  
Stated in these terms ,  the argument is a version of a fairly common 
though controversial antitrust  argument .  The now s tandard defense of 
vertical restraints i s  that they are necessary to solve collec tive action 
problems,  principally free rider problems, that otherwise would pre­
vent the efficient level of dis tributor or retailer inves tment. 1 59 There 
are s imilar suggestions in the horizontal context in Broadcast Music, Inc. 
v. CBS : 1 60 a b lanket l icense to perform copyrighted musical composi­
tions was justified in part as a necessary mechanism for enforcing indi­
vidual copyrights and, by extension, for encouraging an optimal 
investment in creating copyrightable works . 1 6 1 Read this way, the argu­
ment is one in which particular restrictions on competition among 
shareholders are justified because they are , on balance, output-increas­
ing rather than output-restricting. While this is the right sort of argu­
ment to make to jus tify joint bargaining by shareholders-it ties joint 
bargaining to a procompetitive goal-establishing that j oint bargaining 
is , in fact, reasonably necessary to induce the optimal level of invest­
ment is more difficult .  No empirical evidence indicates that sharehold­
ers' inability to coordinate their response to tender offers during the 
pre-Williams Act era of "Saturday Night Special ,"  fas t-track tender of­
fers led to suboptimal inves tment. Without such evidence the argu­
ment remains purely speculative. 
d .  The Ultimate Balancing . - Even if shareholder defendants can es­
tablish that joint bargaining is reasonably necessary to some procompe­
tit ive goals ,  they would s til l have to establish the final s tep of the rule of 
reason analysi s :  that the procompetitive effects of the j oint bargaining 
by shareholders outweigh the anticompetitive effects . Although a gen-
marginal benefit of those companies is greater than the marginal costs .  Similarly ,  the 
fact  that higher tender offer premiums will lead to greater investment in target 
companies does not indicate that l ower premiums l ead to inefficien tly low investment or 
that  the amount of inves tment is efficient at the higher level. 
1 59. See, e .g . ,  Business Elecs . Corp. v .  Sharp , 485 U . S .  7 1 7 , 724 ( 1 988) ; i\1onsanto 
Co. v .  Sprayrite Serv . Corp . ,  4 65 U . S .  75'.!. ,  762-63 ( 1 984) :  Continental  T.V. v .  GTE 
Svlvania, -!33 U.S .  36, 55-56 ( 1 9 77 )  
1 60. 44 1 U . S .  l ( 1 979 ) .  
1 6  i .  S e e  id .  a t  1 8-'.!.0 .  
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eral answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Article, one can 
make a number of preliminary observations .  
Firs t ,  unlike corporate law's traditional fiduciary perspective in 
which joint bargaining is the least ambitious (and easiest) basis for justi­
fying poison pills , from the antitrust  perspective the burden is  on target 
shareholders to justify elimination of competition to tender-a burden 
that so far seems not to have been met. However one comes out on the 
ultimate balancing, one cannot escape the conclusion that joint bar­
gaining by shareholders in response to a tender offer involves clear an­
ticompeti tive effects and potentially important, but less definite, 
procompetitive benefits .  
Second, even i f  an  allocational efficiency defense for joint share­
holder bargaining can be established, the magnitude of the premiums 
that result implicates the hotly contested antitrust  issue of  the extent to 
which increases in allocational efficiency can j us tify significant dis tribu­
tional effects (the transfer of  wealth from buyers to sel lers) . 1 62 In  any 
event, because rent-seeking tends to convert dis tributional effects into 
allocational effects ,  the magnitude of the weal th effects of j oint bargain­
ing should be of significant concern , regardless of one's view of the 
ultimate goals of antitrus t . 1 63 
Finally ,  this balancing, however difficult , addresses critical i ssues 
that are utterly ignored in the traditional corporate law approach . At 
best ,  that approach allows one to ask the question whether joint bar­
gaining is in the interests of the shareholders . That is equivalent to 
asking whether price fixing is in the interests of manufacturers . While 
such an inquiry may be relevant (after al l ,  if price fixing were not in the 
interes ts of manufacturers , then it could be condemned without even 
considering the effects on consumers ) ,  one cannot make it dispositive 
without missing at least half of the story-the Impact on everyone 
else . 1 64 
1 62 .  See sources c i ted supra note 79 .  
1 63 .  See sources ci ted supra note 78 .  
1 64 .  Two-t ier and partial tender offers pose  somewhat d i fferent issues. a l though 
the disappearance of two-tier offers renders these differences of largely academic 
i n terest .  Confronted with a two- t ier tender offer in  which the back end is  less than the 
p re-offer value of the shares to the shareholders, shareholders are subject  to a n  
additional  source of pressure beyond that  presented by one- tier offers . Not only  might 
s hareholders' choice be distorted with respect to that of a sole owner, but  the�: may, at  
least  i n  theory, be put in  a posit ion in which they wi l l  end up worse ofr by not  tendering 
if  the value of the minority share is  less than the price before the offer was made. 
This i n troduces an addit ional j us tificat ion for joint bargaining into the ant i trust 
analysis .  Shareholder defendants might argue that two- tier offers may lead to a market 
fai lure because shareholders may be driven to tender even i f  they value the companv 
more h ighlv than the b idder does.  See, e.g .. Behchuk.  supra note 1 9 .  a t  1 72 3 -26 .  
Furthermore , thev might argue that j o i n t bargain i n g  i s  reasonablv JKcessan t o  cure this 
market fai lure .  
Joint  act ion t o  prev e n t  or repa ir  m arket L1 i lurc is  a class ic  ant i trust  _ j u s t i f ica t i o n  fo r 
collect ive a c t i o n .  See,  e . g . ,  7 A rc cda,  s u p ra n o t e  -+ 9 .  Q! 1 50-t,  at :\ 8 :3 .  The d e b a t e  m er  
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2 .  Populist/Distributional Arguments . - An additional argument may 
be thought to justify different antitrust treatment of shareholders and 
widget manufacturers . Target shareholders are perceived to be 
"weaker" than bidders . 1 65 To the extent that corporate law is  about 
protecting weaker uninformed parties 1 66 agains t  s tronger, better in­
formed parties, one might justify allowing shareholders to band to­
gether to bargain jointly as a way of equalizing bargaining power. A 
s imilar argument can be made in the antitrust context .  Consumers are 
perceived to be weaker than manufacturers so that one reason to pre­
vent cartels i s  to protect weaker consumers from exploitation by 
s tronger manufacturers . 
This populist reading of antitrust and corporate law reflects funda­
mental features of both areas , but a number of differences exi s t  when 
applied to these situations .  Firs t ,  in the antitrust case, the protection of 
the weaker party jus tifies preventing collective action, while in the cor­
porate context it i s  used to permit it. A closer parallel would be with 
preventing bidders from colluding during a tender offer bidding auc­
tion . That case is  truly parallel: in both, one is  preventing the s tronger 
parties from cooperating to the detriment of the weaker. To go beyond 
prohibiting agreements that restrain competition to protect weaker par­
ties,  to permitting agreements that restrain competition to offset supe­
rior bargaining power requires additional argument. In the antitrust  
context, the courts have usually refused to take that s tep . 1 67 
two- tier tender offers can be viewed as a debate over whether such offers create a market 
failure (and thus should be prevented) or whether they repair a market fai lure (and thus 
should be permi tted ) .  In reply to defendant shareholders' market fai lure  argument,  
pla in tiff would argue that two-t ier tender offers are necessary to overcome free riding by 
target shareholders that (potentially) leads to the rej ection of value-increasing tender 
offers and are necessary to allow bidders to capture the ful l  value of  their investment in 
search . See, e .g . ,  Grossman & Hart, supra note 1 48 ,  at  54 . One can argue further that 
two-tier offers, al though perhaps structurally coercive considered independently, 
rein troduce competition to tender that was arguably el iminated by the Wil l iams Act's 
pro rata and best price provis ions .  
A second and separate quest ion is  whether, assuming that two- t ier tender offers can 
cause a market fai lure, joint  bargaining is reasonably necessary to prevent that fai lure, or 
whether a less restrictive alternative might be available. Plaint iffs would presumably 
argue that a fair  price charter provision would suffice to eliminate the market failure, but 
with less res triction on competition among shareholders to tender. 
If one concludes that a collective bargaining agreement in response to a two-tier 
tender offer provides benefits without a l ess restrictive alternative (avoiding market 
failure, possibly increasing allocational efficiency ) ,  but also imposes potentiallv 
s ignificant harm (eliminating competit ion among shareholders, permit t ing free riding) . 
balancing is necessary. The ult imate question of which side is right is well  bevond the 
scope of this Article and, in light of the disappearance of two-tier offers,  largely moot .  
1 65 .  See, e .g . ,  Unocal  Corp. v .  Mesa Petroleum Co. ,  493 A . 2d 946,  955-58 (Del .  
1 985) . 
1 66. See supra notes 1 8- 1 9  a n d  accornpa n v i n g  text .  
l ll 7 .  See S u l l i v a n .  s upra n o t e  1 2 3 ,  at 286-89.  The co u n te n a i l in g p01HT 
j u s t i hcat ion for collective barga i n i n g  i s  n o t  \'en pers uas iH' . If the p re m i s e  is correct ,  
t h a t  i s .  i f  a sel ler  has market po\I'CT,  a l l o11 i n g  buvers to barga m j o i n t h  m� l\  make the  
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A second difficulty with the populist justification is that the percep­
tion of shareholders as weak and uninformed is now simply inaccurate. 
Over the last twenty years , shareholdings have become increasingly 
concentrated. Institutional investors now hold approximately forty-five 
percent of all U .S .  equities and an even greater percentage of the larg­
est companies . 1 68 Moreover, because all shareholders get the benefit 
of the highest price offered to any one of them, individual shareholders 
benefit from the sophistication of the large shareholders . 1 69 In such a 
world, i t  no longer seems correct to think of shareholders as wards of 
the court. 1 70 
3 .  A Doctrinaljustification . - Finally, one might argue that regard­
less of the merits ,  Congress has decreed that competition among share­
holders in tendering stands on a fundamentally different footing than 
other competition among shareholders and, by decree, should not be 
analyzed under the antitrust  laws .  The Williams Act 's  pro rata and best 
price rules , 1 7 1 the provisions that require a bidder making a tender of­
fer to accept shares to an oversubscribed offer on a pro rata basis and 
to pay all shareholders the highest price offered regardless of when 
they tendered their shares , provide the core of this argument. 
The purpose and effect of these provisions is to l imit competition 
to tender among shareholders of a target company. As Senator 
Williams stated in explaining the Act, the pro rata rule "would outlaw 
tender offers on a first-come, first-served basis and thus eliminat[ e] 
pressure on shareholders to make hasty deposits . " 1 72 Similarly, the 
House and Senate reports indicate that the purpose of the best price 
rule was " to assure fair treatment of those persons who tender their 
shares at the beginning of the tender period, and to assure equality of 
situation worse by further restricting output .  See id. For a detailed discussions of the 
conditions under which countervail ing power will and will not be efficient, see F . M .  
Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market S tructure and Economic Performance 527-35 
( 3 d  ed. 1 990) . 
1 68 .  See Carolyn K. Brancato, The Pivotal Role of Institutional  I nvestors in Capital 
M arkets, in Institutional Investing: The Challenges and Responsibil i ties of the 2 1 st  
Century 3 ,  1 4  (Arnold Sametz ed . ,  1 99 1 ) ; Rock,  supra note 8 ,  at 447- 4 8 .  
1 69 .  See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in M arkets on t h e  Basis o f  
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis ,  1 27 U .  P a .  L. Rev. 630, 638 
( 1 97 9) (competit ion among firms for shoppers may protect non-shoppers, at least in the 
absence of an abi l i ty to price discriminate ) ;  Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect 
Information in Markets for Contract Terms :  The Examples of Warranties and Security 
Interests ,  69 Ya.  L. Rev. 1 38 7 ,  1 420-24 ( 1 983)  (same, applied to warranty and security 
interest terms) ;  M ichael H .  Schil l ,  An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 
77 Va.  L .  Rev.  489,  5 1 7-2 1 ( 1 99 1 )  (applying shopper argument to mortgagor protection 
terms) . 
1 70 .  See, e . g . ,  Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp . ,  383 U . S .  363 ,  37 1 ( 1 966) 
( i l l us trating j udicia! concern fo r unsophis ticated shareholders ) .  
1 7 1 .  1 5  U . S . C .  § 78n(d) (6) ( 1 988 ) ; i d .  § 78n(cl ) ( 7 ) . 
1 72 .  ! i 3 Con g. Rec . 856 (jan .  ! 8 , J 967) ( s ta t ement of Sen. Wil l iams ) .  
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treatment among all shareholders who tender their shares . "  1 73 On this 
argument,  the Williams Act has already eliminated the competi tion to 
tender that would face shareholders in a s tate of nature . 
In doctrinal terms ,  the ques tion is whether the pro rata and best 
price rules impliedly repeal the Sherman Act in the tender offer con­
text .  I have argued elsewhere that the Williams Act does not and 
should not be interpreted as any sort of implied repeal of  the Sherman 
Act as i t  applies to the market for control . 1 74 Rather, it should be (and 
has been) read as a limited legislative attempt to impose minimum 
ground rules on the tender offer proces s . 1 75 Consistent with the cases 
interpreting the Will iams Act, the Act should be interpreted as leaving 
undisturbed whatever antitrust restrictions exist on j oint bargaining 
agreements among shareholders because the Act contains no express 
exemption from the antitrust laws,  and because there is no plain repug­
nancy or irreconcilable conflict between the pro rata and best  price 
rules and the preservation of the remaining competit ion among share­
holders . Indeed, the fact that the Williams Act does not prohibit ,  and 
has not been interpreted to prohibit ,  1 76 two-tier or partial tender of­
fers-which reintroduce strong competition among shareholders even 
under a proration rule-is substantial evidence that it should not be 
read as fully insulating shareholders from competitive pressures . 
The language of the Williams Act ,  i ts legislative history, and the 
cases interpreting it are too sparse and unclear to require either conclu­
sion . A court could come out either way . This leads the inquiry to the 
underlying issue with which we s tarted:  should competit ion among 
s hareholders to tender be protected? 
4 .  Summary .  - Joint bargaining among target shareholders is thus 
deeply problematic from the antitrust perspective. On the anticompeti­
tive side, joint bargaining l ike other cartel activity, leads to the conver­
sion of buyer surplus into seller surplus , with attendant al locational and 
dis tributional effects . By contras t , j oint bargaining's procornpetitive ef­
fects , while potentially s ignificant ,  are less clearly demons trated . On 
the current evidence, shareholder joint bargaining would be of  doubt­
ful validity under an antitrust analysi s .  
My treatment of agreements among target shareholders eliminat­
ing competition to tender is thus symmetrical with my treatment else-
i 7 3 .  S .  Rep . No.  550,  90th Cong . ,  l s t  S e s s .  1 0  ( 1 967 ) ;  H . R .  R ep .  N o .  1 7 1 1 ,  90th 
Cong. ,  2d Sess .  1 1  ( 1 968 ) .  
1 74 .  See Rock,  supra note 2 0 .  a t  i 39 1 -96. 
1 75 .  See id.  
1 '7 6 .  See Radol \' . Th omas,  77'2 F.2d 2 4 4 ,  255 (6th Cir .  1 98 5 ) .  ccrt .  denied.  4 77 
L' . S .  903 ( 1 986) ;  Note.  Front-End Loaded Tender Offers :  The Applicat ion of Federal 
and S tate Law to an I n novati\e Corpora te  Acq u i s i t ion Techmque.  1 3 1  U .  Pa. L. Re1· . 
3B9.  394- 4 1 3  ( 1 982 ) .  lh h o l d i n g  in C TS t h a t  the \\' i l l i �1 m s  .-\ c t  doc.s not precl u d e  s t �t tes 
from enact i n g  legislation t o  protect sharchoidcrs from the pressure impdsed b1·  t 11·o- t ier  
lender  offers . the S upreme C : o u n  i m p l icdh recognized tkt t  the  \\' i l 1 i a m s  .-\ ct  i t s el f '  docs 
not proh i b i t  s u ch b i d s .  
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w h e r e  o f  agree m e n t s  a m o n g  competing t e n d er o ffer b i d d e rs 
el iminating competit ion for co ntrol .  1 77 As I have argue d ,  s uch agree­
ments  among competing bidders should b e  subj ect to S ection 1 o f  the 
S h erman Act and indeed s hould b e  per s e  i l le ga l .  By contras t ,  an 
agreement among n on-bidders (fo r  exampl e ,  the typical agreement 
a m o n g  bidder shareholders establ ishing o r  maintai n i n g  the bidder 
firm) would not raise any antitrust concern b ecau s e  when such share­
h ol ders are not themselves bidders or p o tential bidders , a greements 
among them do not eliminate any competiti o n .  
T h e  antitrust perspective o n  tender o ffers h a s  a number o f  virtue s . 
Firs t ,  it calls into question j oint bargaining by s hareho ld ers and the 
functional  equivalent,  the u s e  of a poison pil l  by l o yal  managers . The 
anti trust perspective l inks the issue directly to the more general  prob­
l e m  o f  the circum stances under which j oint  bargaining b y  competi tors 
o r  p otential competitors i s  j us tifiab l e .  A s  such, i t  provides a pers p ective 
lacking in the fiduciary duty analysis which , by framing the question in 
terms o f  management dis loyalty and entrenchment,  largely assumes 
that the use o f  poison p i l l s  b y  l oyal  managers is  unproblematic .  
I n  additi o n ,  the perspective s ugges ts that antitrus t  provi des  the 
natural doctrinal framework for law and economics analys es . The core 
o f  the analyses of tender o ffers-allocational  efficiency-fi ts far better 
into a j urisprudence o f  competition than a j urisprudence o f  fiduciary 
duty .  
But  the shift in perspectives may accomplish even more.  By locat­
ing the issues within the antitrust  framework,  they are l inked to a more 
general debate o n  the relationship between competition and coopera­
t ion.  I n  demanding consis tency b et'Neen the treatment of competing 
widget manufacturers and competing shareholders , the anti trus t p er­
s pective forces the articulation of the relevant differences,  if any, be­
tween the two . 
D .  Stakeholder Coalitions 
In a recent art i c l e ,  Professor John C o ffe e  describes the in terplay 
b etween bidders , man agers , shareholders,  and n o n-equity s takeholders 
during battles for control in terms of the formation and dis s o lution o f  
coalitions . 1 78 As pressure on managers from shareholders a n d  bidders 
i n creases , management may s eek to form coalit ions with b o ndholders 
or empl o yees against  shareholders and bidders . Shareholders may seek 
t o  form coalitions with bidders against  b ondholders,  empl oyees , and 
m anagers.  Employees and bondhol d ers may form coalit ions with bid­
ders again s t  shareholders and managers, and s o  o n .  
In describing the bargaining p rocess  among the different corpo-
1 77 .  See Rock.  supra note 20 ,  at  1 386- 1 -W2 .  
1 78 .  See John C .  Coffee, Jr . ,  Cnstahle Coal ! l ions :  Corporate GO\ ernance as a 
Mul t i -Plavcr Came, 78 Geo . L.J .  1 495 ( !  990) 
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rate constituencies , Coffee describes a process in which actors at times 
fail to achieve their collective self-interest .  Coffee characterizes this 
failure as a "market failure ,"  1 79 asserting that if parties are unable to 
make credible commitments, they "may make choices that yield individ­
ually rational ,  but collectively irrational , outcomes . " 1 80 Moreover, 
courts, by refusing to enforce parties ' commitments, may be ins trumen­
tal in bringing about this (apparently regrettable)  s tate of affairs : 
"Courts are not necessarily at s tage center in this process ,  and legal 
rules that attempt to preclude collusion may only complicate the bar­
gaining process by locking the parties into a familiar problem known to 
game theorists as the ' Prisoner' s  Dilemma. '  " 1 8 1  
Although Coffee provides a persuasive positive account,  in these 
more normative comments one sees the corporate law intuition shining 
through . He moves from the identification of a collective action di­
lemma to the characterization of that dilemma as a " market failure" to 
the conclusion-albeit very cautious and tentative-that escape should 
be facilitated. But the antitrust perspective teaches that each move is a 
distinct and by no means obvious normative step.  Assuming that 
Coffee is correct in observing that at  times s takeholders are unable to 
achieve their collectively ra tional result because of an inabil ity to make 
enforceable commitments, is that a failure or a success ?  Is  the stake­
holder collective choice dilemma one from which escape should be fa­
cilitated or  prevented ? 
How one answers these ques tions depends on where one s tarts . 
Suppose one adopts a shareholder primacy model of corporate govern­
ance, that i s ,  the view that managers should govern the corporation to 
maximize shareholders ' gains ,  subj ect to external constraints imposed 
by statute and regulation . 1 82 On that view, the criterion for whether to 
facilitate or frustrate escape would be whether the manager/s take­
holder coalition interfered with ensuring that managers represented 
shareholders. In the shareholder primacy model, then, managers and 
non-equity s takeholders should be prevented from escaping from their 
collective action problem because a successful escape would permit 
managers and stakeholders to form an al liance agains t the interests of 
the shareholders . 1 83 Indeed, on this view, the s takeholders ' dilemma, 
1 79 .  Id .  at  1 532 .  
1 80.  Id .  at 1 545 .  
1 8 1 .  Id .  at 1 499.  
1 82 .  See,  e .g . ,  Clark, supra note 8 ,  § 1 .2 . 3 . ,  a t  1 7- 1 9 , § 1 6 . 2 . 1 ,  a t  677-8 1 .  
1 83 .  That of course leaves open the question that courts have had to  s truggle wi th :  
how do you distinguish between true arm's  length agreements and col lus ive behavior) 
Compare Gearhart I ndus . ,  Inc .  v.  Smith lnt ' l ,  Inc . ,  592 F.  Supp . 203,  224-28 (N.D. Tex. 
1 984) ,  aff'd in  pan, vacated in part , and remanded, 74 1 F.2d 707 (5 th  Cir. 1 984) 
(declining to enjoin "springing warrant" in bond that was functional equivalent to 
poison pill rights offering) and In re Desoto , I nc .  Shareholder Lit ig . ,  [ 1 989-90 Transfer 
B inder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 94 ,964 (Del .  Ch. 1 990) (change of con t rol provision 
tnserted into sales con tract  wi th largest customer not enjoined) with Air Line Pilots 
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like the Cartel ists '  Dilemma, is a market success ,  not a failure. 
But Coffee approaches the question from a somewhat different 
perspective. In place of the shareholder primacy model, Coffee inclines 
towards a broader view of corporate governance according to which 
" implied contracts" or "implicit bargains" between the firm and s take­
holders should be respected. 1 84 On this view, because such expecta­
tions are not (and, assertedly cannot be) protected by explicit and 
enforceable contracts , s takeholder coalitions should be permitted.  One 
can conclude that such mechanisms are appropriate, however, only if 
one takes the view that :  ( 1 )  stakeholders have entitlements in the firm 
beyond those embodied in explicit contracts ;  (2) those entitlements can 
only be protected by means of coalitions with other constituencies ;  and 
(3) stakeholders cannot be protected without permitting or facilitating 
escape from their collective action dilemma. 1 85 
A second argument for helping s takeholders and managers over­
come their collective action problems could be made if one could show 
that permitting or  faciiitating escape would make the firm more valua­
ble. For example, if one concluded that tin parachutes , employee rep­
resentation on the board of directors,  or ESOPs improved a firm's 
labor relations and led to more efficient operation of the firm, 1 86 and 
Ass 'n  Int'l v .  UAL Corp . ,  7 1 7  F .  Supp. 575 ,  586-89 (N .D .  Ill .  1 989) (enjoining "labor 
contract poison pi ll " ) .  
1 84 .  See Coffee, supra note 1 78 ,  a t  1 548-49. Coffee's endorsement of s takeholder 
coali t ions is not unqualified since, as he notes,  "coali t ion" may at t imes simply be no 
more than a synonym for "collusion ."  I d. at 1 54 7 .  Nevertheless, he argues that 
stakeholders ought to be able to  protect themselves in takeover situations and, absent  
appropriate legislat ion or  the abil i ty to contract expressly, coalit ions are their bes t  bet 
and for that reason ought to be respected . Sec also John C.  Coffee, Jr . ,  Shareholders 
Versus Managers : The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 Mich. L .  Rev . I ,  2 3 -24,  93 - 1 03 
( 1 986)  (examining how perception of modern corporation as a complex set of contracts 
among various consti tuencies should affect subs tance of corporate takeover/defense 
laws) ; John C .  Coffee, Jr. , The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on 
Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1 988 Wis. L. Rev. 435, 446-50 ( 1 988) 
( suggesting model of corporate directors as mediators between shareholders and 
s takeholders to protect implicit and explicit contract s ) .  
1 85 .  This view is analogous to  the s train in  Broadcast Music ,  I nc .  v .  CBS,  44 1 U .S .  
1 ,  1 6-24 ( 1 979) ,  permi tting blanket l icenses and j oint  enforcement as  a necessary means 
of enforcing copyrights . Broadcast Muszc differs from the corporate governance context 
in that copyright holders are beneficiaries of a s tatutory entitlement that the court 
believed would be worthless without collective enforcement .  By contrast, stakeholders '  
ent i tlement to protect " implicit contracts" is less clear. But that  may have been changed 
by state antitakeover legislat ion. One reading of those statutes is that most seek to 
establish precisely that entitlement. See generally Lyman Johnson & David Mi l lon,  
Miss ing the Point About State Takeover S tatutes , 87  M ich . L. Rev. 846, 848 ( 1 989) ; 
Mi l lon ,  supra note 1 34 ,  at 255-70. 
1 86 .  See, e.g. ,  Alexander C.  Gavis, A Framework for Satisfying Corporate 
Directors' Responsibil i ties Under State Nonshareholder Constituency S tatutes : The Use 
of Explicit Contracts, 1 38 U. Pa . L .  Rev. 1 4 5 1 ,  1 479-9 1 ( 1 990) :  Patrick J .  Rvan, 
Corporate Directors and the "Social Costs" of Takeovers-Reflections on the Tin 
Parachute. 64 Tul. L .  Rev . 3 ,  38- 48 ( 1 989 ) .  
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that markets were sufficiently competitive to  prevent rent-seeking, that 
might be a reason for establishing appropriate mechanisms for collec­
tive action. 
But unti l  proponents of stakeholder coalitions establish one of 
these premises ,  they cannot conclude that  the fai lure of s takeholder co­
alitions is a collective action failure rather than a collective action 
success . 
E .  Stale Takeover Regulation and the Shennan Act 
Both the plausibility and importance of the antitrus t  perspective 
are further demonstrated by the insight provided when the focus is 
shifted to the apparently unrelated issue of the constitutionality of s tate 
antitakeover s tatutes . The antitrus t  perspective redirects the analysis in 
a unique and revealing way. 
To date, the analyses of s tate takeover s tatutes have been limited to 
two doctrinal frameworks :  the dormant Commerce Clause and pre­
emption by the Williams Act. 1 37 Neither approach has been particu­
larly satisfactory in responding to what i s  most troubling about these 
state legislative initiatives : the state's attempts ,  often at the instigation 
of self-interested managers of large s ta te corporations ,  to interfere 
wi th-indeed, to opt out of-the competitive market for corporate 
control . 1 88 
1 87 .  See CTS Corp. v. Dvnamics Corp . ,  48 1 U . S .  69, 78-94 ( 1 98 7 ) ;  Edgar v .  M ITE 
Corp . ,  457 U.S .  624.  630- 4 6  ( 1 98 2 ) ;  Allen Boyer, \-Vhen i t  Comes to Host i le Tender 
Offers, Just Say No: Commerce Clause and Corporation Law in CTS Corp. v. Dynanucs 
Co1p. ofAmenca , 57 U .  Cin .  L. Rev. 539, 540- 4 3  ( 1 98 8 ) ;  Maureen B .  Callahan & David ] 
Burman, The Validity of Washington's Anti takeover Act Under the Commerce and 
Supremacy Clauses. 1 3  U. Puget Sound L Rev. 4 1  passim ( 1 989) ; Daniel R .  Fischel , 
From ,\liTE to CTS :  State Anti-Takeover Statutes, the Williams Act ,  the Commerce 
Clause, and Ins ider Trading, 1 98 7  Sup.  Ct .  Rev. 4 7 ,  7 1 -90 ( 1 98 7 ) ;  Donald C .  
Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Polit ics o f  Corporate Takeovers :  A Comment 
on CTS Corp. u. Dynamics Corp. ofA menca , 1 0 1  Harv. L Rev. 96 passim ( 1 98 7 ) ;  Robert A.  
Prentice, The Role of S tates in Tender Offers : An Analysis of CTS ,  1 988 Colum. Bus.  L 
Rev. I ,  1 3 -2 1 ,  3 3 - 40 ( 1 98 8 ) ;  Donald H .  Regan ,  S iamese Essays : ( I )  CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of A merica and Dormant Commerce C lause Doctrine; ( I I )  Extraterri torial 
State Legislation ,  85 Mich. L. Rev. 1 865 ,  1 865-84 ( ! 98 7 ) ;  Elliott ] .  Weiss ,  What Lawyers 
Do When the Emperor Has No Clothes: Evaluating CTS Corp. v. Dynamics C01p. of Amenca 
and Its Progeny (pts .  I & I I ) ,  7 8  Ceo. LJ .  1 655 ,  1 67 3 -82 ( 1 990) . 79 Ceo. LJ . 2 1 1  ( 1 990) 
[ hereinafter Weiss ,  Emperor I and Weiss,  Emperor II] (discuss ing ful ly  briefs and 
opinions in twelve post-CTS consti tutional challenges to s tate takeover s ta tu tes arising 
in the two years after the Supreme Court's opinion in CTS ,  all of which l imi ted analysis 
to Will iams Act preemption and the dormant Commerce Clause) . 
1 88 .  Judge Posner articulated the concern clearly: 
Even if  a corporation's tangible assets are immovable, the efficiency with which 
they are employed and the proportions in  which the earn ings they generate are 
divided between management and shareholders depends on  the market for 
corporate control-an in terstate, indeed international, market that the S tate of 
Indiana is not authorized to opt out of. as in effect it has done in this statute. 
CTS ,  794 F.2d 250. 264 (7 th Cir. 1 986) ,  rev 'd ,  48 1 U . S .  69 ( 1 98 7 ) ;  see also I\Ii l lon ,  supra 
1 992 ]  ANTITR UST LENS 549 
Under the dormant Commerce Clause, the inquiry has focused on 
two principal issues : discrimination against out of s tate actors and the 
burden on interstate commerce resulting from potentially inconsistent 
regulation by the s tates . 1 89 In the leading Supreme Court case on the 
cons titutionality of s tate takeover s tatutes, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corp. , 1 90 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Indiana control 
share acquisition statute 1 9 1  agains t  a dormant Commerce Clause chal­
lenge on the grounds that i t  did not discriminate against out of s tate 
actors and, because it was limited to s tate-chartered corporations,  did 
not create a significant possibility of inconsis tent s tate regulation. 1 92 
By limiting takeover legislation to s tate-chartered corporations ,  
s tates have been able to accomplish a large part  of their goal of insulat­
ing s tate corporations from the competitive market for control .  Pos t­
CTS ,  the dormant Commerce Clause has ceased to provide any mean­
ingful limit on takeover legislation governing s tate-chartered corpora­
tions . 1 93 But in focusing on discrimination and the possibil ity of 
inconsistent regulation, the dormant Commerce Clause analysis fails to 
address the more fundamental subs tantive questions relating to compe­
tition posed by a state's opting out of the competitive national market 
for con trol . The Commerce Clause 's  focus on political union makes it 
an unsuitable framework for evaluating the effect of s tate restrictions 
on competition. 1 94 
note 1 34 ,  at 225 (discussing state anti takeover legislation as attempts to opt out of a 
competit ive market for control) .  
The quest ion posed by state takeover legislation is whether, and under what 
circumstances, a state is authorized to opt out of a competitive market for corporate 
control .  
1 89 .  See Healy v .  Beer lnsl . ,  Inc. ,  49 1 U.S. 324 ,  3 35- 43 ( 1 985 ) ;  CTS ,  48 1 U.S.  at 
87-89; Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers , Inc . ,  447 U .S .  27, 37-49  ( 1 980) . 
1 90 .  48 1 U .S .  69 ( 1 987 ) .  
1 9 1 .  Ind .  Code Ann. § §  23- 1 - 42- 1 to 23- 1 - 42- 1 1  (Burns 1 989) . 
1 92 .  In  CTS ,  the Supreme Court largely ignored the uncertain and unstructured 
Pike balancing of burdens on out of state in terests against benefits to in s tate in teres ts .  
See Pike v .  Bruce Church, Inc. ,  397 U.S.  1 37 ,  1 42 ( 1 970) . Whether the Pike test survives 
CTS ,  either in general or with regard to state takeover legislat ion, i s  unclear. See CTS ,  
48 1 U .S .  at  95-96 (Scalia, J . ,  concurring) (" [The Pike balancing) i s  i l l  su i ted to the 
judicial function and should be undertaken rarely i f  at  al l . " ) ;  Amanda Acquis i t ion Corp. 
v .  Universal Foods Corp . ,  877 F .2d 496, 505-09 (7th Cir. )  (Easterbrook , ] . ) ,  cert. denied, 
1 1 0 S. Ct .  367 ( 1 989) ;  Regan, supra note 1 87,  at  1 866-68;  Weiss, Emperor I, supra note 
1 87 ,  a t  ! 674;  Weiss, Emperor I I ,  supra note 1 87 ,  at  238-64 (discussing post-CTS 
corporate law cases: all but Amanda apply Pike tes t even though courts are uncertain of 
i ts continued vitality) . 
1 93 .  See, e .g . ,  Weiss, Emperor I I ,  supra note 1 87,  a t  225-64 (discussing post-CTS 
cases upholding state takeover statutes covering s tate chartered corporations) . By 
contrast ,  the dormant Commerce Clause cont inues to restrain extra-territorial takeover 
legislat ion .  See id .  at 2 1 7-25 .  
1 94 .  A s  Tribe points out .  " the negative implications o f  the Commerce Clause 
derive ccntrallv from a polit ical theory of union, not primarily from an economic theorv 
of free trade. The function of the clause is to ensure nat ional solidarity. not national 
efTic iency . "  Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitut ional Law 25 (Supp.  1 979) . 
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The Williams Act preemption analysis has similarly failed to ad­
dress these fundamental issues relating to competit ion. 1 95 As the 
Williams Act does not explicitly preempt any s tate takeover regulation, 
the preemption analysis has necessarily focused on the implied pre­
emption question whether a s tate's s tatute frustrates the purposes of 
the Act . In CTS ,  the Court took a l imited view of the Williams Act as 
only imposing general federal securities law disclosure requirements 
and basic procedural rules for tender offers . 1 96 Casting doubt on the 
broad view of the purposes of the Williams Act as mandating neutrality 
between management and bidder contained in the plurali ty opinion in 
Edgar v. MITE Corp. , 1 97 the CTS Court held that, even accepting the 
MITE view, the Indiana s tatute withstood challenge because i t  pro­
tected shareholders and posed only an illusory conflict with the Wil­
l iams Act time schedule . 1 98 
The lack of any clear commitment to a competitive market for con­
trol in the Williams Act and its legislative history, combined with the 
relative opacity of the CTS opinion, 1 99 makes the Will iams Act a se­
verely limited framework within which to consider attempts by  s tates to 
opt out of, or to enable s tate corporations to opt out of, competi tion in 
that market. The content and s tructure of the Williams Act-a s tatute 
imposing disclosure requirements on and ground rules for tender of­
fers-shifts the inquiry away from these troubling aspects of s tate take­
over legislation. In implicitly rejecting the AUT£ plurali ty ' s  broad view 
of the Williams Act, the CTS Court seems also to have rej ected the in­
clusion of a concern with preserving a competitive market for control 
into the Williams Act preemption analys i s . 200 
1 95 .  See sources cited supra note 1 8  7 .  
1 96 .  See  CTS, 48 1 U .S .  at  79 .  
1 97 .  457 U .S .  624 ( 1 982 ) .  
1 98 .  See  CTS ,  48 1 U .S .  at  8 1 -84 .  In  contrast to  the  CTS Court 's narrower 
conception of the Williams Act, the Al!TE plurality had argued that the u l t imate policy 
underlying the Act was " investor protection" to be achieved by " maintaining the 
balance between management and the bidder ."  AUTE,  457 U .S .  at 634 .  The plurality 
would have held the I l l inois ant i takeover statute at issue in A'fiTE to be preempted 
because it upset this "policy of neutral i ty" by 1) providing a 20-day p recommencement 
period that unduly favored incumbent management 2 )  providing for a h earing on the 
tender offer without a deadline which would allow management " to stymie indefinitely a 
takeover" and 3) allowing the I l l inois Secretary of S tate to pass on  the " fairness of the 
tender offer at  the expense of ' investor au tonomy . '  " Id. a t  635-40 .  
1 99 .  The CTS opinion is somewhat opaque on why the  Indiana statute was not  
preempted, on whether any  state statute tha t  d id  not directly conflict wi th the Will iams 
Act would be preempted on the grounds that it "frustra ted the purposes" of the 
Will iams Act, and finally, on whether the Will iams Act would preempt more restrictive 
s tate takeover s tatutes . Weiss, Emperor I, supra note 1 87 ,  at 1 678-8 2 .  
200. I n  :\liTE, Justice White, joined b y  Jus tices Burger and Blackmun ,  had argued 
that any state legislation that in terfered with what he saw as the Wil l iams Act policv of 
neutrality between bidders and target management was preempted. See .\/ !TE ,  457 U .S .  
at 630-34.  In h i s  related discussion of the  constitutionality of  the  statute under t he  Plkt 
balancing tes t ,  sec supra note 1 92 ,  Jus tice White, this time joined by Jus tices Burger. 
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What the cases and commentators have uniformly missed is what 
seems almost too obvious from the antitrust  perspective: the first and 
most appropriate place to look for a national commitment to competi­
tive markets and for restrictions on s tate attempts to opt out of compet­
i tive markets is not the dormant Commerce Clause or the Williams Act, 
but the Sherman Act . I t  is the Sherman Act that es tablishes competition 
as the fundamental principle of commerce .20 1  And it is antitrust  that, 
in other contexts ,  has repeatedly been forced to confront the extent to 
which s tates may displace the competitive processes protected by the 
Sherman Act. Given the confused and obscure elements of antitrust 
federalism doctrine, it is hard to claim that antitrust offers clear and 
obvious answers to the questions posed by s tate takeover l egis lation . 
Rather, I make the more modest claim that antitrust federalism pro­
vides a useful way of thinking about the difficult issues raised by s tate 
takeover legislation and for relating s tate attempts to displace competi­
tion in the market for control to other s tate attempts to displace market 
competition. 
1 .  The Pa:cker Doctrine . -The essence of antitrust federalism, also 
known as the "Parker state action doctrine, "202 is the proposition that 
the Shennan Act prohibits private action that displaces competition, 
but does not proscribe anticompetitive restraints imposed by a S tate as 
an act of government.203 Ultimately, the Parker doctrine reflects a con-
S tevens, O'Connor, and Powel l ,  held that the I l l inois statute imposed a burden on 
inters tate commerce by interfering with "the reallocation of economic resources to their 
h ighest valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and competit ion ." .i"\1/TE , 
4 5 7  U.S .  at 643 (cit ing Eas terbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note ! 27 ,  at 1 1 73 -74) .  
This view of the Wil l iams Act and the Commerce Clause as protecting a competitive 
market for control was clearly rejected by the court in CTS .  
20 1 .  See, e .g . ,  Ci ty o f  Lafayette v.  Louisiana Power & Light C o . ,  435 U.S .  3 8 9 ,  398 
( 1 978)  ("Congress ,  exercising the full extent of i ts constitu tional power, sought  to 
establish a regime of competition as the fundamental principle governing commerce in  
th i s  country ."  ( footnotes omitted) ) ;  Uni ted S tates v .  Topco Assocs . ,  405 U.S .  596, 6 1 0  
( 1 9 7 2 )  (" [Federal antitrust laws] are the Magna Carta o f  free en terprise. They are as 
importa!ll to the preservation of economic freedom . . .  as the Bill of Rights is to the 
p ro tection of our fundamental personal freedoms." ) ;  Northern Pac. Ry. v .  Uni ted S tates, 
356 U.S .  l ,  4 ( 1 958)  (" [Federal antitrust law] rests on the premise that the unrestrained 
in teraction of competitive forces wil l  yield the best allocation of our economic resources , 
the lowest prices , the h ighest quality and the greatest material progress ,  while at the 
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic 
poli tical and social institutions . " ) .  
202.  After the leading case o f  Parker v .  Brown, 3 1 7  U.S .  34 1 ( 1 94 3 ) .  
203.  See i d .  at  350-5 2 ;  Goldfarb v .  Virginia S tate Bar, 42 1 U.S .  7 7 3 ,  7 8 8  ( 1 975) . 
For recent informative and enlightening discussions ,  crit icisms, and reformulations of 
the Parker doctrine, see Frank H .  Eas terbrook, Ant itrust and the Economics of 
Federal ism, 26 J .L. & Econ. 23 , 45-49 ( 1 983) ; Einer R .  Elhauge, The Scope of Anti trust 
Process ,  1 04 Harv. L .  Rev. 668, 668-729 ( 1 99 1 ) ;  Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust  and S tate 
Action : Economic Efficiency and the Pol i t ical Process ,  96 Yale L.J 486,  508- 1 8  ( 1 98 7 ) ;  
Thomas M . Jorde, Antitrust and the  New State Action Doctrine: A Return to  Deferential 
Economic Federalism, 75 Cal. L .  Rev. 2 2 7 ,  229-34 , 247-56 ( 1 987 ) ; William H .  Page, 
Ant i t rus t ,  Federalism, and the Regulatory Process :  A Reconstruc t ion and Cri t ique of 
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s trained view of antitrus t  as limited to the prevention of private re­
s traints of trade rather than as embodying an overarching commitment 
to competitive markets or a view that economically inefficient res traints 
are agains t public policy. 204 At the same time, antitrus t  federalism re­
flects a strong vision of federalism that permits s tates to choose alterna­
tive
-
forms of economic regulation . 205 This two-faceted view, precisely 
because it is generally applicable to s tate economic regulation , provides 
an important perspective on s tate takeover legislation .  
The attempt t o  distinguish between private and s tate restraints o n  
competition has led t o  doctrinal intricacy and, some argue, incoher­
ence.206 Einer Elhauge provides the most  comprehensive and compel­
ling description of the numerous and somewhat incons is tent cases . He  
shows that the cases embody a 
process view that restraints on competition must be  subj ect  to 
antitrust  review whenever the persons controlling the terms of 
the restraints s tand to profit financially from the restraints they 
impose.  Conversely, res traints are immune from antitrust re­
view whenever financially disinterested and politically accountable 
persons control and make a substantive decision in favor of 
the terms of the challenged restraint before i t  i s  imposed on 
the market .  207 
He argues further that distinguishing between private and s tate action 
by reference to the financial disinterest and political accountability of 
the decision maker is the most  effective way of furthering the antitru s t  
goal of  preventing private restraints of trade and the shift in wealth that 
accompanies them, while retaining a deference to s tate economic regu­
lation that is essential to federal ism.208 The compromise embodied in 
antitrust  federalism holds promise for resolving the analogous tensions 
created by s tate takeover legislation . 
2 .  Antitrust Federalism and State Takeover Legislation . - The Sherman 
Act intersects with s tate legislation in two separate but related l i tigation 
the State Action Exemption After J'vfidcal A luminum , 6 1  B.U. L .  Rev. 1 099,  1 1 2 5-36 
( 1 98 1 )  (crit icizing actual s tate supervision requirement) ; S .  Paul Posner, The Proper 
Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Law, 49 N.Y .U .  L.  Rev. 
693 passim ( 1 97 4 ) ;  Matthew L.  Spitzer, Anti trust Federalism and Rational Choice 
Poli tical Economy: A Crit ique of Capture Theory, 6 1  S .  Cal. L.  Rev. 1 29 3 ,  1 3 1 8-26 
( 1 988) ;  John S. Wiley ,  Jr . ,  A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federali sm ,  99 H arv. L. Rev. 
7 1 3 ,  729-39 ( 1 986) .  
204 . See Elhauge, supra note 203,  at 672.  
205 .  As such ,  Parker is a counterpart to the contemporaneous rejection of  
subs tantive due process .  On the relation between the Parker doctrine and the rejection 
of substantive due process ,  see Paul R .  Verkui l ,  S tate Action, Due Process, and Antitrust :  
Reflections on Parker v .  Brown , 75 Colum.  L .  Rev .  3 2 8 ,  330-4 1 ( 1 97 5 ) .  
206 . See Easterbrook ,  supra note 2 0 3 ,  a t  2 6 ;  Page, supra note 203 ,  at 1 099; Wiley, 
supra note 203, at 7 1 4 .  
207.  Elhauge, supra note 2 0 3 ,  a t  67 1 (emphasis added) . Merrick Garland makes a 
s imilar argument. See Garland, supra note 203,  at 4 8 7 .  
208 . See Elhauge, supra note 203 ,  at 682-96.  
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contexts .  In the first  posture, the claim is made that  a s tate s tatute is  
invalid because it is preempted by the Sherman Act .  This  i s  the familiar 
preemption question.209 As in the typical preemption context ,  enforce­
ment of a s tate s tatute will not be enjoined absent irreconcilable con­
flict with federal anti trus t  policy .2 1 0  When facially challenged, a state 
s tatute will be enjoined only if i t  mandates a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act without active state supervision.2 1 1 By contras t ,  conduct 
subject to the rule of reason may or may not be anticompetitive, and 
therefore a statute permitting such conduct does not inevitably conflict 
with the Sherman Act so as to require preemption . 2 1 2 
In the second context, a s tate s tatute is used defensively in an at­
tempt to avoid l iability for conduct that could otherwise violate federal 
antitrust law.2 1 3 In this s ituation, the question is typically couched in 
terms of whether the s tate statute "immunizes" the challenged con­
duct .  2 1 4 The issue however has less to do with implied immunity than 
209. See, e .g . ,  Parker v .  Brown, 3 1 7  U.S .  34 1 ,  350 ( 1 943)  (whether the California 
raisin marketing plan was preempted by the Sherman Act); California v .  ARC Am. 
Corp . ,  490 U.S .  93, I 03 ( 1 989) (whether s tate statutes permitting indirect purchasers to 
recover under s tate antitrust s tatutes were preempted by federal antitrust law's 
res triction on recovery by indirect purchasers) ; 324 Liquor Corp. v .  Duffy , 479 U.S .  3 3 5 ,  
343 ( 1 987) (whether New York statute mandating m:nk up above "posted' '  wholesale 
price was preempted by Sherman Act ) :  Rice v .  Norman Wil l iams Co . ,  458 U.S .  654, 659 
( 1 98 2 )  (whether Californ ia "designation statute" preventing unl icensed beverage 
importer from accep ting delivery was preempted by Sherman Act) ;  California Retail 
Liquor Dealers Ass 'n  v .  M idcal Aluminum, Inc . ,  445 U.S .  97,  1 02 ( 1 980) (whether 
California statute mandating resale price maintenance was preempted by Sherman Act) ; 
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md . ,  437 U.S .  1 1 7 ,  1 33 ( 1 978) (whether Maryland's 
prohibit ion on vertical in tegration in gasoline distribution was preempted by Sherman 
Act or Robinson-Patman Act ) ;  Bates v .  State Bar, 433 U.S .  350, 359 ( 1 977)  (whether the 
Supreme Court of Arizona's prohibit ion on attorney advertis ing was preempted by § §  1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act ) ;  Seagram & Sons,  Inc .  v. Hostetter, 384 U.S .  35,  4 1- 4 5  
( 1 966) ,  commerce clause analysis overruled by Healy v .  Beer Ins t . ,  I 09 S .  Ct .  249 1 ,  2502 
( 1 989) (whether l iquor price affirmation s tatute requiring brand owners to file prices 
with affirmation that prices are no higher than those in other states was preempted by 
Sherman Act) ; Schwegmann Bros. v .  Calvert Disti l lers Corp . ,  34 1 U.S .  384, 386 ( 1 95 1 )  
(whether Louisiana law authoriz ing price-fixing by l iquor retailers was preempted by the 
Sherman Act) . 
2 1 0 .  See Duffy , 479 U.S .  at 34 1 - 4 2 ;  Rzce ,  458 U.S .  at 659; Mldca l ,  445 U.S .  at 1 03 .  
2 1 1 . See Midcal,  4 4 5  U.S .  at  1 05 .  
2 1 2 . See Duffy , 479 U.S .  at  342.  
2 1 3 .  A subcategory of this second context involves the ant i trust l iabi l i tv of  
mun icipalities . See ,  e .g . ,  Fisher v .  C i ty  of Berkeley, 4 7 5  U.S .  260,  264 ( 1 986) ; Town o f  
Hall ie v .  City of Eau Claire, 4 7 1  U.S .  34,  38 ( 1 98 5 ) ;  Communi tv Communications Co. \ .  
City of Boulder, 455 U.S .  40, 4 8  ( 1 98 2 ) ;  City of Lafayette v .  Louisiana Power & Light 
Co. ,  435 U.S. 389, 394 ( 1 97 8 ) .  These cases raise somewhat different issues that are not 
relevant to the mat ters at hand. For a discussion of  these cases , see Elhauge, supra note 
203,  at 732-38. 
2 1 4 .  See. e .g . ,  Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc .  1 · .  lin i ted S tates ,  -t 7 l  
U.S .  -!8 ,  65 ( 1 985)  (whether truckers engaged in  collectin: ra ternaking au t h o rized and 
s upen·iscd b1 the states arc immune from anti trust l iabi l i tY) ; TntL'll of Hallie . -! 7 1  U . S .  �ll 
-t7 (11·hether mun icipalitv's a n ticompcti t il'c activit ies a n:' protected fro m  ant i t nt s t  
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i t  does with whether, in the specific factual circumstances , the Sherman 
Act preempts an arguably inconsistent s tate s tatute .2 1 5 The cases hold 
that when the s tate acts directly in its sovereign ,  legislative capacity , 
there is no antitrus t  liabili ty .2 1 6 When, however, the s tate authorizes 
private action, the test for antitrus t  immunity as articulated in California 
Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal A luminum , 2 1 7  is whether the con­
duct is both clearly authorized and actively supervised . 2 1 8  Authoriza­
tion of the conduct must be clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed in order to ensure that it is a s tate policy rather than merely 
private action .  Conduct must also be actively supervised by the s tate 
itself-for example, by actually setting prices or by reviewing the rea­
sonableness of prices set by private parties-in order to prevent s tates 
from "casting . . .  a gauzy cloak of s tate involvement over what i s  essen­
tially a private price-fixing arrangement. "2 1 9 
a. Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Act . - Consider firs t the 
Sherman Act facial preemption analysis  of the Indiana Control Share 
Acquisitions Act ( ICSA) ,220 the s tatute upheld agains t  Williams Act 
preemption and dormant Commerce Clause challenges in the landmark 
CTS case .  ICSA conditions the transfer of voting rights on approval by 
a majority of the pre-existing disinterested shareholders . By denying a 
bidder voting rights until approval , ICSA eliminates competition to 
tender by allowing shareholders collectively to decide  whether or not  
the bid should proceed .22 1 Moreover, under ICSA, the choice of 
whether or not to eliminate competition to tender is  left to  the share-
l iabi l i ty) ; Hoover v .  Ronwin, 466 U.S .  558,  567-68 ( 1 984) (whether bar exam grading 
committee immune from antitrust l iabil i ty) ; Louisiana Power & Light, 435 U.S .  at 394-408 
(whether c i ty is immune from antitrust l iabil ity by virtue of i t s  identity as a city and 
without a specific s tate authorization) ;  Cantor v .  Detroit Edison Co . ,  428 U.S .  579, 
592-98 ( 1 976) (whether defendant ut i l i ty immune from antitrust l iabi l i ty by v irtue of 
s tate public uti l i ty commission approval and enforcement of rates ) ;  Goldfarb v .  Virginia 
S tate Bar, 4 2 1 U.S .  7 7 3 ,  786 ( 1 975)  (whether state affiliation of  bar association 
immunizes i t  from l iabil i ty for setting minimum rates) .  
2 1 5 . See, e .g . ,  Community Communications Co. , 455 U.S .  a t  60-7 1 (Rehnquist ,  J . ,  
dissenting) . For a counter-argument,  s ee  Harry First ,  Private Interest and  Public 
Control: Government Action ,  the First Amendment, and the Sherman Act, 1 97 5  U tah L. 
Rev. 9,  4 3 - 45 .  
2 1 6 . See, e .g . ,  Parker v .  Brown, 3 1 7  U.S .  34 1 ,  352  ( 1 94 3 ) ; Hoover, 4 6 6  U.S .  a t  
567-69 ( 1 984) ("Thus , under the Court's rationale in  Parker, when a state legis lature 
adopts legislat ion, its actions constitute those of the State . . .  and zpso facto are exempt 
from the operation of the antitrust laws . " ) ;  Bates v .  S tate Bar, 433 U .S .  350, 360 ( 1 97 7 ) ;  
Goldfarb , 4 2 1 U.S .  at  788.  
2 1 7 . 445 U.S.  9 7  ( 1 980) . 
2 1 8 . See id .  at 1 05;  Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc .  v. Uni ted 
States, 4 7 1 U.S .  48, 57 ( 1 985) . 
2 1 9 . Southenz .\/otor Canzfrs , 4 7 1 U.S .  at 62 n .23  (quoting .1 /idral ,  445 U . S .  a t  l OG ) .  
2 2 0 .  I nd .  C o d e  Ann . § §  2 3 - 1 - 4 2 - ! to  23- 1 - 42 - 1 1 (vVest 1 989) . 
22 1 .  See CTS Corp . v. Dmamics Corp . ,  48 1 U.S .  69, 83 n . 7  ( 1 98 7 ) .  Indeed .  some 
have defended s tate takeover l egis la t ion on the grounds that i t  faci l i t a t es j us t  th is  sort of  
jo in t  bargaining. See ,  e . g . ,  Oesterle ,  supra note  1 9 , a t  G5-G6.  
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holders and managers , who have the ability to opt into the provisions of  
the statute during a transition period or to  opt out thereafter. 
Under an antitrust federalism analysis ,  ICSA would not be facially 
preempted because i t  does not mandate conduct, and because the con­
duct authorized (the elimination of competition among shareholders to 
tender) is unlikely to be considered a per se  violation of Section 1 . 222 
As such , ICSA would not create any irreconcilable conflict with the 
Sherman Act .  
But suppose the question arose in the second context :  a bidder 
alleges that the shareholder vote authorized by ICSA constitutes a con­
tract ,  combination or conspiracy in res traint of trade under Section 1 
because i t  eliminates competition among shareholders to tender. 
Shareholders of the corporation defend by asserting that the vote was 
authorized by ICSA and therefore exempt from antitrust  liability. 
Because ICSA simply provides a mechanism by which interested 
and politically unaccountable shareholders may eliminate competition 
to tender, i t  falls on the private action side of the private action/state 
action dichotomy.223 ICSA therefore protects shareholders from any 
antitrust liability only if it meets the two prongs of the Midcal tes t :  the 
restraint of competition is "one clearly articulated and affirmatively ex­
pressed as state policy" and the policy is actively supervised by the state 
itself. 224 
The first prong is easily satisfied: ICSA, by its terms ,  authorizes 
the shareholders to bargain collectively by means of the shareholder 
vote on the transfer of voting rights .  By contrast ,  the "active supervi­
sion" requirement seems to be absent .  No s tate actor or agency regu­
lates the substantive terms of the transaction .225 ICSA shares the 
critical defect of the wine and liquor price posting cases ,226 namely, it 
222 .  See supra notes 2 1 0-2 1 1 and accompanying text. 
223 .  The decis ion to opt  in or to opt out of the terms of  a state takeover statute has 
been viewed as private, not state action .  See. e.g. , Moran v .  Household Int"l ,  Inc. , 500 
A.2d 1 346. 1 353 (Del .  l 985) ; john C. Coffee, Jr . ,  The Future of Corporate Federal ism, 8 
Cardozo L. Rev. 759,  774 ( 1 987 )  ("Action taken by shareholders pursuant to enabling 
legislation is private action which nei ther offends the Commerce Clause nor is 
preempted by the Will iams Act . " ) ;  Prentice, supra note 1 87 ,  at 80; see also CTS ,  48 1 
U .S .  at 94 n . l 4  (because the Court decided the case on other grounds, it did not reach 
question of whether a corporation's decision under ICSA is purely private actJvitv 
beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause) . 
224 .  ,\!ideal ,  445 U .S .  at 1 05 .  
225 .  See, e .g . ,  Patrick v .  Burget, 4 8 6  U .S .  94 , 1 0 1  ( 1 988)  ("The active supervision 
prong of the Mldcal test requires that state officials have and exercise power to review 
particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that fai l  to accord 
with state policy ." )  (quoted in Elhauge, supra note 203 ,  at  693) ;  see also Elhauge, supra 
note 203, at 695 ( "state action immunitv applies onlv when a financial ly disinterested 
s tate o ffic ial  controls the terms of the cha llenged res t rain t ." ) . 
n6.  See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Du ffv , 4 79 U . S .  335  ( 1 98 7 ) :  Cal ifornia Retai l  Liquor 
Dea lers Ass'n , . . i\l idcal Alum., Inc. ,  445 U.S. 97 ( 1 980) : Schwcgmann Bros .  v .  Calvert 
D i s t i l l ers Corp .. 34 1 U . S .  384 ( 1 95 1 ) .  
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allows private parties to set the price .227 The only supervlSlon is pro­
vided by the s tate through judicial scrutiny of a contest for control and 
would seem to be inadequate to satisfy the active supervision require­
ment for s tate action immunity. 228 
If this analysis i s  correct, ICSA provides no immunity from any an­
titrust liability to which shareholders would be subject  for eliminating 
competition to tender.229 That, of course ,  leaves open the underlying 
question of whether elimination of competition to tender raises any 
substantial antitrust  issue at all .230 
b .  Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes . - The analysis of directors ' 
duty or nonshareholder constituency (NSC) s tatutes ,  versions of which 
have been adopted by numerous s tates , would proceed in the same way 
as the ICSA analysis .23 1 In a typical s tatute of this sort, target managers 
are permitted or required to consider the interests of nonshareholder 
constituencies in responding to a tender offer.232 
An NSC s tatute, like a control share acquisition s tatute,  delegates 
the decision to opt out of competition for control to an interested party 
who is not politically accountable .  In both cases, while the " clear artic­
ulation" requirement has arguably been satisfied, "active supervision" 
is lacking. As such , the s tatutes fail to meet the requirements of the 
Parker doctrine.  233 
But while the Parker analysis is similar, the underlying antitrus t  
227 . See Elhauge, supra note 203 , at 684-85 .  The Court indicated that the cases 
would have been viewed different ly if the s tatutes had mandated a specific mark up or if 
the s tate had set the prices or reviewed their reasonableness. See Duffy , 479 U .S .  at 344 
n .6 ;  Midcal,  445 U .S .  at 1 05-06 & n .9 .  
228 .  See Patrick v .  Burget, 486 U.S .  94 ,  1 0  i ( 1 988) (holding that  subsequent 
judicial review of physician staff privileges decision does not consti tute adequate s tate 
supervision) . 
229. The most attractive feature of ICSA from the tradit iona l  corporate law 
perspective, namely, collective action by shareholders, see, e .g . ,  Donald C. Langevoon, 
The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on  CTS Cmp. 
v. Dynamics Cmporation of A.merica . 1 0 1  H arv . L. Rev. 96, 1 04 ( 1 987 ) , thus proves most 
troubling from the antitrust perspective. 
230. See supra text accompanying notes 1 7 1 - 1 76 .  
23 I. .  For a discussion of NSC s tatutes , and  citations to  state enactments, see  Mil lon,  
supra note 1 34,  a t  240- 46.  
232 .  See, e .g . ,  15  Pa . Cons.  Stat .  Ann. § §  5 1 5 , 1 7 1 5  (Supp.  1 99 1 )  (direc tors may 
consider nonshareholder interests )  and Conn.  Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33 -3 1 3 (  e) (West Supp. 
1 99 1 )  (directors must cons ider nonshareholder interests) . For a more complete 
discussion and addit ional citat ions,  see M il lon,  supra note 1 34 ,  a t  240- 46.  
Unlike the control share acquis i tion s tatutes, of which ICSA is a typical example, the 
NSC statutes cannot be in terpreted as shareholder protective measures. See Johnson & 
Mil lon,  supra note 1 85 ,  at 848-53 .  Rather, the goal of such s tatutes seems to be to 
protect nonshareholder constituencies indirectly from the effects of a competitive 
market for control by granting management greater discretion in re�ponding to bids .  
233.  In terms of  the anti trus t federalism analysis ,  a statute that gave discretion to 
the state's Secretary of State to permit or prohibit tender offers-the sort of  statute at 
issue in Edgar v .  M ITE, 457 U .S .  624 ( 1 982)-would fare better. Unlike ICSA or an 
NSC statute, such a statute would satish· the Parkn re4uirements because the decision to 
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analysis poses some different issues .  While ICSA provides a mecha­
nism for competing shareholders to eliminate competition to tender, an 
NSC s tatute removes the decis ion from the shareholders entirely, giv­
ing to target management the essentially unreviewable power to decide 
whether or not a bid will succeed . This raises the question whether the 
threshold "concert of action" requirement for applicability of Section l 
is present. Unlike ICSA, the NSC s tatute would not seem to involve 
any concert of action between competing shareholders . 
Somewhat oddly, this does not seem to be a problem within the 
Parker doctrine. The Supreme Court held in both A1idcal ,234 and 324 
Liquor Corp. v.  Duffy 235 that s tate s tatutes mandating posting of liquor 
and wine prices by wholesalers and maintenance of those prices by re­
tailers constituted resale price maintenance even though no agree­
ments were present between wholesalers and retailers . In substance, 
the Court held that if the effect of the s tate s tatutes was to mandate 
behavior which, if voluntary, would have been a violation of Section 1 ,  
then that was sufficient for purposes of the concert of action require­
ment. 236 The limitation on competition to tender imposed by NSC 
s tatutes involves as much concert of action as was present in the liquor 
and wine pos ting cases .  
If  Professor Elhauge is correct that the key to understanding the 
satisfaction of the concert of action requirement in the wine and liquor 
cases is whether the person or entity setting the terms is financially in­
terested,237 the analysis of the NSC statutes becomes clearer. As in 
A/ideal and Duffy , the NSC s tatutes are problematic because they elimi­
nate competition and delegate the setting of the terms to a financially 
interes ted party , target management .  
Now contrast ICSA and the NSC statutes with the earlier form of 
takeover legislation involved in AIITE . 23'?'. At issue in ;'vl!TE was a s tat­
ute that granted discretion to the Illinois Secretary of State to block a 
tender offer if the Secretary believed that i t  was necessary to protect the 
shareholders of the target company . 239 The effect of the s tatute would 
have been to remove covered corporations from the competitive mar­
ket for control . 240 Leaving aside the extraterritorial impact of the 
eliminate competit ion for c o n trol wou l d  be de l ega ted to a disin terested a n d  p o l i t i c a l l v  
accou n t a b l e  actor. 
234 .  445 U.S. 97 ( 1 980) . 
235 .  479 U .S .  335 ( 1 987 ) .  
236 .  See  .\!ideal ,  445 U.S .  at  1 03 ;  Dujfy , 4 79  U .S .  a t  342 .  
237 .  Sec  E1hauge,  supra note  203 ,  at  687-88. 
238. Edgar v .  MITE Corp., 457 U .S .  624 ( 1 982) . 
239 .  See id .  at 626-2 7 .  
240. The I l l inois statute appl ied to a m  
corpora t i o n  or other i s s u e r  of  securi t ies of  w h i ch s h a rehol ders loca t<:d i 1 1  
I l l i nois  own 1 0 '}1o o f  t h e  c l a s s  o f  e q u i t v  securi t ies  s u bj ec t  t o  t h e  offer ,  or fo r 
\\· hich anv t wo of t h e  fo l l o w i n g  t h r<:e c o n d i t i o n s  are met:  the corpor�t t i o n  h a s  
i t s  princi pal execu t i v e  o H1ce i n  I l l i n o i s .  is  organ i z ed u n der t h e  la \\ S o f  I l l i n o i s .  
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Illinois statute and the resulting burden on interstate commerce-the 
basis upon which the majority held the statute uncons ti tu tional-anti­
trus t  federalism identifies an important difference among the different 
s tate takeover s tatutes . 
The Illinois s tatute, like ICSA and the NSC s tatutes,  displaced 
competition for control .  But the Illinois s tatute differed in that i t  
granted the power t o  veto a transaction t o  the Secretary o f  S tate, an 
arm of the sovereign . Because the decision to eliminate competition 
for control was vested in a disinterested, politically accountable actor, 
unlike ICSA and the NSC s tatutes , i t  would l ikely have sa ti sfied the re­
quirements of the Parker doctrine . 24 1  
Finally , the antitrust perspective provides some ins igh t  into a re­
maining aspect of s tate takeover legislation : that it so often seems to be 
the anticompetitive product of concentrated efforts of financially inter­
ested actors . Nonshareholder consti tuencies-target management, em­
ployees, suppliers , cus tomers, and local and s tate governments-have 
been, or have perceived themselves to be,  losers in the competitive 
market for control. Banding together, they have been remarkably suc­
cessful in achieving legislatively what they have been unable to achieve 
by bargaining: insulation from hostile tender offers . 
Although such collective activities may be anticompetitive from an 
antitrus t perspective, they are clearly not prohibited by the Sherman 
Act. In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight ,242 the 
Court construed the Sherman Act to permit collective efforts by rail­
roads to disadvantage competing truckers through the enactment of 
favorable legislation partly because an al ternative construction would 
raise serious constitutional ques tions.  Even if one interprets NSC s tat­
u tes as the anticompetitive product of collective action by non­
shareholder constituencies ,  such activity would fall squarely within the 
scope of the Noerr doctrine . 243  
3 .  State Takeove1· Legislation and Takeover Defenses . - Both courts and 
commentators have noted the incongruity of holding s tate takeover 
s tatutes preempted by the Williams Act or precluded by the dormant 
Commerce Clause while permitting various private defensive measures 
that are substantially more effective at defeating tender offers . 244 
Poison pil ls have generally been conceded to be beyond the reach of 
or has at least I 0 %  of i ts stated capital and paid-in surplus represented wi thin 
the State. 
457 U .S .  at 627 (c i t ing Ill .  Rev. S ta t . ,  ch .  1 2 1  1 /2 ,  �I 1 37 . 52- 1 0  ( 1 979) ) .  
24 1 .  Cf. Town o f  Hall ie v .  Ci ty of Eau Claire . 47 1 U .S .  34 , 46 n . l O  ( 1 985 )  ( " I n  cases 
in which the actor is  a state agency, i t  i s  likely that active state supervis ion would also not 
be required,  although we do not  here decide that issue. " ) .  
242.  365 U . S .  1 27 ( 1 96 1 ) .  
24 3 .  The .\'oerr doctrine would l ikewise protect col lect in: at temp ts  t o  i n fluence the 
Secre tarY of  State in s i ll lat ions in  which he or she had the po,,-cr to block a tender offer. 
244 .  See Prent ice.  supra note 1 87 ,  a t  79-80;  Morgan Shipman,  In Defense of 
Reasonable State Regula t ion o f  Tender Offers. 53  Brook. L Rc\ · .  99.  1 02 ( 1 98 7 ) .  
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the Commerce Clause and the Williams Act .245  This  incongruity is fur­
ther evidence of the limits of relying on Commerce Clause and 
Williams Act preemption analysis . A s trength of the antitrus t  perspec­
tive is that it provides a more satisfactory analysis of the relation be­
tween s tate takeover legislation and private defensive measures .  
Whi le  neither the Commerce Clause nor the Williams Act  reach 
private agreements restraining competition in the market for control , 
the Sherman Act could .  Absent clear articulation and active supervi­
s ion,  s tate corporate law permitting such private action will not insulate 
it from review under the Sherman Act, any more than s tate law permit­
ting mergers will insulate the merger from review under the Sherman 
Act and Clayton Act .246 To the extent that poison pills are authorized 
under s tate common law,24 7  the s tate does not provide any active sub­
s tantive control over the terms of the transaction. As a result ,  the anti­
trus t  analysis makes the validity of these private restraints on 
competition for control depend entirely on the antitrust  issues 
presented: whether defensive measures are agreements with respect to 
matters as to which the parties compete; and , if so,  whether the agree­
ments ,  on balance, are procompetitive or anticompetitive .  By contrast ,  
although the Commerce Clause and Williams Act analyses can, with a 
bit  of pushing and pulling, examine the effects of s tate takeover legisla­
tion on competition for control ,  neither contains any doctrinal basis to 
justify examining more potent " private" defensive measures . 
Indeed, the previous discussion of antitrust federal ism justifies 
treating state takeover legis lation differently from private action that is 
equally or  more effective in restraining competition for control .  The 
Parker doctrine suggests that if the res traint is, indeed, the action of the 
state, then antitrust  federalism dictates that deference be shown. On 
the other hand, if  the conduct i s  private action, no such deference is 
appropriate. On this view, the incongruity in prohibiting s tate takeover 
legislation while permitting more effective private defensive measures 
becomes clear: things are upside down . One can justify on principies 
of antitrust federalism, but not on Commerce Clause or Williams Act 
grounds, greater deference to state takeover legislation than to private 
defensive measures , so long as the s tate action is not simply a "gauzy 
cloak" over what in essence is a private restraint of trade .  
4 .  The insight of A ntitrust Fedemlism o n  Sta te Takeover Legisla tio n . -
Finally and most critically, what does the antitrus t  federalism analysis 
245.  Professor Coffee argues t h a t  " [ a ]ct ion taken by s hareho l d ers pursuant to 
ena b li ng legis lat ion is private act ion which neither offends the commerce clause nor is  
preempted by the Will iams Act ." Coffee ,  s upra note 2 2 3 ,  at  7 7 4 .  
2 4 6 .  In  t h e  l egendary .\"m·thrrn Smm ties c a s e .  t h e  S upreme Court h e l d  that the fa c t  
t h a t  a merger 1vas au thori zed un der s t a t e  corpor::J t e  iaw did n o t  i n s u la t e  i t  fi·om t-e1·icw 
under t h e  S herman Act .  See Northern S e c .  Co. \ .  Uni ted States .  1 93 U . S .  1 9 7 ,  32 1 ,  
3 2 6-'2 7 '  3 3 2-3 3 .  344- 4 5  ( 1 90-! ) .  
2-!7.  See. e.g . .  �foran 1 .  H o u � choid i n < ' i .  lnc  . .  SOO A . . 2d 1 3-f() ,  I �b l -53 ( D e l .  1 9H S ) .  
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tel l  us about the relation between s tate takeover legislation and our na­
tional commitment to competitive markets ,  including a competitive 
market for corporate control? The lesson of the jurisprudence of anti­
trust federalism is that the national commitment to competitive markets 
is more limited than one might initially think: despite occasional over­
s tatements, federal antitrust  policy is directed at preventing private 
agreements displacing competition .  With respect to genuine s tate at­
tempts to opt for regulation in place of competition, no national policy 
s tands in the way . To the contrary, the national competition policy al­
lows states to adopt alternatives .  If a s tate believes that competition is 
not suitable for the market for corporate control ,  just as  it might decide 
that competition is not suitable for the retail dis tribution of electric 
power, the s tate is free to choose a regulated alternative , so long as it 
can do so in a way that does not conflict with the dormant Commerce 
Clause or some other provision of the Consti tution . 
But this notion of antitrust federalism incorporates s ignificant lim­
its .  A s tate cannot simply grant i ts citizens immunity from the Sherman 
Act and the pressures of competition,248 whether the favored obj ects of 
concern are wine and liquor distributors ,249 lawyers ,250 doctors ,25 1 
shareholders, or s takeholders . I t  may only insula te its corporations 
from the competitive market for control if i t  does so with clear articula­
tion and active supervision . 
CoNcLuSION 
I have argued for an alternative way of thinking about corporate 
law issues at the boundary between firms and markets . Conceptually, 
the traditional fiduciary duty jurisprudence cannot go beyond asking 
whether management's actions are in the in terests of shareholders . So 
long as management acts in shareholders' in teres ts ,  a fiduciary duty 
based jurisprudence cannot give any weight to costs imposed on others 
by management's elimination of competition among shareholders . In 
the paradigmatic corporate governance context, namely collective ac­
tion to minimize agency costs ,  this inability i s  innocuous because, as to 
these matters, shareholders are not  competitors . But at the firm/mar­
ket boundary , where shareholders are also competi tors , agreements 
eliminating that competition raise serious concerns that mirror those 
traditionally recognized and analyzed within the antitrust  rubric .  
The claim of the preceding pages is that the antitrust perspective 
casts s ignificant l ight on this set of corporate law issues . I have argued 
that antitrust  provides an important perspective on attempts to elimi-
248.  See Parker v .  Brown, 3 ! 7  U . S .  34 ! ,  3 5 ! ( 1 94 3 ) .  
2 4 9 .  S e e  3 24 Liquor Corp. v .  Duffv . 4 7 9  U . S .  3 3 5 .  34 1 ( 1 98 7 ) ;  Cal ifornia  Reta i l  
L iquor  Dealers ...\ s s 'n  \ .  i\l idcd Alum . .  Inc. , -! 4 5  U . S .  9 7 .  I ! 0  ( 1 9 H0) ; Sch\\ cgmann Bros .  
\ . Calvert Dis ti l l ers Corp . .  34 1 li S. 384 . 3 8 6  ( 1 9 5 1 ) . 
2 5 0 .  Sec Goldfarb \ .  \ ' i rg in ia  S ta te  Bar .  4 2 1 l' . S .  7 7 3 .  7S8 ( I  9 7 5 ) . 
25 i .  See Patrick \. Burget .  4 8 b  L . S .  94.  9 7  ( 1 98 8 )  
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nate competition among shareholders to tender, either by means of an 
agreement or by means of such functional equivalents as the use of 
poison pills by loyal management to act as shareholders ' bargaining 
agent .  Similarly, the anti trust  perspective provides a necessary s tep in 
appraising the shifting coalitions among shareholders , among s take­
holders , and between them. Finally, antitrust provides a missing link in 
the analysis of s tate takeover legislation in that the question whether 
and how s tates may opt out of a competitive market for corporate con­
trol is first and foremost a question of antitrust  federali sm.  
Whether bidders should put a Section l count in their complaints 
challenging poison pills ,  if  an when hostile tender offers revive, remains 
an open question. But if one becomes convinced that antitrust pro­
vides an appropriate framework within which to analyze agreements 
el iminating competition among shareholders to tender, then the natu­
ral next s tep (and it is  a s ignificant s tep requiring addi tional argument) 
may be for bidders to argue and courts to hold that joint  shareholder 
bargaining agreements and their functional equivalents can violate the 
Sherman Act. 
The bad news is that, if  I am right, or a t  least reasonably convinc­
ing, corporate law types will need to learn antitrust . 252 But more fun­
damentally, as we continue to take seriously the insights of  the theorists 
of the firm and the metaphor that a firm is a network of contracts ,  we 
have no choice but to ask whether certain sorts of coroorate contracts l 
are "contract [ s ] ,  combination[s ]  in the form of trus t  or otherwise ,  or 
conspirac[ ies ] ,  in restraint of trade or commerce."25:> 
252 .  As antitrust is worth s tudying for i tself, that should not be too bi t ter a p i l l  to 
swallow. 
2 53 .  Sherman Act § I ,  1 5  li . S . C . § I ( 1 988) . 
